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Abstract 
As part of the development of the European electricity grid, the EU has decided that ‘Smart 
Meters’ should be installed in 80% of the households of the EU by 2020. It is expected that 
this will lead to a reduction of energy use in the residential sector in the order of 10%. Driven 
by the so-called ‘Information-Deficit’ model, a critical assumption in this policy development 
is that provision of information, via ‘Smart Meters’, enables energy end-users to make more 
informed, and thus better, decisions in relation to their energy service demands (e.g. lighting). 
However, even if there is some evidence that feedback to consumers stimulate an efficient use 
of energy, the magnitude of this reduction is debated. In fact, findings from behavioural 
economics suggest that behavioural biases (e.g. loss aversion) and cognitive limitations restrict 
end-users from displaying purely rational behaviour, which in turn limits the effect (and policy 
expectations) of policies applying the information-deficit model. The thesis at hand addresses 
these issues explicitly and provides empirical analyses of how behavioural biases affects 
consumers’ response to energy-related information. To that end, experimental research 
covering eight field exercises and a Smart Meter experiment was conducted. The thesis aimed 
to generate knowledge about the applicability and implications of using behavioural 
economics to deliver feedback to electricity consumers. With due limitations, the experiments 
illustrate that a knowledge-gap exists, and that information can help correct consumer 
behaviour, but that the framing and salience of this information can affect the magnitude of 
the response. The Smart Meter experiment on loss aversion took place in a real-life setting 
where consumers actually used and paid for the electricity. Results show that the intervention 
group reduced its electricity use, and that those reductions were larger than those found for 
the reference group (for both daily and standby consumption). Compared to related research, 
findings revealed that reductions in electricity use were also larger than the average electricity 
reduction found in other studies of feedback on electricity use. As a whole, it is concluded that 
feedback information can contribute to efficient electricity use and thus contribute to meeting 
EU policy targets. However, the (expected) effects depend on how feedback is designed, 
framed and presented. The Smart Meter experiment indicates an enhanced effect on electricity 
use reduction as a result loss aversion, but further research (e.g. large scale trials) is needed for 
more conclusive and statistically significant results. 
 
Keywords: Feedback, Electricity, Smart Meter, Behavioural Economics, EU policy 
Information Feedback, Behaviour, and ’Smart Meters’ 
III 
Executive Summary 
The amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere is 
increasing, which is leading to global climate change. The increasing levels of GHG are 
attributed largely to human activities, such as the consumption of fossil fuels. As the world’s 
energy system still largely relies on the consumption of fossil fuels, a significant part of global 
anthropogenic GHG emissions stem from energy and electricity demand, a significant part of 
which arise from energy demand in buildings and residential areas. Emissions from this sector 
reached 9.18 gigatonne CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) in 2010, equal to 19% of all global 
emissions, more than a third of which (3.5 GtCO2e in 2010) can be directly attributed to 
electricity use in residential buildings (IPCC, 2014). To mitigate climate change, the European 
Union (EU) and its Member States have introduced numerous policy efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions. Due to the significant energy demand from buildings and residential areas, 
reductions in this sector is expected to play a key role in meeting the EU policy targets of a 
20% reduction in GHG emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy use, and a 20% increase 
in energy efficiency (EE) by 2020. 
As part of their climate and energy policy portfolio, the EU has mandated the rollout of Smart 
Meters in all European households by 2020, where deemed economically a net-benefit as 
assessed by cost-benefit analysis (Directive 2009/72/EC). Smart Meters provide information 
on electricity use, which is expected to overcome the market failure generated by asymmetric 
information and other transaction costs on the part of the consumers. The EU expects the 
introduction of Smart Meters to result in a reduction in electricity use as a result of better 
information to consumers; a policy approach classified as an information-deficit model, which 
assumes rationality on the part of the consumer. This thesis argues that information alone will 
not necessarily be sufficient to induce changes to consumer behaviour, as certain cognitive 
and emotional factors preclude humans from displaying perfectly rational behaviour, as 
understood in neoclassical economics. Taking insights from behavioural economics as a 
starting point, this thesis argues that the way information is presented to households has an 
impact on how it is perceived and acted on. 
Aim 
The objective of the thesis at hand is to explore how theoretically and empirically grounded 
biases from behavioural economics work in a real-life setting, which can help determine the 
role of behavioural economics for increasing the effectiveness of Smart Meters. It is argued 
that there is a lack of knowledge on if and how findings from behavioural economics can 
inform the provision of feedback to consumers, and what the effects of this would be. By 
conducting a number of field-based preference-choice exercises and a Smart Meter 
experiment, and subsequently analysing data, an effort is made to determine what the effect is 
on electricity consumption of using different types of framing and biases in information 
provision and feedback. Using the installation of Smart Meters in Denmark as a case study, 
the aim of this thesis is to point at the importance of carefully considering how feedback on 
electricity is designed. In turn, the thesis aspires to contribute to improving energy efficiency 
policies, primarily in the EU, by informing policymakers of the need to look beyond the 
simple information-deficit model when designing policies. 
The research questions that this thesis sets out to answer are: 
• Which behavioural biases, as suggested by behavioural economics, are applicable 
when consumers are faced with energy-related decisions or provided with 
information on electricity consumption? 
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• Using insights from behavioural economics, what may be the expected energy 
efficiency improvements on electricity use as a result of Smart Meter deployment, 
particularly in the field of controlled customer feedback? 
• To what extent can research findings support and be utilized in public policy 
design? 
Methodology 
Different methods of data collection and analysis were used to conduct this research. Data 
was collected across various sources to increase objectivity, and the collected material was 
analysed using both qualitative and quantitative methods. An extensive literature review of 
related or applicable research was also carried out. The choice exercises and experiments 
conducted aim to test the effect of a number of behavioural biases on consumer behaviour 
with regards to electricity use and energy-related decisions. The preference-choice exercises 
tested five specific biases; above-average bias, information overload, salience, loss aversion, 
and defaults, while the Smart Meter experiment focused on two of biases: salience and loss 
aversion. The knowledge generated from these experiments is used to determine which biases 
could be applicable, when providing consumers with information using Smart Meters. 
The aspects analysed in this thesis departs heavily from behavioural economics. However, the 
research and findings are also framed and supported by different schools of economics, 
including neoclassical, institutional, and energy economics. From a methodological point of 
view, it is expected that the application and use of different disciplines facilitates more 
comprehensive insights on how the provision of information affect end-use behaviour with 
regards to energy and electricity use, and what implications this could have for related EU 
policy goals. 
Main findings 
The results shows that humans are prone to several behavioural biases when faced with 
decisions relating to energy and electricity use, which have implications for the way in which 
information is understood and acted upon. 
It is found that consumer knowledge of electricity is low, confirming that a knowledge gap is 
likely to exist. It is also confirmed through conducting several preference choice exercises that 
making information salient can lead to behaviour change. In one exercise, information salience 
had a significant effect on purchase decision, which led to selecting goods that consumed on 
average 7% less electricity per year. The exercises also show that implicit discount rates are not 
static, but changes depending on framing and salience of information. Contrary to 
expectation, it was revealed that the incumbent plan had no effect on electricity plan selection, 
leading to speculation that Smart Meters can be used to increase the amount of consumers on 
variable tariff plans. The loss aversion choice exercise revealed that framing an EE decision as 
avoiding a loss rather than obtaining a gain increases the willingness to undertake an EE 
investment with an uncertain rate of return. As perceived riskiness possibly contribute to 
presence of the EE gap, understood as the slow diffusion of profitable EE technologies that 
fail to achieve market success, this indicates that changing the frame in these decisions can 
help narrow this gap. 
The choice exercises were carried out in an artificial real-life setting, as participants’ decisions 
had no influence on their real-life situation, meaning that the external validity of the results is 
fairly low. However, the exercises could easily be tested in real-life settings, where decisions 
had consequences, and the tentative indication of an effect calls for further testing. 
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Analysing consumption data from a number of Smart Meters installed in the greater 
Copenhagen region revealed that the average effect of installing a Smart Meter was a reduction 
in consumption of 6.6%. In the loss aversion experiment conducted, the group not subjected 
to loss aversion (reference group) reduced their daily electricity consumption with 7% on 
average, while those subjected to loss aversion (intervention group) reduced their 
consumption by 18%. The reduction in standby consumption was 3% for the reference group, 
but 25% for the intervention group. Reviewing literature on the effect of feedback indicate 
that providing feedback results in electricity reductions of 1-13%, though effects were found 
to be heterogeneous, and further research is needed to determine the effect of feedback. 
The Smart Meter experiment on loss aversion took place in a real-life setting where consumers 
actually used and paid for their electricity. This means that the results have a high external and 
ecological validity, as the experiment took place in the home of the participants, indicating that 
this effect is likely to be found even if implemented in real life. The very specific context 
makes replicating the experiment difficult (low internal validity), which means that the effect 
found in this case cannot be assumed to be of the same magnitude once scaled to a 
population. If previous large-scale feedback trials are any indication, effects in a population of 
applying loss aversion feedback is assumed to be in the order of 4-6%. In any case, the clear 
indication of an effect in both instances (daily and standby consumption), and the likelihood 
of replication in real-life situations, calls for large-scale trials to further test this.  
Conclusions and recommendations 
It is concluded that a knowledge-gap exists, and that information can help correct consumer 
behaviour. However, the framing and salience of this information can affect the response of 
end-users and the resulting order of magnitude of efficiency improvements. The work 
conducted as part of this thesis confirms that behavioural biases exist when end-users are 
faced with electricity and energy-related decisions. In turn, these biases are likely to affect the 
decisions made by end-users. The experiments indicate that at least two of these biases; 
salience and loss aversion, can be utilised when providing feedback to consumers using Smart 
Meters, and that this is likely to increase the effectiveness of said feedback. 
With due limitations, the thesis provides evidence that Smart Meters can lead to reduced 
electricity use, at least in the short to medium term, but that these meters alone are unlikely to 
lead to the sustained behaviour change required to meet EU policy goals. However, the results 
indicate that the right combination of behavioural insights, informative policy instruments and 
Smart Meter technologies can lead to significant reductions in energy use, which can help 
close the EE gap and potentially achieve or even surpass the EU policy target. These policy 
developments also need to take into account a much larger mix of policies, including market-
based incentives and regulatory aspects. 
The research has implications for policy makers, academia as well as industry. To policy-
makers, because it highlights that information is not just about quantity, but that a policy 
prescribing the delivery of information to consumers need to take into account how the 
information is designed, framed, and presented. To academics, because it highlights that our 
knowledge on the effect of information on human (economic) behaviour with regards to 
energy consumption is incomplete, and that findings from behavioural economics can possibly 
contribute to filling this knowledge gap. Finally, the research is important to utility companies 
and others working with electricity end-users, as it demonstrates that behavioural insights can 
likely be employed to change consumer behaviour, e.g. inducing customers to save electricity 
overall and at peak hours, or increase the uptake of EE measures. 
Simon Bager, IIIEE, Lund University 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the reader to the background for conducting this thesis, defines the 
research problem and outlines a relevant research gap worth exploring. The objectives of this 
thesis are presented along with the research questions that this thesis set out to answer, before 
the scope and delimitations are provided. Finally, a number of ethical considerations in 
relation to this thesis are outlined, before the audience to whom this work is relevant is 
presented. The chapter ends with a disposition that outlines the rest of this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Climate change and energy use 
Unsustainable patterns of production and consumption of energy has led to increasing 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as other air 
pollutants, such as NOx, SOx and soot (IPCC, 2013). Since the advent of the industrial 
revolution around 1750, when energy consumption began rapidly increasing, the atmospheric 
concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere have increased (IPCC, 2013). The radiative forcing 
of the gases has led to an uptake of energy by the climate system, which along with feedback 
loops and the storage of energy by the climate system, influences the rate and magnitude of 
global climate change (IPCC, 2014). Critically summarising and analysing existing research 
conducted by the scientific community, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), has concluded that the warming is “unequivocal” (IPCC, 2013), and that human 
activity, especially the burning of fossil fuels, is the main driver of these changes. Such 
increases in temperature are likely to have environmentally detrimental consequences such as 
sea level rise, flooding, ecosystem degradation, and land use change, as well as lead to loss of 
human lives due to an increase in frequency and severity of natural disasters, such as 
hurricanes and floods (IPCC, 2013). The risk of such disastrous events unfolding have led to a 
decision among the governments of the various states to work towards keeping the 
temperature rise in global average temperatures below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels to 
avoid ‘dangerous climate change’ (Hansen et al., 2013). However, due to economic growth 
and increasing demand for many goods, annual GHG emissions keep rising, and grew on 
average by 1.0 gigatonne carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) (2.2 %) per year from 2000 to 
2010, faster than in any of the last three decades of the 20th century, where emissions grew on 
average 0.4 GtCO2e (1.3 %) per year (IPCC, 2014). Projections show that without additional 
effort, current emission patterns will result in global mean surface temperature increases in 
2100 from 3.7-4.8 °C, well above the ‘dangerous’ threshold. 
Energy demand from buildings and residential areas contribute a large part of the total 
demand for energy and electricity, and thus a significant part of global anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. In 2010, buildings accounted for 32% of global final energy consumption and 51% 
of global electricity consumption (IPCC, 2014), and in the European Union (EU), direct 
energy use in households accounted for 26.2% of energy use in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014). GHG 
emissions from the building sector reached 9.18 GtCO2e in 2010, equal to 19% of all global 
emissions (IPCC, 2014), and more than a third of this (3.5 GtCO2e in 2010) can be directly 
attributed to electricity use in residential buildings (IPCC, 2014). Between 1990 and 2005, final 
electricity consumption in the EU increased by 1.7 % a year on average, and The International 
Energy Agency (IEA) (2010) projects electricity demand to grow more strongly than any other 
final form of energy. The IPCC expects electricity consumption to grow between 110 and 
260% to 2050 (Barker et al., 2007, p. 48), driven by economic growth and technological 
changes, such as the advent of electric cars (Verbong et al., 2013). 
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1.1.2 Climate change mitigation and energy efficiency policy 
To mitigate climate change, the EU and its Member States have introduced numerous policy 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions – with the residential sector and increased energy efficiency 
playing a key role. In the EU, binding targets for a 20% reduction in GHG emissions, a 20% 
share of renewable energy use, and a 20% increase in energy efficiency1 (EE) by 2020, has 
been implement as part of the 2009 climate action and renewable energy package (Directive 
2009/72/EC)2. If the targets are met, the expenditure on energy could be reduced by more 
than EUR 100 billion annually by 2020, while avoiding the emissions of ~0.78 GtCO2e per 
year (DG Energy, 2007). 
Within the energy efficiency context, large cost-effective savings potentials have been 
estimated for the EU residential sector, partly due to its large share of total energy 
consumption (DG Energy, 2007). Reducing GHG emissions in the residential sector through 
energy efficiency improvements can be done in basically two ways: 1) by reducing use of 
energy through energy conservation, i.e. curtailing the use of products and service, such as 
switching off appliances, and 2) by increasing EE, i.e. decreasing the energy use needed to 
meet energy service demands and/or deliver goods and services consumed by households 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005)3. Wall and roof insulation, along with a switch from incandescent to 
LED light bulbs and greater appliance efficiency, offer large potentials to save energy (DG 
Energy, 2007; McKinsey & Co., 2010). The full energy savings potential towards 2020 is 
estimated to be around 27% of total energy use by the sector. If this can be achieved, the EU’s 
total energy consumption would be reduced by ~11% (DG Energy, 2007). 
The high energy-use, and large potentials for energy efficiency gains and reduction of 
consumption, makes the household sector an important target for policies aiming to reduce 
GHG emissions (e.g. Benders et al., 2006; Dietz et al., 2009; Vandenberg et al., 2010, Attari et 
al., 2011). Reductions in GHG emissions and increases in EE by the household sector are 
expected to be key factors in determining whether or not the EU meets its policy targets. The 
EU considers EE to be one of the most cost-effective ways of reducing GHG emissions (EC, 
2011a, p. 2) relative to other abatement opportunities, such as increased penetration of 
renewable energy or retrofitting older power plants (McKinsey & Co., 2010)4. 
To tap these EE potentials in the most cost-effective way, the EU and its Member States have 
deployed a great variety of specific policy instruments5, including regulatory instruments, 
                                                
1 Energy efficiency (EE) is defined by the EU as “the ratio of output of performance, service, goods or energy to the input of 
energy” (EC Directive 2012/27/EU article 2(4)). As such, increasing energy efficiency means getting the same service or 
performance (e.g. heating, cooling) or good while using less energy. However, there are various degrees of EE for any 
good or service; that which is theoretically possible (i.e. limited only by physics); that which is technically possible (given 
only technological constraints); that which is cost-effective in a market setting, and finally; that which is actually achieved 
(Mundaca, 2008). 
2 Negotiations towards the updated targets for 2030 are on-going, with new preliminary targets of a 40% reduction in GHG 
emissions and a 27% share of renewable energy consumption, while no specific target has been set for EE at this point 
(European Council, 2014). 
3 Studies reviewed in this paper were aimed at both efficiency and/or curtailment behaviors, with the latter somewhat 
overrepresented. This is striking, because the energy-saving potential of efficiency behaviors is considered greater than that 
of curtailment behaviors (see e.g. Gardner & Stern, 2008). 
4 Murphy and Jaccard (2011) question this assumption and finds that EE policies show “a more modest potential to reduce 
GHG emissions at a given marginal cost”, and a smaller contribution “relative to other abatement opportunities” (p. 
7146). Without going into much detail on this discussion, this thesis takes the position that while EE measures are 
important, they should not be seen as a panacea for climate change mitigation. 
5 Policy instruments can be understood as the operational forms of interventions by which public authorities seek to change 
behaviour and achieve the policy objectives set out (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998). In literature, two ways of chategorising 
policy instruments can be identified (Mundaca, 2008). The common definition, as given by Vedung (1998, p. 30) are: (i) 
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market-based instruments (MBI), and voluntary standards (VS) or informative policy 
instruments (Carter, 2007; Mundaca, 2008; Stavins, 2001), with the objective of addressing the 
unsustainable consumption of energy in the residential sector. Regulatory instruments, 
sometimes labelled ‘command-and-control,’ are the most widely used policy instruments in 
environmental policy, and imply setting standards, such as ambient, emission or design 
standards, in order to control the release of pollutants entering the environment (Carter, 
2007). Critique of this approach has led to a greater use of MBIs, the aim of which is to 
prevent market failure by internalising the external costs of pollution (Carter, 2007). MBIs 
include environmental taxes, such as effluent charges, deposit-refund schemes, and tradable 
permits (Stavins, 2001), such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (Carter, 2007)6. VS aim to 
encourage actions to protect the environment by individuals or organisations, but these “are 
neither required by law nor encouraged by financial incentive” (Carter, 2007, p. 329), unlike 
the first two instruments. In the context of residential energy use, typical examples are 
information campaigns, e.g. providing information on the (environmental and/or financial) 
benefits of energy saving; awareness-raising activities, such as alerting citizens to the impact of 
climate change; or eco-labelling, where consumers are informed of the energy use of a given 
product (Carter, 2007). 
Information generally has public-good attributes and tends to be underprovided by the market 
(Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a), meaning that individuals bear the cost (temporal, cognitive, and/or 
monetary) of obtaining the information. This means that consumers lack information or face 
asymmetric information, which, in the context of energy use, leads to lower uptake of EE 
measures and less energy reduction than predicted by economic theory; a market failure. The 
rationale behind informative policy instruments is to correct this market failure by providing 
information, effectively reducing the transaction costs and uncertainties inherent to many 
energy-related decisions (Mundaca, 2008; Mundaca et al., 2013). The theoretical assumption is 
that this information asymmetry is preventing consumers from exercising rational choice and 
maximising their personal utility (Micklitz et al., 2011) by undertaking these EE measures. 
Historically, European consumers have inferred knowledge about their electricity demand 
through billing estimates and infrequent meter readings, which display the consumption in 
kilowatt-hours (kWh) as a cumulative total. This means that consumers have not had 
information on the impact of their energy-related actions, as the total figure obscures the 
impact of various daily energy use habits (van Elburg, 2009). 
1.1.3 ‘Smart Meters’ and European Union energy policy 
In order to strengthen the mix of the informative policy instruments and address the lack of 
information that users have about their electricity use, the rollout of electronic electricity 
meters, so-called Smart Meters, is essential (Giordano et al., 2011; Christensen et al., 2013a). 
The deployment of Smart Meters is critical to the development of Smart Grids7, as the meters 
                                                                                                                                              
regulatory measures (e.g. mandating use of certain technologies), (ii) economic instruments (e.g. subsidies for energy-
efficient goods), or (iii) informative instruments (e.g. energy-use labels). The approach more common in environmental 
policy-making literature includes a distinction between regulatory instruments, market-based instruments (MBI), and 
voluntary standards (VS) (Carter, 2007; Mundaca, 2008; Stavins, 2001). 
6 However, it should be noted that Stavins (2001, p. 3) classifies MBIs as belonging to one of four major categories: pollution 
charges; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. 
7 To stave off impending challenges to the electricity grid, such as increasing fluctuations to the supply caused by renewables 
with intermittent production capacity (Christensen et al., 2013a), and increasing demand due to the electricification of 
society (e.g. electric vehicles) (Verbong et al., 2013), the EU is in the process of developing a smart electricity grid. Even 
though there is some agreement as to what constitute a smart grid (Christensen et al., 2013a), the term, owing to its 
novelty, is rather vaguely defined and the terminology is still developing7 (Darby, 2010). It conveys a future scenario where 
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provide the technological prerequisite for communication between end-users and suppliers 
(Christensen et al., 2013a). Smart Meter functionalities vary from model to model, but 
generally include measuring and displaying electricity consumption in quantity (kWh) and over 
time and the cost of this, communication capabilities, storage and transfer of data, supporting 
dynamic tariffing and payment systems, communication with and remote disablement and 
enablement of electricity and individual devices within the home, and information transfer to a 
display or other equipment, such as a smart phone or tablet (after Owen & Ward, 2006; 
Hoenkamp et al., 2011)8. 
In the EU, the development accelerated when the Energy Services Directive (ESD) (Directive 
2006/32/EC) required energy suppliers to provide consumers with competitively priced, 
accurate, individual meters that provide information on time-of-use (art. 13, sub1) and 
accurate billing based on actual consumption (art. 13, sub 2), prompting the first installation of 
Smart Meters in some EU countries. The Third Energy Package (Directive 2009/72/EC) 
created common rules for an internal market in electricity and laid the groundwork for an 
efficiently managed electricity network. The directive encouraged smart grids and prescribed 
that EU Member States (MS) should replace at least 80% of traditional electricity meters with 
Smart Meters by 20209, where this was deemed a net benefit as assessed through cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) (applying neoclassical economic analysis), a goal which was reiterated in the 
updated EE Directive (2012/27/EU). MS were free to decide on their own implementation 
strategies (DG IPOL, 2012), which, consequently, have led to MS taking different routes in 
terms of timing and technology regulations (Schleich et al., 2013). A 50% rollout target is set 
for 2015 (Covrig et al., 2014) (Figure 1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1 – EU policies relevant to the Smart Meter deployment (Author, partly after Flath et al., 2012). 
The EU envisions several benefits to result from the introduction of Smart Meters, which, by 
and large, include reduced operating costs, improved functioning of market mechanisms, 
                                                                                                                                              
the main energy providers, i.e. the central power plants and the network of decentralised power generation, e.g. wind and 
solar, communicate with end-users to balance supply and demand. 
8 Using Darby’s (2010) words, Smart Meters are primarily ‘non-dumb’, i.e. they communicate electronically. As such, it is “not 
always necessary to replace a meter in order to achieve smartness: a ‘dumb’ meter can be ‘smarted’ by retrofitting it with 
communications capability” (p. 445). It is important to add that electronic consumption displays (also known as “In-home 
Displays” (IHD) and widely used in the UK), are not Smart Meters, but merely add-ons to Smart Meters, although they are 
often referred to as such (Darby, 2010). 
9 Directive 2009/72/EC (Annex I): “Where roll-out of Smart Meters is assessed positively, at least 80 % of consumers shall 
be equipped with intelligent metering systems by 2020.” 
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increased security of supply, and expected energy savings (DG IPOL, 2012). At the grid level, 
they can help generate GHG emissions reductions and improve supply management, leading 
to fewer blackouts. To the utility, they are intended to reduce transmission costs and improve 
customer relations, among other things. At the user level, the meters can generate better and 
more frequent feedback to households, which should lead to demand reductions and cost 
savings, and induce consumers to shift the time of consumption to fit generation capacity 
(Christensen et al., 2013b; Darby, 2010; Martiskainen & Coburn, 2011; Verbong et al., 2013, 
Covrig et al., 2014). Hoenkamp et al. (2011) identifies five interested parties in the Smart 
Meter roll out case: the metering industry, the DSOs, the electricity suppliers, the EU, and the 
electricity consumers (the public). 
However, and despite numerous policy expectations and arguments, at present, only Sweden, 
Finland and Italy have implemented rollout of Smart Meters on a larger scale. A total of 16 
MS will proceed with large-scale rollout of Smart Meters by 2020 or earlier, three MS have 
opted for selective rollouts to some customers, and four MS had negative or inconclusive 
CBAs leading to no plan for a rollout (EC, 2014)10 (Figure 1-2). Based on these assessments, 
MS have committed to rolling out close to 200 million Smart Meters, and it is expected that 
almost 72% of European consumers will have a Smart Meter for electricity by 2020 at a total 
investment cost of €35 billion (Covrig et al., 2014). The average cost of installing a Smart 
Meter is assumed to be €223±€143, while the expected average benefit per metering point is 
€309±€170 (Covrig et al., 2014; EC, 2014). The lifetime of the meter ranges from 8 to 20 
years with an average of 15±4 years (EC, 2014, p. 5). 
  
Figure 1-2 – Smart Meter rollout in the European Union (Author, after Covrig et al., 2014). 
                                                
10 Full roll-out by 2020: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Particular groups: Germany, Latvia and Slovakia. No meters: Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Portugal. Finally, four Member States (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary and Slovenia) had not 
conducted a CBA when JRC evaluated the national proposals (July 2013) (Covrig et al, 2014, p. 13). 
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The European Commission and most EU Member States find that the perceived overall 
benefits to society of installing Smart Meters exceed the costs (Giordano et al., 2011), but as 
neither consumers nor suppliers are able to capture all these benefits (Owen & Ward, 2006), 
regulatory intervention has been needed to ensure the rollout of Smart Meters. In fact, some 
critical voices (e.g. Klopfert & Wallenborn, 2011; Ernst & Young, 2013) question whether the 
rollout will be an overall benefit to society, and argue that especially customers might not be 
able to capture all of the benefits envisioned. The EU have identified six distinct consumer 
benefits from the installation of Smart Meters (Borchardt, 2014): (i) Generate energy savings 
by helping consumers to reduce their consumption; (ii) Increasing energy efficiency by helping 
consumers master their consumption and realise potentials for energy efficiency; (iii) Provide 
innovative services by enabling customers to obtain innovative smart home and home 
automation services; (iv) Fostering consumer empowerment by improving competition in 
retail markets, (v) Protecting the environment, as less energy consumption and higher energy 
efficiency lead to lower GHG emissions; and (vi) Increased distribution system efficiency and 
lower distribution costs. Hoenkamp et al. (2011), in line with most research on the subject (see 
e.g. Joachain & Klopfert, 2013) argue that reductions in energy consumption is the main 
consumer benefit expected to arise from the rollout of Smart Meters, though it can be argued 
that accurate billing is also an important feature (e.g. this was the main rationale behind the 
rollout in Sweden) (Jennings, 2013). 
The core assumption is that providing feedback to customers will lead to more efficient 
electricity use and reduce overall demand through improved energy management (e.g. during 
peak loads). That information should lead to change can be viewed as an ‘information-deficit’ 
model, where the theoretical assumption is that more information leads to increased 
awareness and knowledge, which leads to changes in energy-use behaviour and a resulting 
efficient use of energy. An example of such a model can be found in several studies (e.g. 
Wilhite & Ling, 1995; Matsukawa, 2004; Abrahamse et al., 2005). Much European consumer 
policy, including the energy and environmental fields, is based on the information-deficit 
model and the assumption of the rational consumer (Micklitz et al., 2011; Gowdy, 2008): 
Verbong et al. (2013) conducted 37 interviews with known expert in the energy sector and 
found that the dominant perspective among the experts was to describe the individual as 
‘homo economicus’11 (Verbong et al., 2013, p. 121).  
The Smart Meter policies implemented by the EU in recent years generally follow the same 
line of thought. The central assumption behind the mandatory disclosure of information is 
that provision of information enables consumers to regulate their demand12. The implicit 
assumption is that it is only asymmetric or lack of information that prevents people from 
making rational choices, and that if the right combination of regulations and economic 
policies are supported by informative policies delivering precise information to customers, 
their behaviour will change accordingly. Reviewing the current EU legislation (Directives 
                                                
11 Homo economicus is understood to be an entity which acts rationally according to self-interest in order maximise personal 
utility (Frank, 1997; Camerer, 1999). 
12 This was first mentioned in the preamble to ESD (Directive 2006/32/EC): “In order to enable final consumers to make 
better-informed decisions as regards their individual energy consumption, they should be provided with a reasonable 
amount of information thereon,” (sub 29). Article 13 (sub 2) went further and stated that: “Billing on the basis of actual 
consumption shall be performed frequently enough to enable customers to regulate their own energy consumption,” 
which was deemed to be one month. The updated energy efficiency directive (2012/27/EU), which repealed the ESD, 
went further and prescribed that information on historical consumption shall include cumulative data for three years, as 
well as time of use for any day, week, month and year for the last 24 months (art. 10, sub 2 a, b). The directive stated that 
the provisions given in the ESD had not “led to customers receiving up-to-date information about their energy 
consumption, or billing based on actual consumption at a frequency which studies show is needed to enable customers to 
regulate their energy use” (Directive 2012/27/EU, preamble, sub 32), though no clear indication was given as to what 
studies that showed exactly what frequency was the optimal. 
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2006/32/EC, 2009/72/EC, 2012/27/EU), reports (e.g. Giordano et al., 2011; Covrig et al., 
2014) and communications (EC, 2011a), it becomes clear that improving feedback via Smart 
Meters is a key policy means towards meeting the 20-20-20 targets, under the expectation that 
regulation on the frequency and timing of feedback will raise consumer awareness, improve 
knowledge, change behaviour, and help overcome any information-related market barriers in 
order to reduce energy consumption: “…being able to follow their actual electricity 
consumption in real time gives consumers strong incentives to save energy and money” (EC, 
2011b). The EU estimates that Smart Meters should reduce “annual household energy 
consumption by 10%” (EC, 2011b) as a result of feedback on consumption13. This assumption 
is also present in national CBA assessments of the Smart Meter rollout (Giordano et al., 2011). 
In their analysis of the CBA’s conducted by MS, the EU Joint Research Centre (Covrig et al., 
2014) found that “most of the EU Member States addressed the energy savings, in terms of 
electricity consumption, as one of the main benefits associated with Smart Metering 
deployment.”  
1.2 Problem definition 
The popularity of the information-deficit model in both academic and policy circles is due to 
the simple policy recommendation: correct market and behavioural failures by providing 
consumers with better or more (technical) information, e.g. through Smart Meters. Despite its 
popularity in policy circles, the information-deficit model has been widely criticised in the 
academic literature, both on epistemic grounds (e.g. what is “the fact”?) (Owens & Driffill, 
2008), and by researchers emphasising that the policy builds on an understanding of the 
consumer as a rational being, perfectly able to act on the information provided. Findings from 
other academic areas, such as psychology (e.g. Bell et al., 1996; Stern, 2000a; b; 2011; Gifford, 
2011) and sociology (e.g. Bourdieu, 1977; Hargreaves, 2011), suggest that matters are more 
complicated than correcting market and behavioural failures through the provision of 
information. The authors have highlighted the importance of aspects such as values, beliefs, 
and attitudes, as well as the impact of social norms shared by distinct groups of people. 
As the expectation of household reduction of electricity consumption features prominently in 
the EU policy on Smart Meter deployment in Member States, whether this reduction 
materialises is of importance. To this end, studies focusing on how the provision of feedback 
by Smart Meters can potentially lead to reductions in electricity consumption or changes in 
energy-related investment decisions that could, in turn, lower energy consumption, are an 
important strand of current research (Joachain & Klopfert, 2013). Until recently, little was 
known about the effects of providing feedback14 on energy behaviour using Smart Meters, but 
                                                
13 The expectation that provision of information will lead to reduced consumption is pervasive in EU writings on the subject. 
They feature in reports by the Joint Research Centre (Covrig et al., 2014, p. 96): “Effective deployment and use of the 
Smart Metering systems will add additional value to the consumers and society in general, leading to reduced amount of 
CO2 emissions. This can be achieved as a result of energy savings and more efficient use of electric energy and higher 
electricity network operational efficiency. Smart Metering systems also help […] make the consumers aware of the CO2 
associated to the electricity they consume”); in communications from Directorate Generals (DG): “With Smart Meters, 
consumers will benefit from enhanced knowledge of their energy consumption. Moreover, given the right conditions in 
place, it is expected that a number of improved customer services will allow individual households to make energy savings 
and financial savings” (DG IPOL, 2012, p. 8). Smart Meters “will provide consumers with the incentive to shift and 
possibly also cut their consumption” (DG IPOL, 2012, p. 55); and on EU websites: “Following energy consumption in 
real time allow consumers to control their energy bills better” (DG Energy, 2014). 
14 Providing feedback can be defined as “actions taken by (an) external agent(s) to provide information regarding some 
aspect(s) of one’s task performance” (after Kluger & DeNisi, 1996, p. 255). From a psychological point of view, “feedback 
is effective when it activates a discrepancy between behaviour and normative beliefs” (Schultz, 1998, p. 33). The 
discrepancy can be eliminated by raising performance to the desired level, adjusting the normative belief, or rejecting the 
feedback message (Schultz 1998 after Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), suggesting that feedback will not necessarily lead to 
“improved” behaviour. 
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trials in the UK and Netherlands (Kinzig, 2014; AECOM, 2011), as well as newer academic 
studies (Drozdowski & Vandamme, 2013; Gans et al., 2013; Grønhøj & Thøgersen, 2011; 
Pyrko, 2011; Schleich et al., 2013) are making up for this lack of research. Kluger and DeNisi 
(1996) argue that feedback researchers have mostly disregarded the research that suggests that 
the effect of feedback on performance is “variable”, which has led to a widely shared 
assumption that feedback consistently improves performance. They argue instead that 
feedback “have highly variable effects on performance, such that in some conditions 
[feedback] improve performance, in other conditions [it has] no apparent effects on 
performance, and in yet others [it] debilitate performance.” Over the years, several electricity 
feedback studies have been conducted using various means of communication (summary 
studies include Abrahamse et al., 2005; Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Faruqui, 2010b). Many of 
these studies have been based on rational choice theories with the implicit notion that 
information about energy consumption and its cost will raise awareness and thereby induce 
behaviour change (this problem is noted by e.g. Hargreaves et al., 2010 and Martiskainen & 
Coburn, 2011). 
Modern research on human behaviour in response to energy use information is generally 
grounded in two main shifts away from the information-deficit model and the understanding 
of the consumer as a fully rational agent: a practice theoretical approach15 focusing on the power of 
social norms and practices (Hargreaves, 2010; 2011; Gram-Hanssen, 2013) and a behavioural 
economics approach proposing the limited rationality of humans and the influence of automatic 
judgments as explanations of why humans do not make energy-saving decisions to the degree 
predicted by neoclassical economic theory (Baddeley, 2011; Newell & Siikamäki, 2013; Gilbert 
& Zivin, 2014; Kallbekken et al., 2013). BE relies on empirical studies to infer the actual 
behaviour of individuals, rather than derive axiomatic assumptions from theory. The central 
tenant of behavioural economics (BE) is that cognitive, emotional and social factors influences 
how information is understood and limits the possibility to display purely rational behaviour, 
which affect human (economic) decision-making (Kolstad et al., 2014)16. 
                                                
15 In practice theory, the focus is not on the behaviour of the individual human being, but rather on the social and societal 
organization of practices that humans engage in; how they form, reproduce, are maintained, stabilized, challenged or 
discontinued (Hargreaves, 2011). The theory draws heavily on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977), i.e. 
the values, norms and behaviour of a given social group that is obtained through the activities and experiences performed 
by the social group as part of daily life (Scott & Marshall, 2009). Practices are to be understood as the “broad cultural 
entities that shape individuals’ perceptions, interpretations and actions within the world” (Hargreaves, 2011, p. 79). In this 
way, practice theory opposes the understanding of human action as a consequence of rational and informed choices 
(Christensen et al., 2013b, p. 2287), leaving little space for the rational individual found in neoclassic economic theory. 
From a practice theoretical approach, humans do not “consume electricity as such, but rather perform practices through 
which electricity is consumed” (Christensen et al., 2013a, p. 336), and the theory thus takes a fundamentally sociological 
view of behaviour as shaped by society. 
16 BE has its origins in the relationship between (social) psychology and economics (Etzioni, 2011), and generally, can be said 
to be the study of the interaction between cognitive psychology and economics, focusing on individual decision-making, 
or, to use “psychology to inform economics, while maintaining the emphases on mathematical structure and explanation 
of field data that distinguish economics from other social sciences” (Camerer, 1999), but it is not straightforward to define, 
and no one single definition exist. The Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Simon, 1987) defines BE thus: “Behavioural 
economics is concerned with the empirical validity of these neoclassical assumptions about human behaviour and, where 
they prove invalid, with discovering the empirical laws that describe behaviour correctly and as accurately as possible. As a 
second item on its agenda, behavioural economics is concerned with drawing out the implications, for the operation of the 
economic system and its institutions and for the public policy, of departures of actual behaviour from the neoclassical 
assumptions. A third item on its agenda is to supply empirical evidence about the shape and content of the utility function 
(or of whatever construct will replace it in a empirically valid behavioural theory) so as to strengthen the predictions that 
can be made about human economic behaviour. Thus, behavioural economics is best characterized not as a single specific 
theory but as a commitment to empirical testing of the neoclassical assumptions of human behaviour and to modifying 
economic theory on the basis of what is found in the testing process” (Simon, 1987). Lunn (2014, p. 20) goes further and 
argues that BE can be defined as “the application of the inductive scientific method to the study of economic activity.” 
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Taking insights from BE as a starting point, it is argued that the way information is presented 
to households has an impact on how the data is perceived and acted on. Research on BE 
argues that the (social) context in which information is presented, understood as the choice 
architecture, along with heuristics (rules-of-thumb), biases and salience influence how humans 
respond to information and make decisions (Sunstein, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). As such, while 
consumers facing energy-related decisions often lack information or face a cost to obtain it, 
they more importantly lack expertise in and mental capacity to translate this information into 
appropriate action (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Kahneman, 2003). The reduction in electricity 
use that is expected to materialise as a result of feedback from Smart Meters, will likely have 
limited effect if the right type of information and feedback mechanisms does not accompany 
the rollout. There needs to be an understanding of how consumers behave with regards to 
electricity decisions to provide this information in a way that has the largest impact. In that 
light, the introduction of Smart Meters and the opportunities for provision of detailed 
feedback about energy consumption is interesting (Steg, 2008). 
However, there is a lack of knowledge on if and how findings from behavioural economics 
can inform the provision of feedback to consumers. In a stakeholder interview process, 
Martiskainen and Coburn (2011, p. 216) found that most agreed that it “is not yet clear what 
information should be displayed to consumers, how it should be displayed, and where the 
display device should be situated to encourage the greatest change in behaviours” (my italics). 
Because Smart Meter technology allows feedback to be tailored, modified, or in other ways 
adapted to the individual or household, knowing how to tailor feedback could increase the 
effect of the meters, helping to meet EU policy goals. The contention in this thesis is not that 
information provision does not work, but rather that due to inherent behavioural biases, it is 
not the merely the presence of information (the quantity), but also the quality, form, framing, 
and presentation of this information that affects how human behaviour with regards to energy 
and electricity changes as a result of this information. 
1.3 Objective and Research question 
Historically, research in BE has consisted of two components: (i) Identifying ways in which 
human behaviour differs from the neoclassical model, and (ii) demonstrating the implications 
of this behaviour in an economic context (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000). Recently, BE has 
come into fashion in both academic (e.g. Epstein, 2006; Gowdy, 2008; Bubb & Pildes, 2013; 
Amir & Lobel, 2008) and policy-making circles, especially in the US (e.g. Sunstein, 2013) and 
the UK (UK BIT, 2011, 2012), and some supranational organisations have even embraced the 
concept (e.g. Lissowska, 2011; van Bavel et al., 2013; Centre d’analyse stratégique, 2011)17. BE 
has gained ground due to mounting evidence that ideas rooted in neoclassical economics are 
insufficient in describing human economic behaviour as observed in real-life settings in a 
number of different fields (e.g. Danziger et al., 2011; Hanks et al., 2012; Shogren et al., 2010). 
Based on insights from experimental and behavioural economics (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1984; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; 1992; Camerer, 1999), and acknowledging the critique of the information-deficit model, 
as suggested by other academic fields (e.g. Owens & Driffill, 2008; Stern, 2000; Hargreaves, 
2011), this thesis takes the starting point that there is a need to think beyond the assumption 
that correcting a market failure through information provision per se can change consumer 
behaviour and lead to efficient use of electricity. In that regard, the installation of Smart 
                                                
17 The recent surge in behaviourally informed policy (Galley et al., 2013; UK Cabinet Office, 2010) is interesting, all the more 
that research in these areas have been on-going since the mid-20th century (e.g. Simon, 1959; 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and can perhaps even be traced to Vilfredo Pareto reformulation of choice theory at 
the beginning of the 20th century (Bruni & Sugden, 2007). 
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Meters offers an interesting research opportunity to better understand the role of BE to 
support energy efficiency policies and on-going efforts to reduce GHG emissions. 
The objective of this thesis is to explore how theoretically grounded interventions from BE 
work in a real-life setting. Taking a starting point in the current knowledge on human 
behaviour as understood by BE, it is studied whether known biases, such as default setting, above-
average bias, information overload, salience, and loss aversion, affect behaviour, when consumers are 
provided with information on electricity consumption or faced with energy-related decisions. 
By conducting a number of preference-choice exercises and experiments, and subsequently 
analysing data, an effort is made to determine what effect employing different types of biases 
has on electricity consumption and energy-related decisions. 
In particular, it is explored which biases are applicable to Smart Meter feedback, and what the 
expected effect on electricity consumption of applying these could be, as this can help 
determine the role of BE for increasing the effectiveness of Smart Meters. Therefore, the 
thesis at hand analyses if information provision through Smart Meters can be expected to 
correct information asymmetries and lead to reduced residential (household and individual) 
electricity consumption as anticipated by EU and national policy-makers, and whether 
applying behavioural insights can increase the effect of this information. 
Using the installation of Smart Meters in Denmark as a case study, the aim of the thesis is to 
point at the importance of carefully considering how feedback on electricity is designed taking 
into account applicable behavioural biases. In turn, the thesis aspires to contribute to 
improving energy efficiency policies, primarily in the EU, by informing policymakers of the 
need to look beyond the simple information-deficit model when designing policies, which can 
potentially contribute to a reduction in electricity consumption and a subsequent reduction in 
GHG emissions, and help realise policy goals. 
The research questions that this thesis sets out to answer are: 
• Which behavioural biases, as suggested by behavioural economics, are applicable when 
consumers are faced with energy-related decisions or provided with information on 
electricity consumption? 
• Using insights from behavioural economics, what may be the expected energy 
efficiency improvements on electricity use as a result of Smart Meter deployment, 
particularly in the field of controlled customer feedback? 
• To what extent can research findings support and be utilized in public policy design? 
As such, the aim is not to provide a final answer as to the effectiveness of the Danish and/or 
European Smart Meter policy, but rather to generate knowledge and provide a better 
understanding of the interplay between Smart Meters, economic decision-making, and 
efficient use of electricity in the residential sector. To determine the effectiveness of such 
interventions, a number of experiments are conducted and supported by an extensive 
literature review. 
1.4 Scope and (de)limitations 
The research carried out for this thesis took place over the course of the summer 2014 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. The data accessed and the participants involved in experiments all 
originate in this area, which means that to the extent that results are statistically representative, 
it will be only to this area. The study relies on only a limited amount of consumption data 
from Smart Meters, all of which concerns household in the study region. The data all comes 
from one company, although it was originally planned to have data from several companies, 
but the reluctance from the utility industry in sharing data complicated matters. This means 
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that the dataset is de-limited both temporally and spatially, and thus most likely not 
representative of all of Denmark, nor the EU. 
It was originally planned to conduct an econometric analysis, but due to the lack of conclusive 
statistical power caused by the small sample size, alternative analyses were conducted. 
The Smart Meter experiment conducted is based on a web-based solution where information 
is accessible to participants online. Energy monitors (In-Home Displays) were not used, and 
are only discussed briefly, where deemed relevant, as only a very limited number of European 
consumers will receive these monitors as part of the Smart Meter rollout.  
The literature analysis deals with the information available in scientific journals, consultancy 
reports, and government briefings to provide an overview of current findings. The analysis 
that follows is extensive, but it is not possible to provide a complete overview of the potential 
applications of behavioural economics to economic decisions regarding energy behaviour. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that this paper only focuses on individual and household 
electricity consumption, and that BE-based interventions applicable in this field might be 
different from those of another field (e.g. transportation).  
It must be acknowledged that most of the research that this paper builds upon, takes a starting 
point in high-income countries and the citizens of these countries, and that the findings of this 
paper thus might not be applicable in other cultural settings (Henrich et al., 2010). It should 
also be noted that the experiments involved subjects living in and around Copenhagen. 
Environmental awareness is fairly high in Denmark (EC, 2011d), and also tend to be higher 
among well-educated citizens (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) who are assumed to be 
overrepresented in the Copenhagen-region, which might limit generalizability. 
Emissions of GHGs from the energy system are affected by technological development, 
which can change consumer preferences and production systems. Although this thesis does 
acknowledge the importance of the structure of the energy system and the need for research 
with a systemic analytical view, the focus of the work at hand is on the demand side of the 
energy system, and as such, the impact of systems change will not be discussed further. 
As Smart Meter data on electricity consumption is collected from households and individuals, 
there is a need to consider the privacy aspects of this data, i.e. public access and availability to 
the data, as well as security concerns, i.e. hacking into, stealing, or unlawful distribution of the 
collected and stored data (Darby, 2012; Brown, 2014). The discussion of these issues, which 
no doubt deserves careful deliberation and is worthy of several studies and Ph.D.-projects 
alone, is not considered in this thesis. For an introduction to this topic, see e.g. Brown (2014), 
Efthymiou & Kalogridis (2010), European Data Protection Supervisor (2012). 
Finally, the ethics of using behavioural interventions, i.e. interventions designed to trigger 
certain behavioural responses or achieve a certain outcome are also not thoroughly considered 
here. Already a number of papers (e.g. Thaler & Sunstein, 2001; John et al., 2009; Goodwin, 
2012) and books (Kahneman, 2011; Sunstein, 2014) have been published on the topic, but 
there is no doubt that as the influence and ubiquity of behavioural interventions in public and 
private areas grow, there is a need to consider the practical, legal, and ethical aspects of this. 
Such deliberation is not found in this thesis. 
1.5 Ethical considerations 
The data collected from Smart Meters are sensitive data, as is the information that subjects 
provide as part of the various experiments. This data should necessarily be treated carefully 
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and kept anonymous, as data collected from Smart Meters can potentially be used for 
commercial or other purposes, while real-time data might be used to gain knowledge of which 
households are currently uninhabited (Darby, 2010; Gram-Hanssen, 2013), which raises 
security and civil liberty issues.  
The consent to use Smart Meter data was obtained from participants in the Smart Meter 
experiment (section 3.1.3), who were alerted to the experiment, and explicitly had to express 
their willingness to participate in the experiment. For ethical reasons, this was necessary, but it 
had the very unfortunate outcome that the sample size was significantly reduced. With one 
notable exception, the participants taking part in the experiments conducted as part of this 
study have been fully informed of the experimental setting and the goal of the study; the 
participants taking part in the Smart Meter study test group (loss aversion) were not alerted to 
the fact that they were being exposed to a psychological mechanism (loss framing), but only 
that they took part in an experiment, as it was assumed that them knowing the presence of the 
bias would influence the result. The researcher only knew which of the households that had 
been assigned what bias after the experiment had taken place, as this was assigned randomly. 
Participants for the questionnaire-based experiments were selected based on their age, as it 
was an explicit goal to get people paying the electricity bill in the household. The study 
location was also chosen to specifically represent a larger proportion of the population. All 
participants were asked to participate and were free to say no. Participants received no 
remuneration for participating. 
While complete objectivity can never be ensured, experiments were to the widest extent tested 
beforehand, and all findings, regardless of the impact on the theory under question, were 
subjected to the same statistical tests and methodological considerations. The results obtained 
are as accurately represented as possible, and all the material collected is available per request 
or in the extensive appendix, to ensure that other researchers can replicate the tests done.  
Shifting from a focus on the conduct of research to behavioural economics in general, one can 
eye potential ethical considerations. As BE relies on insights from psychology, it uses findings 
from this field to ‘improve’ or alter decision-making. That a decision can be improved is a 
normative statement that some would probably find offensive. Strategies such as ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ or ‘nudging’ (e.g. Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) rely on 
knowledge of human behavioural patterns to achieve certain outcomes (e.g. choose X rather 
than Y). The ethical implications of this are potentially severe, as it comes dangerously close to 
restraining the free will of human beings through policy or experimental design. So far, this 
topic has not been sufficiently debated in the literature, though potential implications for 
policy design have been discussed in some academic circles. These articles provide the starting 
point for a brief discussion of this towards the end of this thesis. While this is sufficient for a 
piece of work this size, if one were to implement behavioural interventions on a larger scale, 
e.g. in large-scale trials, a much more careful deliberation of this would be needed. A thorough 
discussion of this topic would require a Ph.D. project in itself, and is thus beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
1.6 Audience 
This research is primarily intended for policy makers at all levels, specifically those dealing 
with energy use at household and individual level, and will be especially important for those 
policy makers seeking to explore options that lie beyond traditional policy means (Bemelmans-
Videc et al., 1998; Carter, 2007). On the one hand, the research at hand can hopefully help 
generate new policies based on behavioural insights (ex-ante utilization). On the other hand, 
the findings in here can help explain why some electricity and energy-related policies worked 
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and others did not (ex-post utilization). Since the research builds on research conducted in 
American and European settings, it will most likely be of greater use to policymakers in these 
countries. 
However, the research might also be important to two other groups of people: academics and 
people working for (private/public) utility companies or other energy providers. To the first 
group because the research highlights potential knowledge gaps in our use of conventional 
economics, as well as behavioural economics, to reduce the negative externalities related to 
energy consumption. The research also outlines suggestions for further research within energy 
feedback to customers specifically and the effect of Smart Meters in general, as well as 
potential areas of interest in relation to energy efficiency and consumer behaviour. To the 
second group because it can help utility companies and DSOs get an understanding of why 
and how consumers use energy, as well as how information should be provided to customers 
to have the largest possible effect, which can potentially help reduce peak demand, cut costs, 
improve customer relations, and increase competitiveness. Finally, anyone with an interest in 
mitigating climate change, specifically by reducing energy consumption, through personal or 
group actions, might find the information contained here useful. 
1.7 Disposition 
Chapter 1 presented the reader to the relevant EU energy policies and the need to include 
behavioural considerations in policy making. The research questions were outlined, and the 
research limitations and considerations were mentioned. In Chapter 2, the conceptual 
analytical framework is presented and the theoretical assumptions and differences of relevant 
economic theories that are employed in this thesis are discussed. In Chapter 3, the research 
methodology is described and the choice exercises, experiments, data collection, and data 
processing conducted as part of this study are presented. In Chapter 4, the results of the 
exercises and experiments are presented. Chapter 5 discusses these findings in relation to the 
theoretical framework, the current knowledge, and the research questions, and provides policy 
and research recommendations for future studies. Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the main 
findings and lessons learned in the course of this research, highlights main research 
contributions and provides suggestions for further research. 
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2 Conceptual Analytical Framework 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a variety of conceptual considerations related to the 
provision of information on electricity and energy to consumers. The aspects analysed in this 
thesis build upon findings from different schools of economics, including neoclassical, 
behavioural, institutional, resource and energy economics to draw insights on how the 
provision of information affects consumer behaviour with regards to energy and electricity. 
2.1 Expected Utility 
Microeconomics, the study of individual economic decision-making and markets, has 
historically been theoretically dominated by neoclassical economic theory, in which market 
participants are assumed to be self-interested, fully rational, and act independently based on 
perfect information, which leads to Pareto-efficient allocation of resources and perfect 
competition (Frank, 1997; Endres & Radke, 2012). Environmental problems are understood 
as market failures, meaning that the problem lies with the market setup and the institutions 
(including lack of information), but not the way market participants actually make their 
decisions (Endres & Radke, 2012; Baddeley, 2011). The basic economic model for analysing 
individual decision-making is known as the theory of rational consumer choice (Frank, 1997). 
The rational choice theory, or expected utility theory, has enjoyed widespread popularity, 
partly due to the influence of the Chicago School of Economics, partly due to its elegant, 
mathematical structure. The theory is based on the idea that decision-makers weigh the 
expected costs and benefits of the range of options available before deciding on the one that 
maximises their utility (Frank, 1997; Endres & Radke, 2012; Jackson, 2005). The model 
assumes that preferences are well defined, stable and consistent (Frank, 1997). In energy 
research, it has been widely applied, for example to obtain consumer preferences for energy 
efficient appliances (e.g. Houston, 1983; Sathaye & Murtishaw, 2004; Lopes et al., 2012). 
Expected utility theory (EUT) can be attributed to the work of von Neumann & Morgenstern 
(1944) and is based on a set of axioms that are claimed to have normative rather than 
descriptive validity in the sense that they describe how individuals ideally should behave 
(normative) rather than how they actually behave (descriptive). There are four axioms, which 
can be formulated thusly (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984): 
-­‐ Transitivity: if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. 
-­‐ Substitution: if A is preferred to B, then an even chance to get A or C is preferred to an 
even chance to get B or C. 
-­‐ Dominance: if A is at least as good as B in every respect and better than B in at least one 
respect, then A should be preferred to B. 
-­‐ Invariance: if A is preferred to B, then this preference should not depend on the way in 
which A and B are described. 
In the experimental field research conducted for this thesis, it is tested whether framing of 
energy-related decisions leads to systematic violation of one or more of these axioms. If this is 
the case, this has implications for the way energy use information is presented (or to use the 
BE term, framed) to customers using Smart Meters, as it can potentially affect the decisions 
made, and as such, the effectiveness, of such information. 
Based on these axioms, one can (theoretically) determine an individual’s subjective probability 
and utility function by observing their true preference in structured choice situations (Frank, 
1997; von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). As such, the (neo-)classical economic 
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understanding of choice posits that individuals assess unknown situations by weighing the 
individual benefit or loss (the utility) of an outcome (Xi) by its probability (Pi)18: 𝑣 𝑃 = 𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑈(𝑋𝑖) 
where u is the function that measures the value of the outcome (Camerer, 1999, p. 10575).  
The model has been discussed extensively and challenged by economists, sociologists and 
psychologists alike (e.g. Frank, 1997; Henrich et al., 2001; Thaler, 2000; Hargreaves, 2011), but 
still enjoys some popularity and remain the basis for construing decision problems. It has been 
widely applied to assess how market participants should behave when faced with e.g. energy-
related decision, such as curtailment decisions or procurement of energy-efficient devices. Its 
normative nature ensures that it is widely used to recommend policy options that are expected 
to maximize utility for individual decision makers. In the context of this thesis, however, there 
is extensive research on numerous market failures and other aspects that, contrary to 
theoretical assumptions, prevent the dissemination of efficient technologies, and thus the 
materialisation of energy efficiency potentials and the reduction of GHG emissions. 
2.2 The ‘Energy Efficiency Gap’ 
The term ‘Energy Efficiency Gap’ is often used to describe the slow diffusion of profitable 
energy-efficient technologies that fail to achieve market success. As such, the EE gap does not 
concern the gap between what is theoretically or technically possible and actually achieved, but 
rather the gap between what should be cost-effective in a market setting and what is actually 
achieved; despite the very real economic and environmental benefits of procuring energy-
efficient technologies (Mundaca, 2008), people forgo EE investments, which net present value 
(NPV) calculations show to be cost-effective, such as procuring CFL’s or efficient fridges 
(Jaffe & Stavins 1994b; Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). A number of market barriers and failures 
have been suggested as explanations for this EE gap, e.g. lack of or asymmetric information 
and other transaction costs, high (implicit) discount rates, hidden costs, bounded rationality, 
principal-agent problem, negative externalities not reflected in energy prices, lack of sufficient 
capital, and uncertainty about risks, costs, and benefits (c.f. Mundaca, 2008; 2010; Sathaye et 
al., 2004; Sanstad and Howarth, 1994; Lucon et al., 2014)19. A major energy policy focus thus 
has been to reduce or overcome these barriers to encourage end-users (i.e. consumers) to 
undertake EE measures (Baddeley, 2011) 
The following sections present an overview of two important aspects, transaction cost and 
discounting, that have been proposed as causes or drivers for the existence of the EE gap, and 
which are worth exploring in detail. The first, because it relates to the provision of 
information and economic decision-making in the context of such information or lack 
thereof, the second, because it concerns how individual preferences for energy efficient goods 
depend on the valuation of current and future costs. 
                                                
18 According to EUT, decisions are evaluated in terms of total wealth, e.g. an offer to bet €10 on a coin toss is represented as 
a choice between an individual’s current wealth (W) and an even chance (0.5) to move to W + €10 or to W - €10 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). 
19 Another explanation of the EE gap is that some cost-effectiveness calculations are based on the economic situation in the 
average household, which means that there are household where installing a given technology will not be cost-effective. 
This is the explanation that some European nations use for not rolling out Smart Meters to households; they assume that 
Smart Meters will only be cost-effective for those with high consumption. Whether this assumption is correct is not 
known with certainty, but Schleich et al. (2013) find evidence that it does not hold. This question is not further explored in 
this thesis, as the data available was insufficient to explore this and it is beyond the scope of this work, but the question no 
doubt deserves further attention. 
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2.2.1 Transaction costs and information asymmetry 
The analysis of transaction costs is a fundamental component of New Institutional 
Economics, the focus of which is on “how transactions made by market agents are frequently 
based on imperfect and asymmetric information and how institutional frameworks influence 
the behaviour of these agents” (Mundaca et al., 2013, p. 4). Transaction costs, or as they are 
sometimes labelled, ‘the hassle factor’ (Fox-Penner, 2010, p. 143) can be understood as the 
costs that arise from transaction activities, but which are not included in the direct price of the 
good or service in question (Mundaca et al., 2013). For instance, transaction costs could be the 
costs of searching for and evaluating information on EE technologies or the costs associated 
with negotiating a deal (Mundaca et al., 2013). The approach is that transactions in markets are 
made by individuals that act on imperfect information (Mundaca et al. (2013), contrary to the 
assumption underpinning EUT that decision-makers are fully informed. Viewed from this 
theory, potential energy savings and energy efficiency investments fail to happen as a result of 
market failures, such as lack of capital, lack of information/information asymmetries, 
principal-agent problems, and split-incentives (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Baddeley, 2011). As 
such, TCs can slow or even hinder the diffusion and commercialization of EE technologies, 
which in turn can undermine the potential for GHG emissions reductions. Though TC’s come 
in many forms (Mundaca et al., 2013), only one will be discussed in detail here, namely 
information search costs. 
It is well known that imperfect or asymmetric information can lead to outcomes that deviate 
from Pareto optimal allocation (Endres & Radke, 2012; Faure & Skogh, 2003), and several 
researchers (e.g. Sanstad and Howarth, 1994; Ruderman et al., 1987) argue that this does in 
fact contribute to the EE gap. As an example, the cost of adoption of a new technology (e.g. 
information acquisition) is not included in calculations of cost-effectiveness, and as consumers 
are generally “poorly informed concerning the energy choices they face” (Howarth & Sanstad, 
1995, p. 106) they face a cost of obtaining this information, leading to lower than expected EE 
diffusion. For instance, Attari et al. (2010, p. 16055) in a survey found that although EE 
technologies are often more energy saving than curtailment, “only 11.7% of participants 
mentioned efficiency improvements, whereas 55.2% mentioned curtailment as a strategy for 
conserving energy.” Smart Meters should theoretically overcome some of these barriers 
stemming from asymmetric information, as consumers can be informed about the effect of 
various actions. The effect of information provision on consumer decisions is tested as part of 
the research for this thesis. In the same manner, sellers of goods that increase EE face costs in 
conveying this information to the consumers, especially if the EE relevant characteristics are 
not salient in market transactions (Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). The energy labels mandated by 
the EU are trying to make up for this by providing information on energy consumption for 
various goods, such as fridges. How the design of these affects consumption patterns is 
explored in an experiment for this thesis, as it is assumed that this can inform decision-makers 
on the way information should be presented to consumers using Smart Meters. 
If an economic analysis of the diffusion of EE technology does not take TCs into account, it 
will arrive at a higher diffusion rate than is feasible in real life, and thus overestimate EE 
potential and underestimate costs (Mundaca et al., 2013). For policy purposes, the important 
issue is therefore whether any interventions can reduce TCs when they occur (Sanstad & 
Howarth, 1994). As Coase (1960) pointed out, market failures will persist when transaction 
costs, perceived or real, exceed the benefits of undertaking the intervention20. The EU Smart 
Meter policy can in this regard be seen as a way of overcoming these transaction costs. 
                                                
20 The Coase theorem (1960) state that, in the absence of transaction costs (TCs), bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation 
of resources, regardless of the initial allocation of property rights (Faure & Skogh, 2003, p. 151) 
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However, Sathaye & Murtishaw (2004) found that it was difficult to explain the gap between 
cost-effective potential and current penetration rates for EE technologies, even accounting for 
TCs. They suggested that “cognitive limitations on gathering and processing information may 
account for much of this gap” (Sathaye & Murtishaw, 2004, p. 4), which suggests information 
provision in itself is not sufficient to close the EE gap. The research conducted as part of this 
thesis explores whether the way in which this information is framed facilities or hinders the 
ability of humans to act on it, and in turn, narrow the EE gap. 
2.2.2 Implicit discounting rates 
The literature about the (non-)adoption of EE technologies reviewed for this thesis yields 
compelling evidence that households implicitly apply high discount rates (e.g. sometimes in 
the order of 100% or more) when evaluating EE technologies, which is effectively hindering 
the adoption of such technologies (see e.g. Hausman, 1979; Gately, 1980; Train, 1985; 
Ruderman et al., 1987; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a, 1994b; Hasset & Metcalf, 1993; Howarth & 
Sanstad, 1995). In the context of the research conducted here, various explanations for the use 
of high implicit discount rates can be found: a lack of information about costs and benefits of 
efficiency improvements; a lack of knowledge about how to utilize the information available; 
uncertainties about technical performance of EE investments; income level/access to capital; 
high transaction costs (perceived or real) involved in obtaining useful information, and; risks 
associated with such investments (e.g. Ruderman et al., 1987; Train, 1985; Sutherland, 1991; 
Gates, 1983; Hasset & Metcalf, 1993). 
As an individual’s discount rate is not known, it must be inferred from the behaviour in the 
market displayed by that individual (Ruderman et al., 1987). If it is assumed that observed 
behaviour is consistent with cost minimization, as is the case in neoclassical economic theory, 
the discount rate required to make the individual’s behaviour rational can be calculated, since 
“implicit discount rates will equate with the rate-of-return available on alternative investments 
of comparable risk, revealing information concerning the marginal time preference of decision 
makers” (Howarth & Sanstad, 1995, p. 102). Theoretically, non-credit constrained consumers 
would be expected to have discount rates equal to the real market interest rate plus 
depreciation rate, i.e. in the order of 5-15%21 (Dubin & McFadden, 1984). 
Using an econometric model, Hausman (1979) estimated the implicit discount rate used by 
buyers of air conditioners and found an implicit discount rate that averaged 25%, but varied 
with income (higher income yielded lower discount rates). A similar estimate by Gately (1980) 
found implicit discount rates ranging from 45-300%. Train (1985) reports on three other 
studies on implicit discount rates, all of which yield discount rates significantly above real 
market interest rates. If the high implicit discount rates do in fact correspond to the true 
discount rates of the individual, there is nothing wrong (in an economic sense) with this, and 
no EE gap can thus be said to exist. For instance, Sutherland (1991) argue that high discount 
rates may be appropriate as EE investments are often highly uncertain and often irreversible. 
In markets, investors demand higher rates of return on risky assets, and high discount rates 
could thus imply that consumers see EE investments as particularly risky (Howarth & Sanstad, 
1995)22. Gately (1980) points out that the high implicit discount rate raises questions about 
                                                
21 Dubin and McFadden (1984) finds the value to be in the range of 0.10-0.15, but as the interest rate is currently historically 
low, it could be argued that this figure could be lowered to 0.05-0.15. 
22 In a similar fashion, Hasset and Metcalf (1993, p. 710) argue that “the apparently high discount rates attributed to investors 
making energy conservation investments are not irrational or the result of some market failure. Rather they may result 
from an investor recognizing that many conservation investments entail substantial sunk costs. In the presence of these 
costs and uncertainty over future conservation savings, consumers should use a higher hurdle rate for investment than if 
there were no uncertainty.” In a response to this claim, Howarth and Sanstad (1995, p. 105) argue that even when higher 
hurdle rates are taken into account, this still fail to account for the discount rates found in the literature. 
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consumer behaviour, arguing that “one would be hard put to defend the purchase of a low 
efficiency unit as an intelligent choice” (p. 374). It is suggested that the irrational choice is 
made “because the calculations were difficult or impossible because of ignorance of the 
monthly operating costs,” (p. 374) which suggests that humans do not fail to buy the efficient 
units because of high discount costs, but because we fail to take non-salient costs into 
account. This assumption is tested in a number of preference choice exercises conducted as 
part of this thesis. Train (1985) speculates that discount rates for consumer appliances, such as 
freezers, are higher than for cars, say, because the energy usage these appliances are less 
known to consumers (Train, 1985). This observation fits recent research (Kallbekken et al. 
2013; Newell & Siikamäki, 2013), which show that consumers purchase decisions change 
when the operating costs are made salient23. This implies that the implicit discount rate 
observed in the market is not the true discount rate. For Smart Meters, this has the implication 
that simply providing information might not be enough to change behaviour, as consumers 
can display varying discount rates depending on how information is presented. Whether this is 
indeed the case will be tested empirically as part of this research24.  
2.3 Behavioural Economics 
2.3.1 Bounded Rationality 
The theory of bounded rationality is based on research by Simon (1959; 1982; 1986), who 
found that people do not have unlimited information processing capacity, and thus fail to 
make consistently rational choices. Rather, they have inherent behavioural biases that lead to 
predictable outcomes, as explored by the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
and others (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1992; Kahnemann et al., 1982; 1991; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; 1984; Thaler, 1980; Slovic et al., 2002; 2007; Camerer, 1999). Bounded 
rationality implies that humans’ reason to some extent; our decisions are more or less good, 
but seldom optimal in the economic understanding of the term. Humans do not employ 
decision calculus when making a decision (Pasche, 2014), nor do they evaluate every available 
option (John et al., 2013), but instead apply certain cognitive heuristics (mental shortcuts and 
‘rules of thumb’) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Shogren & Taylor, 2008). Bounded rationality 
should not be confused with irrationality; humans are generally goal-oriented, and specify a 
reason for what they do (John et al., 2013), but decision-making processes are often 
characterised by procedure rather than results (Pasche, 2014). 
An important aspect of the bounded rationality of humans is the theory known as Prospect 
Theory (PT) developed by Tversky & Kahneman (1979), a purely descriptive theory of how 
people make choices under uncertainty, which was further refined in Cumulative Prospect 
Theory (CPT) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). A prospect can be defined as an opportunity or 
                                                
23 Newell and Siikamäki (2013) found that labels with simple information on the economic value of saving energy had a 
substantial impact on purchasing behaviour, leading to a choice of appliances with higher energy efficiency. Kallbekken et 
al. (2013) also found evidence of this, noting that consumer purchase decisions were on average 5% more efficient when 
the operating cost was made salient on the energy label. 
24 Experiements have found other behavioural inconsistencies with regards to discounting. For instance, consumer behaviour, 
using both models and experiments, has been shown to fit a hyperbolic discount function, which is a time-inconsistent 
model of discounting, “characterized by a relatively high discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low discount 
rate over long horizons” (Laibson, 1997, p. 445). This is inconsistent with rational choice theory, which assumes an 
exponential function, where discount rates are constant over time (Frederick et al., 2002). Congdon (2013, p. 473) 
speculates that hyperbolic discounting might “depress investments in energy-saving technologies because of the way in 
which the costs of such actions are front-loaded, while the benefits are realized only in the future” (Congdon, 2013, p. 
473). Other inconsistencies in discounting behaviour include discounting gains more than losses, and discounting small 
outcomes more than large ones (Frederick et al., 2002). As these inconsistencies do not directly apply to the research 
conducted her, this will not be further elaborated upon. For a comprehensive overview of discounting over time and time 
preferences, see Frederick et al. (2002). 
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contingency (a ‘gamble’) (Read, 2002, p. 469); a set of outcomes (e.g. A and B) with a 
probability (P(A) and P(B)). In contrast to EUT, prospect theory evaluates decisions in terms 
of changes from a reference point, usually, but not always, the status quo, i.e. the gamble from 
above becomes a choice between (a) nothing (0) (no gamble), or (b) a 0.5 chance winning €10 
or losing €10 (gamble) (Read, 2002). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that humans display several pervasive effects when 
choosing among risky decisions (gambles) that are inconsistent with the basic axioms of EUT. 
In CPT, value is assigned to relative gains and losses rather than to total wealth, and 
probabilities are replaced by decision weights, which are generally lower than the 
corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low probabilities. EUT assumes that the 
decision weight put on an option is equivalent to its probability, but Tversky & Kahneman 
(1979; 1992) found that decision weights are an increasing, but non-linear function of 
probability, as opposed to the linear probability function in EUT (Figure 2-1). In other words, 
very unlikely events are overweighed, while likely events are underweighted: A change from 
impossibility to possibility (from 0 to 0+x) or from possibility to certainty (1-x to 1) has a 
bigger impact than a comparable change in the middle of the scale (from 0.5 to 0.5+x)25 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). This ‘certainty effect’ is captured by the probability weight 
function, which has a discontinuity before the endpoints (0 and 1), making events that are 
certain to happen (or not) far more impactful than those that occur at 0.9 or 0.1, respectively 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Weber, 2013). This has implications for how humans decide 
among events with an uncertain outcome, a feature characterising many energy-related 
decisions. As part of this research, a preference choice exercise on human decision making for 
an uncertain outcome is conducted to test how the effect influences behaviour. 
 
Figure 2-1 – Stylistic representation of the weighted probability function in CPT (solid line) and that of EUT 
(dashed line) (Author, after Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 310) 
In their seminal paper on “Judgment under Uncertainty,” Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
found that humans rely on heuristics to guide their decision-making, e.g. substituting 
probability (difficult to estimate) with representativeness (easy to estimate), and that these 
heuristics systematically depart from basic principles of probability. They found three types of 
heuristics: ‘representativeness’, ‘availability’, and ‘adjustment and anchoring.’ In evaluating probabilities 
                                                
25 Intuitively, this makes sense. The difference between no risk of dying in an accident and a risk of 0.01 feels huge and very 
important, while a difference between a risk of dying of 0.5 and 0.51 seems trivial (Read, 2002). 
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using representativeness, humans have been found to assess the likelihood that A belongs to B by 
“the degree to which A is representative of B, i.e. by the degree to which A resembles B” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). For instance, when consumers are asked to assess the 
energy use of appliances, they tend to rely on the representative heuristic: that energy use is 
related to the size of appliances. The larger the appliance, the higher perceived energy use 
(Steg, 2008). If this holds in practice, it has the implication that Smart Meters should display 
electricity information by appliance, and not just as a cumulative total, in order to help correct 
for this bias, as consumers would otherwise target the largest appliances first, and not 
(necessarily) those that used the most electricity. The presence of this bias was not tested as 
part of the research conducted here. Availability bias occurs when people assess an event by 
the ease of which a similar instance can be brought to mind, instead of using statistical 
inference. Salience affects the retrievability of instances, and thus leads to an overestimation of 
those factors that can easily be brought to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This means 
that presenting a cost on its own makes it more salient than when presented as part of a larger 
cost, and thus more available, enabling humans to act on it. For electricity, this means that 
providing information on the cost of standby electricity in itself (“stand-by costs you 500 
DKK per year) is more effective than when seen as part of a whole (“you can reduce your bill 
from DKK2500 to DKK2000 by turning off stand-by electricity”). It is theorised that 
aggregation of smaller costs into one should also make these more salient, and thus easier for 
humans to act on. In terms of stand-by electricity, this means that a cost of DKK500 per year 
appear larger than 1.37 DKK per day, although the total yearly cost is the same. EUT states 
that whether a cost is presented alone or as part of a whole should not make a difference to 
human behaviour, but heuristics would say that it does. Some of the experiments conducted 
for this thesis tests whether these assumptions about salience do in fact impact observed 
behaviour. Due to adjustment and anchoring biases, people make numerical estimates or 
predictions by starting from an initial, often completely arbitrary value, which is then adjusted, 
most often in the right direction, but to an insufficient degree, to yield the final answer 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This effect has been demonstrated in numerous experiments 
since then (e.g. Etzioni, 2011, Kahneman, 2011; Ariely, 2008), e.g. Attari et al. (2010) found 
that using a relatively low anchoring point (100W light bulb used for 1 hour) when evaluating 
energy use caused participants to underestimate energy consumption and savings. This has the 
implication that if consumers are presented with comparative figures in order to understand 
the information provided by Smart Meters (e.g. CO2 emission from an activity presented with 
equivalent “km driven by car”), the comparative figure used (in this case, “km driven by car”) 
would serve as an anchor. The choice of anchor can thus affect how effective the comparative 
information is. Although this potentially impacts behaviour, it was not possible to test this bias 
in the research conducted for this thesis. 
2.3.2 Loss Aversion 
Another central element to the research at hand that distinguishes CPT from EUT is the non-
linear value function, or the tendency for people to put substantially greater weight on relative 
losses than on gains of the same magnitude (Weber, 2013), when evaluating choices and trades 
(Kahneman et al., 1990). There are three important features of the individual value function in 
prospect theory, as seen in Figure 2-2, which will be briefly discussed, as these can help guide 
how feedback on electricity consumption should be designed. Firstly, the function concerns 
relative changes to wealth as evaluated from a reference point, rather than absolute wealth, as 
in EUT26 (c.f. footnote 18). Secondly, the loss function is steeper than the gain function, i.e. a 
                                                
26“The influence of the reference state on people’s valuations appears to offer a far more general and parsimonious 
explanation of observed instances of losses being valued more than otherwise commensurate gains, than reliance on 
incentives recognized in standard theory alone. Further, the valuation disparity seems to be a pervasive though perhaps not 
universal characteristic of their preferences” (Knetsch and Wong, 2009, p. 413) 
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change in satisfaction is larger in response to a relative loss (-A) than a relative gain (A) in 
wealth, which is also in opposition to the value function of EUT. This difference in steepness 
is the notion of loss aversion, and suggests that behaviour can be influenced depending on 
framing (Weber, 2013). For electricity consumption, this has the implication that information 
on how to save electricity should be framed as preventing a loss, rather than achieving a gain. 
As part of this research, the effect of such a framing is tested in a real-life Smart Meter 
experiment, where participants will receive feedback on their electricity framed as a loss, which 
should incentivise them to avoid this loss. Thirdly, the function shows diminishing sensitivity 
to gains and losses (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000), i.e. the value function is concave for gains 
and convex for losses. This has the implication that individuals show risk averse behaviour 
with respect to sure gains and unlikely losses, but risk seeking behaviour with respect to sure 
losses and unlikely gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). If risk 
preferences depend on the framing of reference point, this effect violates the invariance axiom 
of EUT (c.f. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981, 1986) found preference reversal (i.e. violation of invariance axiom) in 
choices concerning monetary gains and losses, both hypothetical and real, and in questions of 
loss or saving of human lives, while Kahneman et al. (1990) found that the effect persisted 
even under market settings. As part of this thesis, an experiment was conducted test whether 
preference reversal depending on framing also holds for energy efficiency investments, 
traditionally viewed as uncertain, as this has implications for how information on the EE 
investments should be presented to consumers. 
 
Figure 2-2 – Loss aversion. A change in satisfaction is larger in response to a relative loss of wealth than a 
relative gain of wealth (Author, partly after Kahneman, 2011). 
2.3.3 Endowment effect 
EUT assumes that an individual’s preference for good A is not affected by ownership and 
that, when income effects are small and transaction costs negligible, an individual’s 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for good A should, in theory, equal the willingness-to-accept (WTA) 
the loss of good A (van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1996). This prediction contrasts with 
empirical observations; individuals place a higher value on something they have than on 
identical goods that they do not possess27: good A might be preferred to good B when A is the 
                                                
27 Gowdy (2010) rightly points out that this feature partly explains the oft-observed discrepancy between WTP and WTA in 
measures of environmental change.Venkatachalam (2008) also touches upon this subject. 
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endowed good, while the reverse can be true if good B is the endowed good28 (Kahneman et 
al., 1990) This effect was first suggested by Thaler (1980) who labelled it “the endowment 
effect,” and has been demonstrated in numerous experiments since (see Etzioni, 2011; 
Kahneman, 2011, Ariely, 2008; Kahneman et al. 1990; van Dijk & van Knippenberg, 1996). 
This effect has been suggested as a reason why people are reluctant to trade or switch 
position, although doing so would entail economic benefits; Faruqui et al. (2010a) suggest that 
this can possibly explain consumer resistance towards electricity plans with variable (dynamic) 
tariffs. As part of the research for this thesis, an experiment was set up to test the whether the 
effect of changing the default settings, i.e. automatically enrolling consumers to either a 
dynamic or a conventional plan, would have an effect on electricity plan selection. Following 
EUT, an individual would choose the option that maximised utility, regardless of whether or 
not this option was the default option29 or not.  Humans, to the contrary, tend to choose the 
default option (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Johnson et al., 2012), even when “an 
alternative option is markedly better and switching appears easy” (Allcott & Mullainathan, 
2010)30. Theoretically, this has the implication that changing the default can influence the 
choices made by economic actors, contrary to what is assumed in EUT31. McKenzie et al. 
(2006) found that individuals uncertain about their preference are more likely to be influenced 
by defaults. This fits the finding from neuroscience that humans are more likely to stick with 
the default when decisions are complex and/or difficult (Fleming et al., 2010), a statement 
which would characterize many energy-related decisions.  
2.3.4 Limited self-interest 
Limited self-interest captures the notion that people are other-regarding and concerned about 
the opinion and welfare of others, and include behavioural traits such as fairness, altruism, and 
reciprocity (Shogren & Taylor, 2008). Several of these traits are described in Gifford (2011) 
and Gsottbauer & Bergh (2011). These aspects are important for the research because they 
demonstrate that behaviour takes place within a (social) context, which affects both how 
individuals respond to information and the decisions taken by these individuals. 
                                                
28 It is important to realise that the theory does not postualate that this is always the case, but simply that humans show 
inconsistency in preferences which is affected by initial endowment (Kahneman et al., 1990, p. 1344). This violates the 
axioms of rational choice theory (c.f. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). 
29 Defaults can be defined as “settings that apply, or outcomes that stick, when individuals do not take active steps to change 
them” (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013, p. 401). Johnson and Goldstein (2003) suggest three possible answers as to why the 
default effect exists: (1) loss aversion; as the default is seen as the status quo, a change might feel like a loss; (2) Changing 
the default requires an effort, leading to a bias towards maintaining status quo; and (3) the choice of default signals a 
recommended course of action (McKenzie et al., 2006). Whether any of the three possible explanations for the default 
effect is more valid than the others will not be further discussed in this thesis. It is important to note that defaults are 
ubiquitous and thus has an impact on outcomes, even if the choice architecture (the framing of the problem) has not been 
subject to careful consideration (Thaler et al., 2010). 
30 When deciding among options, the classical view is that each option is assigned a subjective value, or utility, and the option 
with the highest utility is then selected. Contrary to this, behavioural research found that people often have a hard time 
deciding among options and that more options can complicate the decision, effectively worsening the decision (Barr et al., 
2013, p. 441). In a rational choice model, the assumption is that more options are always better, but some behavioural 
research suggests that limiting the number of options would entail better decisions (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 
2004). 
31 Using EUT, one could argue that defaults could have an effect on decision outcome, if these were seen as a type of market 
failure. If the cost of selecting the preferred option is larger than the benefit gained from that preference, then defaults 
would be selected even when they would be rejected if transaction costs were zero. A transaction cost prevents equilibrium 
from being reached because the cost of reaching equilibrium is higher than the benefit gained (Johnson & Goldstein, 2013, 
p. 420). However, the problem is that understanding defaults in such a way would make the transaction costs involved 
enormous (in the order of several thousand euros in some examples), leading one to suspect that most individuals do not 
perform a rational calculation of whether the transaction costs exceed the benefits. 
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Societies are based on values and norms, which often vary from place to place, that govern 
what is (and what is not) socially acceptable behaviour (Lundgren, 1999). Humans compare 
their belief and attitudes with those of others, deriving subjective and descriptive norms from 
their observations, to learn what constitutes socially acceptable behaviour (Gifford, 2011) or 
the “social norm.” Cialdini et al. (1990) distinguish between descriptive social norms, i.e. 
beliefs about behaviours people actually engage in, and injunctive social norms, i.e. beliefs 
about what most people believe is the right course of action. Because of perceived status or to 
maintain a self-image, humans are more likely to contribute when their actions are visible to 
others. Reflecting this, human behaviour has been found to change when others can observe it 
(Bell et al., 1996; Schultz, 1998; Nolan et al. 2008). Along those lines, and in the context of 
this thesis, it can be argued that a preference for green energy displayed by an individual arise 
not because of a careful deliberation that the perceived (social) environmental benefits 
outweigh the private costs, but rather to express the values that this choice connotes (Sunstein 
& Reisch, 2013). 
Altruism means helping others while making sacrifices of your own. In a behavioural 
economics understanding of the word, altruism can be defined as being “costly acts that 
confer economic benefits on other individuals” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, p. 785). Without 
external incentives, a utility-maximising individual would not contribute to goods that 
benefited others or a group, but would ‘free-ride,’ i.e. live off of the contributions made by 
others. Although free-riding is found in many settings where incentives or rewards are not 
clear, Kahan (2002) found that in collective action settings, utility ‘calculations’ took on a more 
social form; when individuals perceive that others behave cooperatively, they are moved to 
contribute to public goods. In contrast, when they find that others ‘free-ride’ or in other way 
evades contributing to a public good, they retaliate, even at a cost to themselves (i.e. reducing 
individual utility) (Boyd et al., 2010). These responses are known as altruistic punishment and 
altruistic rewarding. Interestingly, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003, p. 785) found that “a minority 
of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists 
can induce a large number of altruists to defect.” Along these lines, Reiss and White (2008) 
found a surprisingly large reduction as a result of public appeal. Absent any pecuniary 
incentive to do so, energy use declined by 7% over a six-month period. This confirms that 
humans respond altruistically when this seems to be the norm: “Issuing public appeals like 
these is like soliciting anonymous contributions to a public good: respondents incur private 
costs individually; yet achieve tangible benefits only if aggregate participation is high” (Reiss & 
White, 2008). This suggests that using Smart Meters to subject people to statements of 
positive peer behaviour, e.g. installation rate of green technology, can increase installation of 
EE technologies. 
2.4 Feedback and Energy Use 
According to neoclassical economic theory, electricity is a commodity and consumers will 
adapt their usage in response to price signals. How consumers respond should depend on the 
price elasticity of demand for electricity, but, ceteris paribus, one should expect financial 
incentives to have some impact on electricity behaviour. Cook et al. (2012) find that income 
influences price elasticity, with low-income consumers showing a relatively elastic demand 
(around -1), while high-income consumers show relatively inelastic demand, but effects are 
unknown as previous estimates very widely (Platchkov & Pollitt, 2011). Nonetheless, 
electricity is considered the most inelastically demanded form of energy (Reiss & White, 2008). 
Whether this is due to lack of information or actual low elasticity has important implications 
for information provision on electricity use, especially with regards to a future with variable 
prices. Jossoe and Rapson (2013) found that “information feedback about electricity usage 
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increases the price elasticity of demand” (p. 18)32, which suggests that provision of feedback 
can lead to reduction in consumption. 
Electricity feedback can come in various forms, either verbal or written, online or offline, and 
through various devices (e.g. separate displays (IHD), smart phones, TV’s, and web-based). 
The information on electricity consumption provided to customers can be presented in many 
forms, but has traditionally been shown as kWh or alternatively using local currency (€, £, $). 
As part of this thesis, an experiment was conducted to test how much consumers know about 
these units relative to each other. A natural way to present this information would be to 
present it in the form of environmental impact (e.g. in CO2e), as the principal purpose of 
reducing energy consumption (at least from an EU policy point of view) is to reduce GHG 
emissions. This presents the problem that people are generally unable to act on this 
information, not knowing what 1 kg of CO2e signifies, meaning that comparative data would 
be needed (Karjalainen, 2011). This being said, presenting factually correct information “may 
be insufficient to induce consumers to make substantively rational decisions” owing to 
cognitive limitations. The interpretation and use of the information presented needs to be 
taken into account, as this will affect the behavioural response, in this case, the reduction in 
electricity or adoption of EE technologies (Sanstad & Howarth, 1994; Kahneman, 2003). As 
part of this research, it is explored whether increasing the salience of one part of two factually 
similar pieces of information changes consumer preference. 
Consumers can get two types of feedback about their energy consumption: indirect feedback 
provided after consumption, or direct feedback provided in real-time (Ehrhardt-Martinez et 
al., 2010)33. Here, the focus is on feedback from Smart Meters delivered through some form of 
connected device, such as a phone, IHD, or computer. Typically, feedback with regards to 
electricity consumption tries to influence one of two types of behaviour: electricity reduction 
or load shifting (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010). Load shifting is typically induced through 
variable prices, where electricity prices vary over the course of the day or the year. Various 
pricing schemes exist, such as time-of-use rates, real-time pricing, critical peak pricing, or peak 
time rebate34. 
The effect on overall electricity consumption of providing feedback has been studied by 
several researchers (e.g. Midden et al., 1983; Wilhite et al., 1999; Abrahamse et al., 2007; Allen 
et al., 2006, Hargreaves et al., 2010; Gleerup et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2007) and summarised 
in several review studies (e.g. Abrahamse et al., 2005; Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Faruqui et 
al., 2010b; Vine et al. 2013;). The general conclusion is that the frequency of the feedback, 
whether it is direct or indirect, and the way it is presented (the context), has an impact on the 
effect (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010, p. 39). Early studies generally found quite large effects 
(e.g. Midden et al., 1983 found savings of 18.8%), while newer studies have been more 
cautious, generally reporting savings in the range of 0-5%). This is in line with the expected 
reductions of Smart Meter feedback, as reported by EU Member States in their CBA’s of 
Smart Meter rollout, but below the expectations by the EC. Two widely cited studies by Darby 
                                                
32 The authors provide the very interesting insight that, should consumers be rational and change their behaviour, “the 
direction of social benefits may be setting-specific”, meaning that although information makes consumers more price 
elastic in their case, “in other settings consumers may realize that they consume too little or are too price responsive. If 
there are externalities in these markets, then this response will make private decisions more efficient, but may increase 
social costs” (Jossoe & Rapson, 2013, p. 19). 
33 This paper will not elaborate on the classification of feedback, but a thorough discussion of this can be found in Darby 
(2006) or Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010). 
34 The nature of these and the impact on consumption of enacting the various pricing schemes will not be discussed in detail 
here. For more information, the reader is referred to Faruqui et al. (2010a). 
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(2006) and Fischer (2008) find potential savings from feedback of 5-15% and 5-12%, 
respectively, while a recent review by Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) find savings of 4-12%. 
However, it is less clear whether feedback provided by Smart Meters lead to these reductions, 
as e.g. Darby (2006) do no discuss in detail the effect of providing feedback through various 
media. It is generally not known for how long any of these reductions persist, but Staats et al. 
(2004) suggest that there is some evidence that the effect diminishes over time, and might 
even completely disappear once the feedback is gone. Fischer (2008, p. 101) suggest that the 
most effective form of feedback is based on actual consumption, given frequently, involves 
interaction and appliance-specific breakdown, is given over a longer period, may involve 
historical or normative comparisons, and is presented in an understandable and appealing way. 
The effect of feedback on reducing peak demand has been studied less than the effect of 
reducing overall consumption, but a general finding is that programmes with this focus are 
somewhat “successful in shifting energy use from peak periods to off-peak periods, [but] 
much less successful in generating energy savings” (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010, p. v). The 
research conducted here focus solely on overall electricity consumption, and this question will 
not be discussed further here. 
A separate strand of literature has focused on the effect of normative feedback, i.e. providing 
information on consumption relative to social norms. Although people generally believe that 
they are not influenced by the actions of others (Wood & Newborough, 2007; Nolan et al., 
2008), their actions prove otherwise, and effects have been found in behaviours ranging from 
recycling (Schultz, 1998) to towel reuse (Goldstein et al., 2008) to electricity consumption 
(Schultz et al., 2007). For instance, Schultz et al. (2007) demonstrated that when informed of 
the amount of energy that the average peer used, homeowners tended to decrease 
consumption when they were above the norm, but, importantly, increase consumption if they 
were below the norm. However, the invisibility of electricity consumption prevents people 
from not only assessing their own, but also the consumption behaviour of others, making 
normative comparison impossible (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010). If this finding is consistent 
across various populations, it follows that information on electricity consumption should 
include descriptive normative information. 
2.4.1 The ‘Rebound effect’ 
The ‘rebound effect’ theorises that increased energy efficiency in goods (e.g. a car) lead to 
increasing level of energy services (e.g. more driving) and thus more energy consumed (e.g. 
gasoline), and has been heavily discussed in the literature (Khazzoom, 1980; Nässén & 
Holmberg, 2009; Greening et al., 2000)35. In relation to EE, Khazzoom (1980) pointed out 
that energy savings from mandated efficiency standards was most likely not as significant as 
expected ex ante, as increased efficiency will reduce the effective cost of energy services (e.g. 
cost per hour of light) which, ceteris paribus, should increase demand for the service, thus 
diminishing the energy reduction expected (or even increasing demand)36. 
The rebound effect can be expected to take four different forms in response to an increase in 
energy efficiency: (1) direct effects; (2) indirect effects; (3) economy-wide effects; and (4) 
transformational effects (Greening et al., 2000, p. 390). Only the first two will be discussed, as 
the latter two are less important for end-users, who are the foci of this thesis. 
                                                
35 For an outline of the history of the academic discussion and estimates of the size of the rebound effect, see e.g. Nässén & 
Holmberg (2009) and Greening et al. (2000). 
36 “We may expect the reduction that increased efficiency entails to exert an upward pressure on the demand for energy. This 
pressure will partly offset, and may more than offset, the energy saving that results from improved appliance efficiency” 
(Khazzoom, 1980, p. 22). 
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The direct rebound effect essentially reflects the argument provided by Khazzoom (1980). If 
one assumes that energy consumption drops to a third if efficiency is increased three-fold, this 
would imply that the “‘own’ elasticity of energy demand with respect to appliance efficiency is 
-1,” which would imply that the “elasticity of energy demand with respect to energy price is 
0,” (Khazzoom, 1980, p. 22) which would be unreasonable37. As long as the average 
individual’s price elasticity of demand for appliances is not zero, the lower energy price, 
implicit in the higher efficiency, will exert an upward pressure on the demand for the service 
delivered by the appliance (Khazzoom, 1987, p. 86). Academics disagree about is the size of 
this effect, which can be either insignificant (e.g. a few percent increase in demand for the 
service) or massive (e.g. result in higher energy consumption). Research (Greening et al., 2000; 
Nässén & Holmberg, 2009) indicates that the magnitude of the direct rebound effect is less 
than postulated by Khazzoom (1980). Nässén and Holmberg (2009, p. 221) find “rebound 
effects in the order of 10–20%,” while the IPCC (Lucon et al., 2014) assumes effects to be in 
the range of 0-30%. Indirect effect results from the reduced cost of energy services, which 
increases the disposable income available to procure other goods and services (Nässén & 
Holmberg, 2009). As these goods also require energy, this increases demand, and leads to 
economic growth with the associated environmental impact of this growth. The size of these 
indirect effects depends on the share of the consumer’s income spent on energy services (e.g. 
driving, electricity) (Greening et al., 2000, p. 391). Greening et al. (2000, p. 399) give an 
overview of over 75 estimates of the rebound effect in the literature with estimates derived 
from both econometric studies and direct measurements, and finds that “available 
measurements of the rebound for residential end-uses suggest a range of responses of 0-50% 
for a 100% increase in energy efficiency.” They arrive at the conclusion that “the rebound is 
not high enough to mitigate the importance of energy efficiency as a way of reducing carbon 
emissions” (p. 399). For Smart Meters, especially the size of the indirect rebound effect 
becomes important; assuming that people reduce their electricity bill as a result of installing 
the meter, this will increase their disposable income. If they then spend this money on energy 
intensive goods, such as air travel, this has the implication that the overall reduction in GHG 
emissions as a result of the policy will be limited. 
                                                
37 The mathematics behind this is explained in a fairly straightforward manner in Khazzoom (1987, p. 87), and in slightly 
more complicated terms in Khazzoom (1980). While some of Khazzoom’s (1980; 1987) conclusions have since been 
rebutted, the price elasticity argument still hold true, at least to this author’s knowledge. 
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3 Research Methodology  
This chapter elaborates on the methodology used during this thesis. The research 
methodology was framed by behavioural economics, which is defined as an inductive science, 
relying primarily on experiments and observations to establish theories on how humans 
behave. This highlights the legacy owed to experimental psychology, a predominantly 
inductive science, and is in stark contrast to the deductive method used in neoclassical 
economics, where theory is deduced from axiomatic assumptions and then subjected to 
empirical tests. However, inductive experiments can, and sometimes do, confirm theories 
suggested by neoclassical economics38 (Lunn, 2014). Following the presentation of the 
exercises and experiments conducted as part of this work, the different methods of data 
collection and analysis used to conduct this research are summarized. Data was collected 
across various sources to increase objectivity. Experiments, interviews, questionnaires and raw 
data collection were part of the research, and the collected material was analysed using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. An extensive literature review from related or applicable 
research was also carried out. 
3.1 Experiments 
The experiments conducted as a part of this thesis aim to test the effect of a number of 
behavioural biases on consumer behaviour with regards to electricity use and energy-related 
decisions. This knowledge is used as starting point to determine which biases could be 
applicable when providing consumers with information using Smart Meters. However, it must 
be noted that this thesis does not provide an exhaustive overview of how BE-based 
interventions can potentially be applied to increase Smart Meter effectiveness, but rather 
explores human susceptibility to a select number of these. All of the biases explored here have 
been found in other experiments or real-life settings and are reported in research on BE. In 
order to answer research question 1, the experiments explore questions such as: 
• What is the effect of framing feedback as avoiding a loss rather than obtaining a gain? 
• What is the effect of changing the amount and salience of electricity information? 
• Does changing the default choice/value have an effect on consumer decisions? 
• What is the effect of salience on consumer discount rates? 
• What is the effect of loss aversion on energy-related investment decisions? 
All of the experiments have been conducted in the greater Copenhagen region, Denmark, 
which constitutes the case area for interventions. Results for statistical representativeness are 
thus for Denmark or Copenhagen, unless anything else is reported. 
3.1.1 Energy-use awareness 
From studies in psychology (e.g. Dunning et al., 2004; Kruger, 1999), it is known that people 
consider themselves to perform above average for a given task, e.g. when asked to rank their 
own behaviour, and that of others, people often rank their own behaviour consistently above 
the behaviour of others. To test how people perceive their actions on electricity relative to 
those of others, an experiment was conducted at a science fair in collaboration with 
researchers from a consultancy working on behavioural design in public spaces. The goal was 
to test whether ‘above-average bias’ could be found for electricity consumption, specifically 
whether participants, all of whom lived in the Copenhagen region, believed themselves to be 
                                                
38 Leaving aside here the discussion initiated by scholars of scientific theory of whether or not a finding can really be 
‘confirmed’ or whether only falsification is possible (c.f. the work of Karl Popper (1973) and others). 
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more aware of their energy consumption than the average Dane. Participants were asked two 
ranking questions and told to provide an answer on a scale from 1-10: 
1. How aware are you of your own energy consumption? 
2. How aware do you think the Danes are of their own energy consumption? 
The rationale behind the experiment is to test whether ‘above average bias’ exists for energy 
consumption. This could provide valuable insight into the utilisation of Smart Meters, because 
if this bias can be confirmed, it constitutes an argument for providing people with information 
about other peoples’ actual behaviour. The information conveyed by the Smart Meter would 
enable participants to act on a descriptive social norm (c.f. Cialdini et al., 1990). In other 
words, if people think they are more aware of their energy use (i.e. use less electricity) than 
Danes in general, but the information from the Smart Meter conveys that they are actually 
below, i.e. use more electricity than the average person, this constitutes a strong incentive to 
change behaviour to obey to the descriptive social norm, i.e. reduce their electricity 
consumption to a level that aligns with the norm.  
3.1.2 Exercises on preference choices in energy-use decisions 
While insights from CPT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; 1992), such as loss aversion or default 
setting, appear theoretically promising, no practical evidence of successful utilisation of this 
for Smart Meter feedback was found in the literature. The following exercises did not directly 
address Smart Meter use. Instead they were intended to test four specific biases; information 
overload, salience, loss aversion, and defaults, over seven experiments. This was done in order 
to understand whether these biases could be expected to occur when humans are provided 
with information on energy use or faced with energy-related decisions through a Smart Meter. 
This knowledge is crucial, as it expands our understanding of how feedback should be 
provided using Smart Meters to overcome, work with or avoid these biases, rather than be 
prone to them.  The exercises all build on previous evidence or experiments found in 
literature, all of which will be presented for each exercise. Exercise 1 tests whether the presence 
of unnecessary information (information overload) impedes optimal (rational) choice, exercise 2 
tests whether salience of information changes energy-related decisions, exercise 3 assesses 
participant knowledge of electricity consumption data, exercise 4 and 5 explores how the 
salience of information changes discounting preferences, exercise 6 assesses whether loss 
aversion changes willingness to undertake EE investments (c.f. CPT value function), and 
finally, exercise 7 looks at the effect of default setting on electricity plan selection. The order of 
the exercises is random, and does not signify anything special (e.g. exercise 1 is not more 
important that exercise 7), but refers to the order in which the participants were asked these 
questions. 
To test whether these biases were present in relation to information on electricity 
consumption, two versions of the seven exercises were created, one with the theoretical 
findings in question, and one without. About half of the subjects received version 1 of the 
questionnaire (Q1) and half received version 2 (Q2). All seven exercises took the form of a 
question that had to be answered. For each exercise, subjects were asked to select one of two 
or three options available, and all questions had to be answered. Besides the questions related 
to electricity consumption, subjects had to indicate gender and age, in order to make it 
possible to test whether these variables had an influence on the biases in question. The full 
version of the two forms of the seven exercises questions can be seen in Appendix 6.1. 
Exercise 1: Information-overload and choice invariance 
Rational choice theory predicts that humans should select their most preferred option, 
regardless of ranking and the presence of inferior options (c.f. section 2.1; von Neumann & 
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Morgenstern, 1944; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). To test whether this was the case, 
participants were asked to select between two ways of receiving and paying for Smart Meter 
feedback, one with online-only feedback (relatively cheap) (option A), and one with online 
feedback as well as detailed consumption reports mailed to the customer (relatively expensive) 
(option B). The assumption behind this type of question is that the developments in 
technology will lead to various data services being made available to consumers at an added 
cost. If preference for these can be influenced by unnecessary information, this calls for 
standardised ways of offering these services to consumers. In version 1 (Q1), only the two 
described options were available (A & B), while an inferior version of option B (B-) was added 
in version 2 (Q2). Based on an experiment conducted by Ariely (2008), where preference for 
newspaper subscriptions was found to change based on the presence of an inferior option, the 
assumption is that a larger proportion select option B in Q2 than in Q1, as the presence of B- 
makes B appear more beneficial. 
Exercise 2: Salience and preference for energy-efficient goods 
This experiment was intended to test the effect of the salience of information on the 
preference for energy-efficient goods. It has implication for feedback if salience changes 
decisions, as it implicitly follows that not just providing information on consumption, but also 
how consumption is displayed, can affect decisions. The aim was to explore whether making 
the energy cost part of the total life-cycle cost (c.f. section 2.2.2) explicit (salient) would 
change procurement decision. If this is the case, this bias could lead to procurement of more 
energy efficient models and thus help close the EE gap. The inspiration for this experiment 
comes from Kallbekken et al. (2013) and Newell & Siikamäki (2013) who conducted similar 
trials. In the experiment, participants were asked to choose between two fridges, a relatively 
efficient and a relatively inefficient model. Participants were given information on 
procurement cost, size, and electricity consumption (kWh/year) of both fridges. In version 2 
(Q2), however, the cost of electricity over the lifetime of the refrigerator was stated explicitly 
as part of the information provide to participants, in order to increase the salience. The 
lifetime was assumed to be 12 years, but the payback period for the relatively expensive, but 
efficient model was only about 6.5 years. The assumption was that in version 2, where the 
electricity cost was explicitly stated, a larger proportion would opt for the efficient fridge. 
Exercise 3: Assessing participant knowledge of electricity prices 
This experiment had two goals: Firstly, to assess what level of knowledge on electricity and 
electricity prices consumers can be expected to have. If consumers generally know very little 
about electricity and electricity prices, this could signify that comparative information is 
needed. Secondly, to assess how consumers understand the information on electricity and 
electricity prices that they are provided with, depending on how this information is presented. 
In other words, does the way information is presented affect the knowledge-level one can 
infer from consumer behaviour? Participants were asked to correctly identify the largest yearly 
cost out of two possible options: the electricity (in kWh) or currency (in DKK) option, with 
the alternative option to choose “I do not know.” The way the total cost was presented 
differed in the two versions. In version 1 (Q1), both options were labelled as a total per year 
(4,000 DKK and 4,000kWh), while in version 2 (Q2), the electricity was per given per month 
(330 kWh/month), while the monetary cost was per year (4,000 DKK/year). CPT (c.f. section 
2.3.1) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) predicts that knowledge is not an absolute constant, and 
that the different framing in the two versions of the experiment would lead to differing levels 
of inferred knowledge. The electricity cost stated in kWh is more than twice as large (in 
monetary terms) as the price stated in DKK, so to anyone with knowledge of electricity prices, 
determining the largest cost, even in version 2, should mathematically prove a relatively easy 
task. It was expected that participants given version 1 would perform better than those given 
version 2, as getting the answer right in version 1 only involved having a rough knowledge of 
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the cost of electricity (more or less than 1 DKK per kWh), while in version 2, the participants 
needed to know the price and calculate what the monthly use translated to in yearly 
consumption in order to arrive at the correct option. 
Exercise 4 and 5: The effect of information salience on implicit discount 
rates 
As presented in section 2.2.2 on discounting, some researchers (e.g. Sutherland, 1991) argue 
that the low uptake of EE measures is not a market failure, but are rather due to high 
consumer discount rates caused by the inherent uncertainty of these. These two experiments 
had three objectives in combination: Firstly, to gauge the implicit discount rates that 
consumers employ when faced with energy decisions. Secondly, to test whether the implicit 
discount rate changes if the question used to assess this is framed in more difficult language 
(i.e. reducing the salience). Thirdly, to test whether participants are consistent in their 
application of discount rates. If consumers do have high implicit discount rates and apply 
these consistently, this would provide an argument that no EE actually exist, as Sutherland 
(1991) argued. Contrary, if consumer rates are inconsistent and can be affected by how 
information is presented, this means that an EE gap exists, and that the size of this gap 
depends on how consumers are provided with information. It then follows that the framing of 
the EE information that Smart Meters can technically provide, e.g. benefit of switching to 
compact fluorescent light bulbs or buying an efficient fridge, can affect whether consumers in 
fact decide to undertake the EE measure. If the framing of knowledge can lead to more EE 
measures being undertaken, this can help close the EE gap and increase the social surplus of 
Smart Meter deployment. 
The purpose of the first discount exercise (#4) was to derive a rough estimate of consumer 
discount rates, by asking participants whether they would be willing to undertake either or 
both of two explicit EE measures. These had payback periods of four and six years (implying 
discount rates of 25% and 16.6%), respectively. However, the payback period was not stated 
explicitly, but the cost and the benefit of the respective measures were given. To test whether 
smaller sums were discounted more than large sums, which have been shown in other areas 
(c.f. Frederick et al., 2002), the cost and benefits of the EE measures stated in version 2 (Q2) 
were ten times higher than those in version 1 (Q1). If consumers do discount smaller amounts 
more than large, it would provide an argument for providing EE information as aggregate 
amounts, rather than in separate smaller parts, as this would lower discount rates and help 
close the EE gap. 
To test whether discount rates were subject to the salience of EE-related information 
provided, i.e. whether an inconsistency in consumer discount rates could be found depending 
on the formulation of the information given to participants, the discount question was stated 
in more difficult language in experiment 5. The experiment builds on a similar experiment 
conducted by Houston (1983) who tried to assess implicit discount rates by asking consumer 
about their preferred return on an investment, rather than ask about willingness to undertake 
an EE measure, or willingness to purchase an efficient good, as is usually done (c.f. Hausman, 
1979; Gately, 1980). The implicit discount rate was implied by asking participants to indicate 
the minimum return on an investment of 500 DKK (€~70) required in order to undertake an 
EE measure. Bounded rationality and CPT (c.f. heuristics) predict that consumers would show 
higher rates when the language was difficult, as more mental capacity would be required, and 
as such, the implicit discount rates derived from exercise 5 are assumed to be higher than 
those derived from exercise 4. 
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Exercise 6: Loss framing and the willingness to undertake risky EE 
investments 
When explaining the EE gap, some researchers (e.g. Hasset & Metcalf, 1993) have argued that 
the uncertainty involved in EE measures makes it a risky investment, which justifies the high 
discount rates. If the perceived riskiness of an EE measures leads to higher discount rates, 
reducing the risk should lead to a higher uptake of EE measures. However, according to CPT, 
riskiness is a relative concept that depends on framing, meaning that the willingness to run a 
risk (in essence, the willingness to gamble) depends on the framing. This experiment was 
designed to test whether the willingness to undertake an EE investment could be changed 
depending on whether the outcome was framed as a gain or loss relative to the status quo. 
The idea for this experiment comes from an experiment conducted by Kahneman & Tversky 
(1984, p. 343), who showed that preference for a risky medical treatment changes depending 
on framing. If this can be found for energy-related decisions, it has the implication that 
decisions on whether or not to undertake EE measures involving a degree of uncertainty can 
be changed by changing the framing. This implies that information should be framed so as to 
reduce the perceived risk, which should increase the willingness of participants to undertake 
risky EE investments. 
Participants were asked to decide between a certain outcome and a more risky outcome when 
deciding on procurement of an EE good. The questions participants were asked in the two 
versions of the experiment are indistinguishable from each other in real terms, meaning that 
they are mathematically identical. However, the impact of installing the EE measure is framed 
as obtaining a benefit in version 1 (Q1), and as avoiding a cost in version 2 (Q2). According to 
the value function in CPT (c.f. section 2.3.2), participants given Q2 are expected to show a 
risk seeking preference for the gamble (gambling to avoid a loss of 600 DKK) (option B) over 
the sure loss of 400 DKK (option A). Contrary to this, participants given Q1 are expected to 
show risk aversion (taking a sure gain of 200 DKK) (option A) over the risky prospect 
(gambling to gain 600 DKK) (option B). 
Exercise 7: The effect of Default setting on electricity plan selection 
Adoption of dynamic pricing by consumers could potentially lead to savings in energy 
(Faruqui et al., 2010a). However, Faruqui et al. (2010a) speculate that loss aversion could 
influence consumer willingness to try these new plans, as consumers, rather than focusing on 
potential savings, would focus on the risk that costs might increase, leading to the incumbent 
being favoured. Previous experiments (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Pyrko & Darby, 2009) 
had found that current type of plan was the most important predictor of future plan selection. 
Along the same lines, in an experiment, Pichert & Katsikopoulos (2008) asked participants to 
choose between two different types of electricity: conventional and “green” (renewable). 
When conventional was the default, 31 of 75 participants (41%) chose the green utility, 
whereas 52 of 77 participants (68%) chose the green utility when this was the default. Smart 
Meters could potentially be used to automatically determine which plan would fit consumers 
(e.g. dynamic or static pricing), but if the incumbent plan influences preference for future 
plans, this would affect the degree to which Smart Meters can be used to switch consumers to 
a new (more appropriate) plan. To test whether the type of incumbent plan (the default) had 
an effect, an experiment was set up. In version 1 (Q1) of the experiment, the conventional 
(static) tariff was the incumbent, so participants would have to take action to get the dynamic 
tariff plan. Contrary to this, in version 2 (Q2) participants were told to imagine that they had 
been moved to the dynamic price tariff, meaning that participants would have to take action to 
get the conventional (static) plan. Participants were told that the assumption was that dynamic 
tariffs could lead to savings of 5%, but that this could not be guaranteed. Based on the results 
from previous experiments (e.g. Pyrko & Darby, 2009), the assumption was that the majority 
Simon Bager, IIIEE, Lund University 
32 
of the participants would keep the default plan, meaning they would select the conventional 
plan in Q1 and the dynamic pricing plan in Q2. 
3.1.3 Smart Meter experiments 
In Denmark, the rollout of Smart Meters has begun and an increasing number of customers 
have Smart Meters installed with more or less advanced features. To assess the effectiveness 
of a Smart Meter where no behavioural intervention was conducted, data from 92 Smart 
Meters installed in households in Copenhagen was collected. Customers with such Smart 
Meters were provided with near-real time feedback, as their consumption was reported and 
made available in 15-minute intervals. The data was analysed to assess whether any effects 
greater than those expected from natural yearly fluctuations could be discerned. The Smart 
Meters used in this experiment are so-called add-ons, i.e. extra meters added to a ‘dumb’ meter 
to make them ‘smart,’ meaning that they are able to transmit consumption data. The 
customers have access to a portal where they can check their consumption in kWh and DKK 
on an hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or yearly basis, but unless they access this portal they 
receive no other information than what a “normal” meter can provide (Figure 3-1). The 
rationale behind the analysis of the Smart Meter data is to test whether the EC prediction of a 
reduction in energy consumption of 10% from installation of Smart Meters in Europe is in 
any way reflected in consumption profiles of the users who have already had a meter installed. 
 
Figure 3-1 – Snapshot of consumption information available to Smart Meter customers online. ©NorthQ 
(used with permission). 
Given CPT, it is assumed that framing a cost as avoiding a loss rather than obtaining a gain 
should have an effect on behaviour (see e.g. Kahneman, 2011; Weber, 2013) (see also section 
2.3.2). It is also known that the salience of the information upon which humans act can 
systematically change behaviour, as shown by e.g. Gilbert and Zivin (2014). Employing these 
insight to Smart Meter feedback can hep determine whether these biases also exists for 
electricity consumption and how large the effects are, which can assist in answering RQ#2. 
In order to test these assumptions, a second Smart Meter experiment was set up. The rationale 
behind the Smart Meter experiment was thus two-fold: Firstly, to assess whether framing the 
total daily electricity consumption as a loss can trigger loss aversion, meaning that any reduction 
in consumption will be seen as reducing a loss, which theoretically (c.f. the value function in 
CPT) should induce a more significant change in behaviour than if electricity consumption 
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reduction is seen as a gain. Secondly, to test whether the salience of the information presented 
makes a difference to final electricity consumption. This was tested by presenting the nightly 
consumption (00-06) as a cumulative figure per year, rather than in kWh and DKK per day, as 
is usually the case, as it was assumed that the cumulative figure would be more salient to the 
consumer than the daily figure39. If salience does have an impact, this means that not only 
whether information is provided, but also how it is provided, can impact consumption. This 
would entail that simply correcting the information asymmetry is not enough, and it should be 
carefully considered how the information is framed. 
The participating households were divided in two groups: a test group and a reference group. 
The reference group received information on household electricity consumption in kilowatt-
hours (kWh), and information on how much their consumption aligned with a pre-defined 
budget (in DKK per year), which had been set by the household. The test group received the 
same information, along with information on the running cost of electricity consumption and 
the estimated weekly cost (framed as a loss), and the cost of passive and stand-by electricity 
consumption per day and per year (framed as a loss and made salient), as described. The 
widget in the software interface read: “Money lost from electricity consumption” and then 
stated the number (see Figure 3-2). The widget displayed the amount spent per day as a 
running total, which was updated every few seconds and reset every day, meaning that it 
looked like the money was “flowing” out of the pocket. The estimated weekly cost was 
updated every 15 minutes. The standby consumption data was updated once every day to 
reflect the standby consumption of the previous night. 
 
Figure 3-2 – Loss Aversion widget as seen by participants in Smart Meter experiment. ©Bager & NorthQ. 
3.2 Methods for data collection and processing 
The literature review conducted for this thesis had several aims: Firstly, to provide a 
comprehensive and up-to-date overview of human behaviour as understood by the economic 
theories discussed in this thesis; mainly neoclassical (Frank, 1997; von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), new institutional (Sathaye & Murtishaw, 2004; Mundaca et al., 2013), and 
behavioural (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 1986; Thaler, 
                                                
39 It was assumed that the nightly consumption primarily consisted of stand-by and passive consumption (e.g. freezers, 
refridgerators), and thus would be representative of the standby consumption for the household, absent any daily activities, 
such as cooking, cleaning, etc. In the functionality requirements for Smart Meters, the EC states that information on 
energy consumption should be “provided in a fashion that does not require any numerical computation or energy literacy 
to understand, examples include display of cost rather than kWh” (EC requirements report, p. 21). As the electricity 
consumption in this experiment is shown in DKK rather than kWh, this is in line with EC recommendations. 
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1980). Secondly, the literature was scorched for research on the effect of feedback on energy 
and electricity consumption in order to be able to compare the effect of the research 
conducted here against previous research (most notably Abrahamse et al., 2005; Darby, 2006; 
Fischer, 2008; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010). This also included newer research into the 
effect of using Smart Meters for feedback provision (e.g. Joachain & Klopfert, 2013; 
AECOM, 2011; Gans et al., 2013; Schleich et al., 2011; 2013). Thirdly, the experiments 
conducted here are either inspired by or take a point of departure in research conducted by 
experimental economist or psychologists (e.g. Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984; Houston, 1983; Kallbekken et al., 2013; Ariely, 2008). 
In order to expand on the knowledge gathered in the literature review, a number of interviews 
with relevant stakeholders were conducted. For the purpose of understanding Smart Meters 
and the technical details behind these, Mr. Christian von Scholten and Mr. Andrei Cimpoeru 
of NorthQ were interviewed. They played an important role for this research, as the Smart 
Meter experiment was conducted from data collected by their meters. The loss aversion 
widget was designed by the author in collaboration with Mr. Cimpoeru. To gain a deeper 
understanding of the electricity market and the benefits to companies of installing Smart 
Meters, Mr. Lars Elmegaard of Danish utility company SEAS-NVE was interviewed.  
Sample data was subjected to statistical tests to learn the significance of the results. The most 
common test applied was chi-squared test (see Appendix 6.2) (McGrew & Monroe, 2000), 
which was used to test whether a significant difference between the answers to the two 
version of each of the exercises could be found, in order to determine whether the 
intervention in question could be said to have a statistically significant effect.  
3.2.1 Data collection for energy-use awareness experiment 
The sample collected for the test of energy-use awareness consisted of 64 answers for 
question 1 (nq1 = 64) and 67 answers for question 2 (nq2 = 67), as not all participants answered 
both questions. The data was collected using an iPad, where people filled in their answer to 
the two questions and then submitted these. No background information on the participants 
was collected. Given that there are roughly 3 million adults in Denmark (Statistics Denmark, 
2012), and taking into account a confidence level of 95% and a margin of error of 5%, the 
sample should have been 385 to be representative. This means that results cannot be said to 
be representative of the case area using standard statistical uncertainty. To determine whether 
a significant difference between the answers to the two questions could be found, the results 
were subjected to a t-test. 
3.2.2 Data collection for Smart Meter experiments 
The data collected from the Smart Meters without loss aversion intervention is sampled from 
92 meters (nSM=92). The observation from each meter is of varying time span and covers a 
period from the fall of 2012 to early August 2014. The number of observations is much higher 
in the final part of the period, due to a higher number of Smart Meters being installed at that 
point. Before analysis, data from weeks with less than 7 observations in one week, i.e. weeks 
with data missing for any days, were discarded, as was weeks that returned a total 
consumption of “0” (zero), as this indicated something had gone wrong when transmitting the 
data. Finally, meters with observations spanning less than 3 weeks in total were excluded. This 
yielded at total sample of 51 meters. Furthermore, two meters with extremely high readings 
were also excluded based on an assumption that this data was incorrect. This yielded a final 
sample of 49 meters (nSMfinal =49). Taking into account that there are 2.6 million households in 
Denmark (Statistics Denmark, 2014), and using a confidence level of 95%, results are 
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representative when the margin of error is 14%. With standard margin of error (5%), sample 
should have been 385 to be representative. 
Data for the Smart Meter experiment on loss aversion was collected over a 5-week period in 
July and August 2014. 85 households located in Copenhagen were invited to participate in the 
experiment, but only 63 chose to do by providing their written consent. Even though the 
experiment was postponed two weeks to increase the sample size, out of the 63 households 
that accepted the invitation, only 16 installed the meter in time to be part of the experiment, 
meaning that the two group were reduced to a test group of 11 households (ntest = 11) and a 
reference group of 5 households (nref = 5). The sample was contains information on daily 
consumption (kWh/day), weekly consumption (kWh/week), nightly consumption (passive 
and stand-by) (kWh/night (23-06)), as well as average daily consumption (kWh) and average 
weekly consumption (kWh). 
The participating households have similar building characteristics, as all houses are semi-
detached houses, constructed around the same time, all connected to the district-heating grid, 
none of them using electric heating, and with sizes varying from 103-130 m2. The households 
had the same type of Smart Meter installed as those meters from which the long-term data is 
collected, along with software to monitor the consumption of electricity.  
Supplementary socio-economic data on the target group was collected through a 
questionnaire-based survey in order to ensure that any difference in electricity consumption 
could be attributed to the framing of consumption, and not structural differences. The 
dependent variables were selected based on evidence from previous research (Gram-Hanssen, 
2013; 2014; Mills & Schleich, 2012; Gans et al., 2013; Kavousian et al., 2013). Mills and 
Schleich (2012) in a study of 5,000 households in 10 EU countries and Norway found that 
family age-composition (variable #2 and #3) had “a distinct impact on household energy use 
behaviour” (p. 616), as did education (not included) and income (#5) (Gram-Hanssen, 2003)40. 
Gram-Hanssen (2003; 2013) and Kavousian et al. (2013) makes the case that the total number 
of appliances influences total household electricity consumption (#6), while Gram-Hanssen 
(2014) argues that environmental awareness (#8) also has an impact. Kavousian et al. (2013) 
find that the size of the house (#4) has an impact, while “number of hours spent at home” 
(#7) was included as it was hypothesized that this could possibly have an effect. 
The data was collected in June, July and August 2014, prior to and during the experiment. 
Data on eight dependent variables was collected (questionnaire can be seen in Appendix 6.3): 
1. Previous yearly consumption (2011, 2012, 2013) (in kWh) 
2. Number of occupants (#) 
3. Age of occupants (year) 
4. Size of house (m2) 
5. Yearly income (four brackets, do not want to disclose option) 
6. Number of electric or electronic appliances (five brackets) 
7. Number of hours spent at home (07-15, 15-23, 23-07) 
8. Environmental awareness (yes/no). 
The household data gathered was entered into a spreadsheet, which is available per request, 
while the consumption data (in *.csv-form) was collected from the server of the utility 
company. This is also available per request. 
                                                
40 It should be noted that Kavousian et al. (2013) observed ”no significant correlation between electricity consumption and 
income level” (p. 184). They furthermore found no correlation between electricity consumption and home ownership nor 
building age, and as these were deemed difficult to obtain information about, they were excluded. 
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3.2.3 Data collection for preference choice exercises 
The sample had a size of 278 participants (ntotal=278) divided between two versions of the 
questionnaire (nQ1=131, nQ2=147). The data was collected by hand at a hardware store in a 
suburb in Copenhagen, Denmark, during a summer weekend in early August 2014. Subjects 
were given no reward for participating. Thoroughly incomplete data sets were discarded 
(n=2), while datasets with answers to gender and age, as well as some of the seven exercises 
were kept, as questions were deemed to be independent of each other. This yielded a total of 
276 questionnaires, but a different number of observations for each of the seven exercises (see 
Table 3-1). Taking into account that there are 2.6 million households in DK (Statistics 
Denmark, 2014), and using a confidence level of 95%, results are representative when the 
margin of error is 6%. With standard margin of error (5%), sample should have been 385 to 
be representative. Of those 276 questionnaires, men answered 184 questionnaires, while 
women answered 92, which mean that men make up two-thirds of the sample. The average 
age of the participants is 47.9 years (SD = 13.4 years), with the oldest participant being 81 
years old and the youngest participant being 21 years old (spread = 60 years). 
Preference choice exercise Version 1 (Q1) Version 2 (Q2) 
Exercise 1: Information plan 128 138 
Exercise 2: Fridge 131 145 
Exercise 3: Electricity knowledge 130 144 
Exercise 4a: Discounting, 25% 131 145 
Exercise 4b: Discounting, 16.6% 124 134 
Exercise 5: Discounting, unknown rate 198 (same question in both Q1 and Q2) 
Exercise 6: Risk profile 128 139 
Exercise 7: Default plan 131 142 
Table 3-1 – Sample sizes from questionnaire experiment 
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4 Results 
The following section presents the findings from the various analyses, choice exercises and 
experiments conducted for this thesis. First, the results from the eight choice exercises are 
presented in order to answer RQ#1. Secondly, the results from the Smart Meter data analysis 
are presented. Then the findings from the experiment on Smart Meters with loss aversion 
framing are offered, in order to answer RQ#2. This is followed by the results from literature-
based analysis of the effect of feedback provision, conducted in order to have something to 
compare the results of the Smart Meter experiments against. 
Where applicable, statistical tests of significance have been conducted. Unless anything else is 
stated, significant means significant at a 95%-confidence level (p-value <0.05). 
4.1 Behavioural biases and energy-related behaviour 
The following section presents the results of the various choice preference exercises 
conducted to test the effect of behavioural biases. The section first presents the exercise 
intended to assess the knowledge-level displayed by participants. Next, the results determining 
the effect of information provision and the salience of this information are presented. This is 
followed by the results from the default-effect and energy-use awareness exercises, and finally 
the results from the exercises with loss framing of information are presented. 
4.1.1 Consumer Knowledge of Electricity prices (Exercise 3) 
As mentioned, this exercise had two objectives: To test the level of knowledge present in the 
sample, and to test whether the way information was presented affected this. The results show 
that generally, only about half of the participants (54%) know enough about electricity prices 
to correctly identify the kWh-option as the right option. Older people seem to have a higher 
knowledge of electricity than young people, but a chi-squared test determined that the 
difference is not significant (p-value: 0.418) (Table 4-1). 
The different framing of the options in the two versions of the exercise reveal that the salience 
of the information, i.e. the ease at which the kWh and DKK options can be compared, had an 
impact on perceived knowledge. Overall, a slightly higher percentage of the participants were 
able to identify the right option in version 1 (Q1) than in version 2 (Q2), but a chi-squared test 
determined that the difference is not significant (at 95%).  Women do not perform 
significantly different in the two versions (at 95%), though there seems to be a tendency that 
more women select the “I do not know”-option, when direct comparison is made more 
difficult. Men perform significantly better (at 95% level) in version 1 than in version 2, 
dropping from well above average (72%) to average (54%). Interestingly, the main difference 
between the genders seem to be that women are willing to admit that they do not know the 
answer, while men are not, and as a result guess wrong when direct comparison is difficult (c.f. 
men selecting the DKK option increase from 9% to 24%). All of the chi-squared tests of 
significance can be seen in Appendix 6.4. 
 nDKK (percentage) nkWh (percentage) nDo not know (percentage) Total 
Overall 43 (16%) 147 (54%) 84 (31%) 274 
Age <40 14 (17%) 39 (48%) 29 (35%) 82 
Age 40+ 29 (15%) 106 (56%) 54 (29%) 189 
Q1 all 16 (12%) 78 (60%) 36 (28%) 130 
Q2 all 27 (19%) 69 (48%) 48 (33%) 144 
Q1 men 7 (9%) 57 (72%) 15 (19%) 79 
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Q2 men 24 (24%) 55 (54%) 23 (23%) 102 
Q1 women 9 (18%) 21 (41%) 21 (41%) 51 
Q2 women 3 (7%) 14 (34%) 24 (59%) 41 
Table 4-1 – Breakdown of results from experiment 3 by age and gender. 
4.1.2 The effect of multiple options on choice selection (Exercise 1) 
This choice exercise did not confirm the bias proposed by Ariely (2008) that the presence of a 
clearly inferior option would lead to increased preference for a similar, but better option. 
Participants selected option A to the same degree in both versions of the experiment, while 
only option B seemed to be affected by the presence of a clearly inferior option (B-) (Table 
4-2) One would expect none to select option B- (Ariely, 2008) as it is clearly inferior. From a 
neoclassical economic perspective, this is suboptimal behaviour, as it violates the dominance 
axiom of EUT.  
 Option A Option B- Option B Total 
Version 1 (Q1) 77 (60%) (N/A) 51 (40%) 128 
Version 2 (Q2) 85 (62%) 16 (12%) 37 (27%) 138 
Table 4-2 – Breakdown of results from experiment 1. 
Within the context of this experiment, note that information overload and the effect on 
consumer behaviour have received some attention in the academic literature, but experimental 
results are inconclusive (e.g. Jacoby, 1984; Malhotra, 1984; Hwang & Lin, 1999). Honing in on 
choice selection, psychologists have discussed the observation that multiple options or the 
presence of inferior options can lead to suboptimal decisions visibly in violation of EUT (e.g. 
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004). If decisions can be affected by the presence of 
multiple or irrelevant options, this would suggest that the information presented to consumers 
should be limited to ease choice. The results from this exercise do seem to align with the 
suggestion that increasing the amount of options leads to suboptimal decisions, though it 
must be noted that the amount of options presented here much is lower than in the original 
experiment (c.f. Schwartz, 2004; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000). 
4.1.3 The effect of electricity cost salience on consumer purchase 
decisions (Exercise 2)  
The following choice preference exercise was intended to test whether the way information 
was presented (i.e. the salience of information) would make a difference to consumer choice. 
In both versions of the exercise, the participants were asked to choose between two fridges, a 
relatively efficient model (A) and a relatively inefficient model (B). Both questionnaires 
contained information on purchase price and yearly electricity consumption (in kWh). 
However, in version 2 (Q2) the kWh was also translated into cost of electricity over the 
lifetime of the fridge (set to be 12 years). A perfectly rational, utility maximising actor with 
perfect information would choose the same model in both experiments, as s/he would 
calculate the electricity price over the lifetime of the fridge and relate that to his personal 
discount rate, selecting the fridge that provided the highest utility (Frank, 1997). 
In version 1, where the electricity cost was not made salient, 85% of the participants chose the 
efficient fridge. When the electricity cost was made salient (version 2), this was the case for 
95% of the participants (Table 4-3). As such, making the information salient had a significant 
(at 99%) effect on purchase decision. As in exercise 3, men showed larger changes from 
version 1 to version 2 than women did. The percentage of men selecting the efficient model 
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increased from 83% to 96% (significant difference at 95%), while the percentage of women 
selecting the efficient model increased from 90% to 93% (this is not a significant difference, 
though it must be noted that small sample size for women can bias this result). That making 
information salient has an effect on preference is in line with other research on the topic 
(Newell & Siikamäki, 2013; Kallbekken et al., 2013). Kallbekken et al. (2013) found that 
highlighting the lifetime electricity cost led to consumers buying fridges that were 5% more 
efficient on average. In this experiment, the selection between the two fridges led to the 
fridges being selected having an average electricity consumption per year of 168 kWh/year in 
version 1, while version 2 led to an average electricity consumption per year of 156 kWh/year, 
which translates into a 7% drop in yearly energy consumption, in line with the results found 
by Kallbekken et al. (2013)41. Results from statistical tests can be seen in Appendix 6.5. 
 Fridge A (Efficient fridge) Fridge B (Non-efficient fridge) 
No cost salience (version 1) – all 112 (85.5%) 19 (14.5%) 
Cost salience (version 2) – all 138 (95%) 7 (5%) 
No cost salience (version 1) – men 66 (82.5%) 14 (17.5%) 
Cost salience (version 2) – men 98 (96%) 4 (4%) 
No cost salience (version 1) – women 46 (90%) 5 (10%) 
Cost salience (version 2) – women 38 (93%) 3 (7%) 
Table 4-3 – Breakdown of results from experiment 2 
4.1.4 The effect of information salience on implicit discount rates 
(Exercises 4 & 5) 
As elaborated on in section 2.2.2, implicit consumer discount rates have been discussed 
extensively in academic literature, especially in relation to EE (e.g Hausman, 1979; Gately, 
1980; Train, 1985; Ruderman et al., 1987; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994a, 1994b; Hasset & Metcalf, 
1993; Howarth & Sanstad, 1995). However, whether the accessibility or salience of EE 
information affects the implicit discount rate has only received scant attention in literature 
(Houston, 1983; Train, 1985). The following two exercises intended to test whether 
information does affect decisions by subjecting participants to a number of imagined EE 
investment decisions, and deriving implicit discount rates from their answers. 
The first question was framed in a relatively simple manner, asking participants to indicate 
their willingness to undertake an EE investment with known costs and benefits. The first 
observation from this exercise is that the implicit consumer discount rate appears to indeed be 
high: A little less than half of the participants provide answers that indicate that they are not 
willing to undertake investments with a payback period of 6 years, which translates into a 
discount rate >16%, while around 10% are not willing to undertake an investment with a 
payback period of 4 years, which implies a discount rate >25%. Overall, as slightly over half of 
the participants are willing to undertake both these measures, this translates into a discount 
rate for the group somewhere above 16%, possibly in the range of 16-20% (Table 4-4). 
To test for the notion that small sums are discounted higher than large, as theorised by e.g. 
Frederick et al. (2002), the values indicated in the two versions of the experiment differ by a 
                                                
41 Calculation for electricity use: Average electricity consumption = (electricity usage per year fridge A * percentage selecting 
fridge A) + (electricity usage per year fridge B * percentage selecting fridge B). Version 1: (150kWh/year*0.855) + 
(274kWh/year*0.145) = 168 kWh/year. Version 2: (150kWh/year*0.952) + (274kWh/year*0.048) = 156 kWh/year. 
Drop in consumption: (average electricity use version 1 – average electricity use version 2 / average electricity use version 
1) = (168-156)/168 = 0.0714 = 7.14%. 
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factor of 10 between version 1 (Q1) (small values) and version 2 (Q2) (large values). Although 
it would seem that large values lead to lower discount rates, there is no significant difference 
between the answers in the two versions (p-value: 0.41), indicating that people are fairly 
consistent in applying discount rates even if the total sum changes (Table 4-4). 
 Discount rate ≤ 16% Discount rate 16-25% Discount rate > 25% 
Both versions (Q1 + Q2) 149 (57%) 84 (32%) 28 (11%) 
Version 1 (Q1) 67 (56%) 36 (30%) 16 (13%) 
Version 2 (Q2) 82 (58%) 48 (34%) 12 (8%) 
Table 4-4 – Breakdown of results from experiment 4. 
The following exercise (#5) tested whether the difficulty of the language with which the 
question was asked had an impact on the implicit discount rate derived. The participants were 
asked to state how large a yearly saving they would need in order to be willing to install an 
energy saving device that cost 500DKK. This question is, if understood in economic terms, 
indistinguishable from the question asked in choice exercise 4, as it can be used to derive the 
implicit discount rate of participants. Almost a third of the participants (29%) found this to be 
such a difficult task that they either gave no answer (14.5% of participants) or gave answers 
indicating very large discount rates (upwards of 200%) (14.5% of participants). These values 
are similar to those found in other studies (e.g. Hausman, 1979), and also reflects a finding 
from an experiment by Houston (1983) from which this experiment (#5) is derived, namely 
that framing a question on discounting in difficult language leads to a significantly larger 
amount of “no data” or “do not know”-answers than putting the question in simpler terms (as 
in exercise #4). Those of the participants that did state a reasonable return (defined here to be 
≤500 DKK) wanted on average a return of DKK164 per year, equal to an implicit discount 
rate of 33%, higher than in the exercise above (#4), where discount rates were found to be 
around 16 to 20%.  
The two exercises were also intended to test whether participants showed inconsistencies in 
discounting preferences with the aim assess if salience systematically influenced discount rates. 
In line with previous experiments on discounting (Train, 1985; Houston, 1983), participants 
were found to apply discount rates inconsistenly depending on framing. 5% of the participants 
said no to the short payback period (high discount rate) in exercise 4, but yes to the long 
payback period (low discount rate). More than a third (38%) of the participants gave 
inconsistent, none-overlapping discount estimates in the two examples, e.g. stating an implicit 
discount rate under 16% (yes to both questions in experiment 4), but above 25% in question 5 
(stating a payback of 200, say). It should be noted that participants conducted exercise 5 
immediately after exercise 4, and as such, should have their answers in recent memory, but the 
answers suggest that participants did not link the answers provided in the two exercises to 
each other. 
Reviewing the answers from exercise 2 that asked participants to select between two models 
of a fridge can also yield implicit discount rates (Table 4-5). Given current electricity prices, 
the payback period on the expensive, but energy efficient fridge is just over 6 years, meaning 
that the implicit discount rate is 15% or less for those buying the efficient fridge. As 85% of 
the participants select the efficient fridge, these 85% should also say yes to both questions in 
experiment 4, which would indicate a discount rate ≤16%. However, only 57% does so (Table 
4-4). Furthermore, the amount of participants that selected the efficient fridge increased when 
the electricity price was highlighted, which indicates that the discount rate is not a static figure, 
but changes depending on how a question is framed, as the other experiments also indicate. 
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 Fridge, version 1 Fridge, version 2 
Cost of fridge (DKK) 5,599 3,805 
Yearly electricity cost (DKK) 330 603 
Purchase cost difference 1,795 DKK 
Payback period (expensive fridge) 6 years 7 months 
Implicit discount rate ≤0.1519 (≤15.2%) 
Table 4-5 – Implicit discount rate derived from consumer purchase decisions 
4.1.5 The effect of default setting on electricity plan selection 
(Exercise 7) 
The effect of default setting on consumer decision making is well established in the literature 
(e.g. Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Carroll et al., 2009; Dinner 
et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2013). To test whether the default setting influenced preference for 
electricity plan, consumers were asked to state whether they wanted to keep the default plan or 
take action to get the non-default plan. In version 1 the static tariff (conventional) plan was 
the default, and in version 2 the dynamic tariff (new) plan was the default. Provided that the 
default is expected to have an effect on choice, the results are somewhat unexpected. In both 
versions, slightly less than 60% of the test subjects opted for the variable plan (Table 4-6). A 
chi-squared test was conducted, and no significant difference in choice of plan was found 
between the two versions (p-value: 0.59).  This is contrary to what was expected, as previous 
research (Pyrko & Darby, 2009) found that 70% of customers wanted their old conventional 
tariff back when the dynamic plan was the default.  
 Conventional plan Dynamic tariff plan Total 
All participants 115 (42%) 158 (58%) 273 
Participants (version 1) – Conventional plan default 53 (40%) 78 (60%) 131 
Participants (version 2) – Dynamic tariff plan default 62 (44%) 80 (56%) 142 
Table 4-6 – Breakdown of results from experiment 7 
4.1.6 Assessing the potential to use normative feedback (Energy-use 
awareness) 
The results from the test on above-average bias for energy-use awareness show that 
participants generally believe that they perform above average, meaning that they tend to 
believe that they are more aware of their own energy use, than the average Dane is of his/her 
own energy use. Results for own behaviour (m=5.83±2.02, n=64, M=6) are higher than 
results for other peoples’ behaviour (m=5.05±1.80, n=67, M=5). An f-test was performed to 
determine variance within the two samples (p-value: 0.351) indicating equal variance 
(homoscedasticity). A two-tailed t-test for equal variance samples was performed, which 
indicated a significant difference between the two answers (p-value: 0.0287). This indicates 
that the bias found was statistically significant, meaning that “own behaviour” was rated 
significantly above “other peoples behaviour.” However, it must be noted that only the 
sample for “Danes” was normally distributed, while the answers for “Me” had a slightly 
bimodal frequency distribution, limiting the conclusive power of a t-test, since this test 
requires samples to be normally distributed (Figure 4-2). Participant answers, as well as results 
from statistical tests can be seen in Appendix 6.6. 
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Figure 4-1 – Average energy-use awareness 
 
Figure 4-2 – Frequency distribution for energy-use awareness, “Me” and “Danes” 
4.1.7 The effect of framing on EE decisions and risk (Exercise 6) 
That EUT does not fully explain human behaviour with regards to risks has been amply 
discussed in economic research (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 
1988; Rabin & Thaler, 2001). In experiments (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, 1986; 1992), it has been shown that changing the framing of a question 
changes the outcome of the decision. The following experiment was intended to test whether 
this effect could be replicated for participants faced with a choice of buying either of two 
appliances, one with a guaranteed saving and one with a larger, but uncertain saving. When 
this was phrased with a gain framing (in version 1 (Q1) of the question), 89% of the 
participants were risk averse and only 11% were risk seeking. When the framing was changed 
to avoidance of loss, the percentage of participants showing risk averse behaviour had 
dropped to 72%, and the percentage of those showing risk seeking behaviour had increased to 
28% (Figure 4-3). A chi-squared test showed that there was a significant difference (at 99%) 
between the answers in the two versions, as was expected. The results are not as pronounced 
as in the experiment by Kahneman & Tversky (1984), as a higher percentage of participants in 
this experiment show loss averse behaviour than was found in the original version. However, 
participants do behave as predicted by the value function in CPT, as those participants 
subjected to a loss framing showed higher degrees of risk seeking behaviour, i.e. higher 
willingness to take the uncertain bet. The increase in risk seeking behaviour with loss framing 
is significant for both genders, and especially pronounced for women (95% for men and 99% 
for women). Men show a slightly higher degree of risk seeking behaviour when not subjected 
to a loss framing (not significant at 95%), but the two genders show similar behaviour when 
subjected to a loss framing (Table 4-7). All results from statistical tests can be seen in 
Appendix 6.7. 
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 nRiskAverse (percentage) nRiskSeeking (percentage) Total 
Gain framing (version 1) – all 114 (89%) 14 (11%) 128 
Loss framing (version 2) – all 100 (72%) 39 (28%) 139 
Gain framing (version 1) – men 66 (86%) 11 (14%) 77 
Loss framing (version 2) – men 74 (73%) 27 (27%) 101 
Gain framing (version 1) – women 48 (94%) 3 (6%) 51 
Loss framing (version 2) – women 26 (68%) 12 (32%) 38 
Table 4-7 – Breakdown of results from Experiment 6 
 
Figure 4-3 – Percentage of participants showing risk averse and risk seeking behaviour, respectively, in the two 
versions of the experiment 
 
4.2 Smart Meters and electricity use reduction 
4.2.1 Smart Meter analysis 
As it was not possible to get extensive background information about the households where 
the Smart Meters were installed, a multiple regression analysis of consumption was not an 
option. Instead, to assess the effect, the deviation in weekly consumption from expected 
consumption was compared. Data from 3,000 Danish households was used to create a yearly 
demand profile for an average Danish household, against which the consumption data from 
the Smart Meters could be compared (NorthQ, 2013). The data is based on daily readings, but 
has been converted into weekly values and normalized, displaying the weekly consumption as 
a percentage of the yearly consumption. The profile can be seen in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 – Weekly consumption as a percentage of yearly total (Data from NorthQ, 2013). 
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To assess the effect of installing the Smart Meters, the consumption from the first week after 
installation was taken as a starting point, assumed to be the ‘normal’ consumption from which 
an effect should be discerned. Based on the yearly consumption profile, the expected weekly 
consumption was calculated, while taking into account the time of the time of the year the 
meter was installed (week = 0) (e.g. in week 27 consumption was expected to be 1.644% of 
total yearly consumption). This means that the starting point varies according to the 
installation time for the meter (1 ≥ X ≤ 52). The actual consumption in week 0+X was then 
compared to the expected consumption in week 0+X, and the relative change in consumption 
from the expected consumption was found. 
𝐸!"#$%&'%'$ = 𝐶!"#$%& − 𝐶!"#$%&$'𝐶!"#$%&$' ∗ 100% 
Based on this, the relative effectiveness of the meters, i.e. the deviation in percentage from the 
expected consumption, was found for the 49 Smart Meters. Due to the applied method (using 
only week 1 as baseline), relative large deviations (±50%) were found. The deviations are 
especially large (+200%) for two datasets (no. 217 & 451), as can be seen from Appendix 6.8. 
Data is quite scant for the weeks before week 43 in 2013 (less than 10 observations), due to a 
lack of installed meters in the early period. For this reason, the early results are not included; 
neither are the two ‘abnormally’ large observations. The final results can be seen in Figure 4-5. 
Due to lack of space, the legend is excluded, but a larger version can be seen in Appendix 6.8. 
 
Figure 4-5 – Deviations in electricity consumption from expected values for the Smart Meters analysed. 
Although the effect on electricity use reduction is difficult to quantify due to large 
fluctuations, an assessment was made nonetheless. The average deviations are negative 75% of 
the time (31/40 weeks) (i.e. consumption is below the expected value). Overall, the average 
change from the expected consumption is -6.6%. However, the standard deviation is 0.43, or 
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43% (n=47), meaning that there is a large variation in the effect found. Taking only values 
from week 43 in 2013 and onwards changes the effect to -6.7%(±41%, n=47). The weekly 
deviations are negative in 309 instances and positive in 341 instances, indicating that the 
average negative deviation is slightly larger than the average positive deviation. 
4.2.2 Loss aversion and Smart Meter effectiveness 
Whether loss aversion can affect electricity use consumption has, to the knowledge of this 
author, not been previously tested. This experiment was intended to make up for this lack of 
knowledge. Due to the limited sample size (nfinal = 6, nLAReg = 3, nNoReg = 3) available for 
regression analysis, a multiple regression analysis of consumption was finally dismissed after 
statistically insignificant results were computed. 
Due to the low level of responses and thus the statistical power to explain the variability of the 
dependent variable (energy use) using econometric analysis, a different analysis was performed 
for all households (n=16) for which Smart Meter data was available. 11 of these households 
had been subjected to the loss aversion widget (nLA = 11), while 5 had not (nNo = 5). The 
analyses ignore the fact that there is a difference in the composition of the households (e.g. 
size, number of householders, income), and is somewhat similar to the analysis conducted for 
the long-term Smart Meter data in section 4.1.6. However, as the experiment took place over 
just 5 weeks in the summer months, no climate correction was done42. The results for the two 
analyses and the respective parts (daily and standby consumption) can be seen below. 
The effect of loss framing on total daily household electricity consumption 
The daily consumption for each day in the time series was plotted for all households. Data is 
somewhat scattered and fluctuates significantly within and between households (see full data 
plot in Appendix 6.9). There is a tendency that the average consumption of the two groups 
drops over time. However, there is an indication that those households subjected to the loss 
aversion widget reduced their consumption by a larger figure over the course of the 
intervention period, than those in the reference group (Table 4-8 and Figure 4-6). Incidentally, 
the same reduction is found for the reference group as for the Smart Meter group as a whole, 
but this is assumed to be a coincidence and further research is needed to address causality. 
The larger reduction for the participants subjected to loss aversion suggest that seeing a 
reduction in electricity as avoiding a loss (as done by the LA group) provides a stronger 
incentive to reduce this loss than seeing a reduction is electricity as gaining a benefit (as done 
by the No group). This is in line with the value function of CPT (section 2.3.2) and previous 
research on loss aversion in other areas (e.g. Genesove & Mayer, 2001; Tom et al., 2007). 
Though the reductions are highly uncertain, they roughly correspond with the general notion 
(e.g. Kahneman, 2011) that losses are felt twice as much as gains. 
 First week Average 
(kWh) 
Mid-period week 
Average (kWh) 
Last week Average 
(kWh) 
Change in 
consumption 
Loss Aversion (n=11) 5.72 4.88 4.68 -18% 
No intervention (n=5) 5.10 -- 4.72 -7% 
Table 4-8 – Daily average consumption for households in loss aversion experiment 
                                                
42 Based on the yearly consumption data used to correct the Smart Meter data, consumption is expected to be about 5% 
higher at the end of the test period than at the beginning, so if anything, not correcting for climate impacts yield answers 
that might be too low. As so many other variables were also not accounted for, it was assumed that not correcting for 
climate variability would have little influence. 
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Figure 4-6 – Average electricity consumption per day (kWh) for the test group (blue) and reference group (red) 
over the course of the experiment 
It was also assessed what the effect of the loss framing can be said to be, when the data is 
analysed using the same methodology as applied in the Smart Meter data analysis (c.f. section 
4.2). The data series contains daily data and run over a shorter time period, but the method is 
almost identical; the first seven days was used as a starting point (reference consumption) 
while the relative change from this was taken as the effect of the intervention. Analysis reveal 
that the relative change is -5.2% on average for the loss aversion meters, and 2.2% for the 
non-loss aversion meters if starting from day 8, and slightly less if all days are included (Table 
4-9). However, and with due limitations, the findings are still consistent with the results found 
with the first method: the loss aversion widget has a larger effect than when no loss framing is 
applied. 
 With loss framing No loss framing 
Change, all days included (also first week) -4.3% 1.8% 
Change, all days after day 7 (not first week) -5.2% 2.2% 
Table 4-9 – Effect of loss aversion framing on daily consumption using a different method for calculation 
The effect of loss framing on household standby electricity consumption 
The nightly consumption for each calendar day in the time series was plotted for all 
households under the assumption that nightly electricity consumption could be taken as a 
proxy for standby electricity consumption43. As is the case with the daily data series, the 
nightly data display fluctuations within and between households, but the internal variation is 
smaller, indicating that standby consumption is comparatively steady (see full data plot in 
Appendix 6.9). As above, there is a tendency that those subjected to the loss aversion frame 
reduced their consumption over the course of the experiment, however in this case the 
reduction is larger (Table 4-10). Those without the intervention consumed roughly the same in 
the beginning and the end of the experiment, while those subjected to loss aversion cut their 
consumption by a quarter on average (Figure 4-7 and Table 4-10). For the nightly values, the 
difference between the two types of framing is markedly larger than for the daily values. As 
                                                
43 It should be noted that the data nightly data is not available for one of the households that are part of the daily data series, 
which reduces the number of non-intervention households to 4 in this case. 
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nightly values was labelled standby consumption and aggregated to a yearly figure, this 
suggests that the salience of the standby cost increased, which would further contribute to the 
reduction in consumption. This would be in line with other research (e.g. Gilbert & Zivin, 
2014) as well as the other experiments conducted for this thesis (e.g. exercise #2), and 
indicates that highlighting certain aspects can increase the effect of feedback. 
 First week Average 
(kWh) 
Mid-period week 
Average (kWh) 
Last week Average 
(kWh) 
Change 
Loss Aversion (n=11) 1.04 0.94 0.75 -28% 
No intervention (n=4) 0.89 -- 0.86 -3% 
Table 4-10 – Nightly average consumption for households in loss aversion experiment 
 
Figure 4-7 – Average electricity consumption per night (kWh) for the test group (blue) and reference group 
(red) over the course of the experiment 
Similar to the daily consumption figures, standby data is also analysed using the same 
approach as applied in the Smart Meter data analysis (c.f. section 4.2). Analysis reveal that the 
relative change is -12.8% on average for the loss aversion meters, and 2.4% for the non-loss 
aversion meters (Table 4-11). The findings are slightly smaller if all days are included, 
consistent with the findings for daily consumption. The findings are consistent with the results 
found with the first method in that it also finds the loss aversion widget to have a larger effect 
on consumption than when no loss framing is applied. Similarly, this method also finds that 
there is a larger effect on standby consumption than on daily consumption from applying the 
loss framing. 
 With loss framing No loss framing 
Change, all days included (also first week) -10.5% 2.4% 
Change, all days after day 7 (not first week) -12.8% 3.2% 
Table 4-11 – Effect of loss aversion framing on standby consumption using a different method for calculation. 
4.2.3 Review of the effect of Individual Feedback 
In order to be able to compare the effect found in the Smart Meter analysis and the loss 
aversion experiment against the ‘normal’ effect of feedback, a literature-based analysis was 
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conducted44. Though some literature reviews exist, they were, with the notable exception of 
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010), deemed to contain an insufficient amount of information to 
conclude on the magnitude of the effect of feedback, as basic statistical tests, as well as 
comparisons against intervention time or group size, were generally lacking. The feedback was 
divided into groups depending on how often feedback was provided, as, theoretically, 
providing feedback more often should increase salience and thus lead to higher reductions. 
In general, the studies reviewed indicate that providing feedback results in electricity 
reductions of 1-13% (m=-6.9±5.8%, M=-6.5%, n=23). The result can be seen in Figure 4-8. 
This range (1 to 13 percent) is generally in line with the ranges given in recent studies 
(Abrahamse et al., 2005; Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008), though in the lower end. The mean and 
median are almost similar, indicating that there are just as many studies finding no effects as 
studies finding large effects. The standard deviation is around ±5% (percentage points), which 
shows that there is a relatively large spread in the effect found in the studies. There is an 
indication that the studies that provided feedback frequently, i.e. weekly or more often, are 
more effective than those that provide feedback less often, but the difference is not 
significant. 
 
Figure 4-8 – Average change in electricity consumption from feedback intervention (non-normative) with 
percentage change, as well as one standard deviation. 
Similarly, Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) speculate that the effects found are somewhat 
dependent on group size and intervention period. Indeed, there seems to be an indication that 
smaller studies and studies with short intervention periods find larger effects than studies with 
large groups and long time horizons (Figure 4-9 and Figure 4-10). To assess whether this was 
the case, an f-test was conducted to test whether any of these had a significant influence on 
the variability in electricity reduction reported (Table 4-12). Applying a 95%-confidence level, 
none of the two can be said to have a significant influence. However, changing the confidence 
level to 90% brings the “feedback as function of sample size” within range of the critical 
value, and changing the confidence level to 85% brings it below. This means that it can be said 
with an 85%-confidence interval that the sample size has an effect on the size of the feedback. 
However, applying such a low confidence interval is not the norm, and therefore this thesis 
does not draw any conclusions from this. However, due to the limited sample size (n=20), an 
effect cannot be ruled out, especially not for sample size, and further research is warranted. 
                                                
44 The criteria for including a study in the review was: (a) the presence of a control/no effect group, (b) a quantitative estimate 
of the effect of the intervention provided, (c) a test group larger than 10 individuals/households, (d) the feedback could 
not be normative (social). Where available, the intervention length was also included. The studies included in the review 
can be seen in Appendix 6.10. 
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Statistical parameters Feedback as a function of 
length of intervention period 
Feedback as a function of 
sample size 
n 20 20 
r, r^2 -0.165, 0.027 -0.339, 0.115 
f-test 0.557 2.597 
f-critical (95%, 90%, 85%) 4.351, 2.975, 2.241 4.351, 2.975, 2.241 
p-value 0.465 0.123 
Table 4-12 – Statistical test results for the f-test  
 
Figure 4-9 – Effect of feedback as a function of intervention group size 
 
Figure 4-10 – Effect of feedback as a function of intervention length 
Only a limited amount of academic studies explicitly testing the effect of comparative 
feedback could be found (Midden et al., 1983; Schultz et al., 2007; Abrahamse et al., 2007; 
Nolan et al. 2008), and these all find reductions in consumption. Excluding the oldest study 
(Midden et al., 1983) yields an effect slightly higher than that found for individual feedback 
(m=-7.2%±2.4%, n=3). It should be noted that these reductions are notably larger than those 
found in a large-scale study (n>3,000) conducted by the American utility OPOWER, who 
found reductions of 2.24%[95%-confidence interval: 1.91%; 2.56%] (Klos, 2009, p. 2) from 
normative feedback, and a large-scale British trial (AECOM, 2011) who found effects ranging 
from 1-2% reduction in energy use from comparative feedback. As these trials are larger and 
of newer date, they probably provide a more accurate view of the reductions, which can 
realistically be expected from feedback. The effects found in the large-scale trials are about a 
quarter to a third of effect found in the smaller studies. If the findings from this type of 
feedback (normative) provide any indication of what can be expected with behavioural 
feedback, this suggests that feedback using loss aversion should result in reductions of 4-6% 
in daily consumption and 6-8% reduction in standby consumption45. 
                                                
45 Daily consumption effect: 18%. 18*0.33 = 6%. 18*0.25 = 4.5%. Standby consumption effect: 25%. 25*0.33 = 8.33%. 
25*0.25 = 6.25% 
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5 Discussion 
This section opens with a discussion of the results. Firstly, the results from the preference 
choice exercises are discussed, and suggestions for further research needs are given. This is 
then followed by a discussion of the results from the Smart Meter analysis and the Smart 
Meter experiment, in this context and in relation to other feedback studies in general. Finally, 
the limitations and applicability of the results found in this thesis are discussed. The following 
section discusses the methodology applied for conducting this research, and the experiments 
and the conceptual framework are discussed in turn. The final section of this chapter discusses 
the policy implications of this research before providing considerations for further 
development of Smart Metering and behavioural interventions. 
5.1 Discussion of Results 
5.1.1 Behavioural Interventions and energy-use behaviour 
Knowledge and the effect of information type and salience 
The two stated goals of the exercises on this topic, to test the level of knowledge and to test 
whether the way information was presented would make a difference to consumer choice, 
were both assessed successfully. Generally, it is confirmed that a knowledge-gap (information 
deficit gap) exists, since only about half of the participants were able to identify the right price, 
even in the relatively easy version. Although the knowledge displayed in the two 
questionnaires was not statistically significantly different overall, it was interesting to note that 
there was a different in knowledge between genders and that especially men were influenced 
by the salience of the information. That participants do not know the price of a kWh indicate 
that presenting information on kWh-consumption alone would have little effect on 
consumption. This reflects findings from other studies, e.g. o Karjalainen (2011, p. 466) who 
found that “many people have problems with understanding scientific units and do not 
understand the difference between W and kWh.”  
The exercise on salience of information (exercise #2) confirmed that the salience of 
information affects consumer choice, as there was a significant difference between the fridges 
selected in the two versions. If people had perfect knowledge on electricity prices and were 
perfectly rational and not limited in mental processing capacity, they would be able to calculate 
the electricity price in version 1, as the electricity consumption is displayed in both versions, 
and then select the appropriate fridge. However, as exercise 1 showed, people do not know 
the electricity price, and are thus not able to select the fridge that correspond to their 
preference. As the only difference is the salience of the electricity cost, this shows that the 
salience of and the way information is presented can influence behaviour. The implications for 
EE is that e.g. energy labels should display expected energy costs over the lifetime of the 
product (and/or per year) rather than the total kWh per year, as this clearly do not have the 
intended effect. For Smart Meter feedback, it indicates that cost is more salient and easier to 
interpret than scientific units, and that aggregation (over life time rather than year, or over year 
rather than month) also make it more salient, and thus easier to understand. This suggests that 
Smart Meters should provide lifetime benefit of undertaking an EE investment such as 
procuring a new fridge, rather than simply displaying the amount of saved kWh that an 
upgrade could result in46. The effect of salience is recognised by very few studies, let alone 
policies, indicating that this observation has not yet translated into common knowledge. 
                                                
46 An interesting thought suggested by Baddeley (2011) would be to make salient and aggregate the impact of a certain act, 
such as washing clothes at a lower temperature, over an entire population, rather than the individual, to increase the 
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Contrary to the first two exercises presented here, the results from exercise 1 did not obey by 
the theoretical expectation. The presence of an additional option (B-) did not increase the 
attractiveness of option B, but rather decreased it. Ariely (2008) theorised that it should 
increase, as the inferior option (B-) would make option B appear more attractive. One can 
speculate that perhaps the presence of extra information did nothing more than confuse 
participants rather than making any option appear more attractive. Research by Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) found that increasing the amount of options makes choosing the preferred 
option more difficult for participants and decreases the percentage making the optimal 
(rational) decision. The results from this exercise, although the amount of choices are more 
limited here than in the research by Iyengar and Lepper (2000), yield some support to this. 
The implication of this insight is that more information is not necessarily better and that 
consumers should be presented only with information relevant to energy efficiency 
investments and electricity consumption, nothing more, as this simply complicates the 
decision. 
Discounting preferences and the effect on the EE gap 
The exercises (4 and 5) confirmed the expectation that people are inconsistent in applying 
discount rates, and provided interesting insights into how this can potentially be used when 
providing consumers with EE information through Smart Meters. When the question was 
framed as an easy calculation (exp. 4), the implicit discount rates were rather low (around 16-
20%), while they increased significantly (to above 30%) when the question was difficult (exp. 
5). The discount rate is lowest (<15%) and actually close to the expected market rates (c.f. 
footnote 21) when participants face a direct comparison between two fairly similar goods (exp. 
2). As noted, participants are generally inconsistent in applying discount rates. This, along with 
the relatively large proportion not able to understand or answer either the more difficult 
question indicate that asking participants to state an expected saving (and thus their implicit 
discount rate) is not likely to yield very accurate estimates of actual behaviour. The results 
show that how information is provided and the context it is placed in affects the discount rate 
of the participants, exactly as theorised. How information is provided thus has an effect on 
how people behave, and indirectly affect their total electricity consumption, as their 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for energy efficient measures can be greatly influenced depending 
on how the information is presented.  
It is possible that loss aversion also contributes to the relatively higher discount rates in 
exercise 4 and 5. The question is framed as a cost now and a benefit occurring later in time. 
This means that if the investment is not made, the upfront cost is seen as avoiding a loss, 
while the gains are forgone benefits. This could probably be avoided if the question was 
turned around to indicate that forgoing a gain now could lead to avoiding a loss in the future 
(the two decisions are mathematically identical, but psychologically different). The impact of 
this has not been tested here, but Johnson and Goldstein (2013, p. 422) find that this framing 
significantly changes savings behaviour, which in essence is not much different from 
investments in EE, in that both entail forgone benefits now (money cannot be spent on other 
goods), but greater benefits later in time (interests in the case of saving, reduced energy costs 
in the case of EE). 
                                                                                                                                              
perceived effect of this change: “if all UK households were to wash their clothes at 30 degrees centigrade or less, this 
could save 620,000 tonnes of CO2 and £170million on energy bills. However, the disaggregated savings per change are 
generally not large; one household washing clothes in water at 30 degrees or less would save just £12 per year on their 
energy bill” (Baddeley, 2011). 
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Since discount rates are inconsistent, the EE gap could be narrowed if Smart Meters were 
used to provide consumers with simplified information on energy efficiency investment 
decisions. The results indicate that providing tangible information, such as “by spending €100 
on XX you could save €25 on electricity per year” lead to lower discount rates than those that 
are derived from actual consumer behaviour or less concrete suggestions. Furthermore, due to 
loss aversion, the effect would probably increase if it was not framed as a gain, but as an 
avoided loss: “by spending €100 on XX could reduce your electricity cost by €25 per year.” 
Providing this information through Smart Meters is technically possible and can contribute to 
closing the EE gap, which could increase the overall effect of installing the meters. 
The effect of defaults on plan selection  
Based on the results from previous research on the effect of defaults (e.g. Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Dinner et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2013) and 
the apparent reluctance of consumers to adopt dynamic tariffs (e.g. Pyrko & Darby, 2009), the 
results of the default choice exercise were somewhat unexpected, as the dynamic pricing plan 
was chosen by about 60% of the participants in both versions. It is possible that the 
mentioning of an expected 5% reduction in electricity costs with the dynamic pricing plan had 
an effect, but it was not possible to test whether this was the case. Furthermore, as the 
consumers did not actually change their tariff, but merely indicated what they would do in 
such a situation, there were virtually no TCs, nor any risk, involved in selecting the dynamic 
pricing plan. However, if the decision made by participants actually had to be carried out in 
real life, it is likely that the results would have been different, a possibility which is discussed 
later in relation to the limitations of these exercises. 
Individual behaviour and normative statements 
Assuming energy-use awareness is normally distributed and non-skewed, naturally about half 
of us will be less energy-aware than the average person47. However, the results from the 
energy-use awareness experiment show that people generally believe that they are more aware 
of their energy use than the average Dane is. This shows that people hold beliefs about their 
actions that are sometimes not in accordance with reality, which has implications for 
information provision, as it suggests that descriptive normative statements (Cialdini et al., 
1990) would induce these people to change behaviour. It then follows that feedback, such as 
that provided by OPOWER (as described in Klos et al., 2009) would be a cost-effective way 
(Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010) of correcting this bias through information provision. 
Risk aversion and framing 
In risk aversion exercise (#6), there was a very significant difference in the option preferred by 
participants in the two versions, indicating that this frame do indeed affect behaviour. Some 
researchers (e.g. Hasset & Metcalf, 1993) have argued that the risk inherent in many EE 
decisions justifies the apparently high discount rates observed. This experiment showed that 
risk preferences depend on framing, and that a loss framing can induce risk-seeking behaviour. 
This means that framing an energy efficiency investment decision as avoiding a loss, rather 
than obtaining a gain, can possibly increase the number of people willing to undertake such 
investments and thus help close the EE gap. Similarly, as noted by Weber (2013), the 
willingness to undertake EE investments should also increase if the added up-front costs of 
most EE investments can be reframed not as losses, but rather as forgone gains (c.f. the value 
                                                
47 It must be noted, however, that while the answers on “Danes” are unimodal, the answers on “Me” are slightly bimodal. It 
is now known why this tendency is found, but if it is replicated in the population as well, one could speculate that people 
“classify” themselves as belonging to either an “I’m doing okay”-group, or an “I’m doing good”-group. It then follows 
that feedback would have the most significant impact on those people in the ‘good’ group, who are actually not 
performing well. This possibility was not explored further. 
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function in CPT). Weber (2013) further argues that the certainty effect can explain why 
humans often fail to capture energy-efficiency gains; sure outcomes (e.g. deciding between an 
efficient, but more expensive fridge, or a cheaper, but less efficient one) tend to be costly, 
whereas gains (e.g. savings on energy from the efficient fridge) are delayed in time and 
uncertain, meaning that the sure, but negative decision carry more weight than the uncertain 
decision. The findings in this study support this argument. 
5.1.2 Behavioural interventions and the potential to use Smart Meters 
to improve feedback to electricity customers 
Smart Meter effectiveness 
The amount of large-scale trials testing the effect of installing a Smart Meter is somewhat 
limited. McKerracher & Torriti (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of the effect of feedback 
using Smart Meters, and argue that using data from current studies, a realistic, large-scale 
conservation effect from feedback is in the range of 3-5 %. As few longitudinal studies are 
available, the long-term effect is difficult to assess. Van Dam et al. (2010, p. 465) find that 
participants equipped with a Smart Meter achieved average savings after four months of 7.8% 
(SD = 13.8%, n = 54), but report that the effect had dropped to an average of 1.9% (SD = 
11.8%, n = 54) after 15 months. All in all, a total of 19 separate Smart Meter intervention 
studies testing the effect of feedback were found (these were found in Gans et al., 2013; van 
Dam et al., 2010; Ersson & Pyrko, 2009; AECOM, 2011; Schleich et al., 2011; 2013; and 
Grønhøj & Thøgersen, 2011). The average effect was -1.6%(±9.7%, 1st-3rd quartile: -6.15% to 
0.05%, M=-2.9%, n=19). If meters with IHD’s are excluded, the effect changes to -
0.7%(±11.2%, M=-2.4%, n=14). Given the different nature of the studies, the lack of 
longitudinal studies, and the general context in which these studies were conducted (different 
countries, different setups, different time of the year), it is very hard to generalise from this48.  
The results of the Smart Meter data analysis are roughly consistent with the reductions found 
in the literature, as an effect of 6.7%(±41%) falls within most of the studies reviewed. Gans et 
al. (2013) find reductions ranging from 11% to 17%, somewhat larger than this experiment, 
while Grønhøj and Thøgersen (2011) found reductions of 8.1% and Van Dam et al. (2010) 
found reductions of 7.8%, almost exactly the same as this study. Schleich et al. (2013) find 
reductions of 4.5%, slightly below the reductions found here. The findings from the large-
scale trials in the UK also all find reductions below 4.0% (AECOM, 2011). Schleich et al. 
(2011; 2013) and Gans et al. (2013) all use regression analysis, but find fairly different effects, 
indicating that other contextual factors probably also matter. 
The large standard deviation found in the analysis conducted for this thesis indicates that one 
probably should not take the results too literal. The small sample size and the large 
fluctuations mean that one “odd” sample have enormous influence on results, as shown by 
the effect of removing two observations (changing the overall effect from an increase to a 
reduction). This means that the results are incredibly sensitive to deviating observations. As no 
background information on the households included in the sample was available (household 
size, income, housing type, etc.) it was not possible to test for the effect of these variables. 
Obviously, this also limits the strength of the results. Using the first week as “background 
consumption” also introduces an error, as an unusually high or low first week will lead to large 
deviations later on. In order to have a firm basely from which to estimate a change in 
                                                
48 However, the lower median value indicates a larger number of studies found low values (i.e. reductions), and perhaps the 
presence of a single (or a few) studies (e.g. Ersson and Pyrko, 2009a; 2009b) finding high values (i.e. large increases) 
distorts the picture. 
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consumption, a much longer time series pre-installation of the meter is needed. As the climate 
lead to seasonal fluctuations, correcting the consumption for yearly fluctuations should 
increase the relative strength of the results. 
Loss Aversion and the effect of framing feedback as avoiding a loss 
The Smart Meter experiment with loss framing intervention was intended to test whether the 
reduction in electricity consumption could be affected by framing electricity consumption as a 
loss, which would mean that a reduction in consumption would be seen as avoiding a loss, 
rather than a gain, as is the usual frame. A regression analysis was not possible due to the low 
number of participants that filled out the accompanying questionnaire, and instead simpler 
analyses were conducted. 
In the first analysis, the effect was assessed by comparing average use in the beginning of the 
period with average use at the end of the intervention period, while in the second analysis, the 
effect was found by comparing the average deviation from the baseline consumption in a 
manner similar to that applied for the first Smart Meter analysis. The effect found using the 
second analysis method is slightly smaller than with the first method, possibly because the first 
seven days (where the meter is already installed) are taken as a starting point, which means that 
any reduction made in that period would lead to a lower starting point from which change 
should then be discerned. However, both analyses found that the loss framing leads to larger 
reductions in electricity and that this is especially pronounced for standby consumption. As 
the standby consumption is framed as a loss and made more salient by aggregating costs for a 
year, this supports the hypotheses that increasing the salience and framing reductions as 
avoiding a loss rather than obtaining a gain, leads to changes in behaviour. 
However, it must be noted that this loss framing Smart Meter experiment is also short-term 
and small-scale, as most studies reviewed, meaning that if other feedback studies provide any 
indication, the effect will be smaller in the population than in the study sample and possibly 
diminish over time. It must be noted that it is plausible that people with an interest in 
electricity conservation are overrepresented in the sample, as all the participants in the loss 
aversion experiment that did answer the background questions indicated that they considered 
themselves to be “environmentally aware.” However, knowing from the energy-use awareness 
experiment that people consider themselves more aware of energy use than other people, it is 
also possible that they suffer from the same “above average” bias as was found in that 
experiment. This possibility has not been further explored. 
As was discussed earlier, the studies reviewed for the effect of feedback were also limited by 
low statistical explanatory power due to limited sample sizes and lack of background 
information. This suggests that feedback studies generally are very difficult to conduct and 
that the work conducted for this thesis, which also was limited by this, might not be the 
exception. Although the results are not representative of the Danish population, and although 
it was not determined whether there was a significant difference between the intervention 
group and the reference group, the experiment nonetheless provide an indication that future 
research should do well to focus on these aspects when designing feedback studies. 
Reviewing the effect of feedback provision 
Compared to studies employing meters to provide feedback, there is a relative abundance of 
studies that have tested the effect of information provision to consumers, and several review 
studies (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010; 
Vine et al., 2013) have assessed the overall effect of these interventions. As noted, these 
studies, which are similar to the review conducted here, do find an overall reduction of 
electricity as a result of feedback. The review conducted for this thesis is in the lower range of 
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the scale, but generally consistent with previous estimates. However, some researchers (e.g. 
Gans et al., 2013) caution against taking the reductions reported too literal, as many of the 
studies and reviews do not contain any statistical tests of the significance of the results, mostly 
due to the relative low number of households/participants in the experimental group, as well 
as the large within-group variation (Osbaldiston & Schott, 2011; Abrahamse et al., 2005). This 
suggests that it is common to have very low-level (statistical) sample data, meaning that the 
sample size and statistical power of the experiments conducted for this thesis are the norm 
rather than the exception. Similarly, almost no studies employ multiple regression analysis to 
test the influence of other variables, and it is thus difficult to know whether there is really an 
effect (a driver or signal) or it is merely the influence of another variable (“the noise”), such as 
housing size, which is picked up as a signal (Silver, 2012). Contrary to other reviews of 
feedback (e.g. Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Vine et al., 2013), this thesis cautions against 
concluding that an effect of the magnitude found in a sample will arise in a population, as a 
number of factors potentially affecting the magnitude of the reduction needs to be further 
explored. The following paragraphs will elaborate on these.  
Longitudinal effects 
Reviewing studies against their duration, Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010, p. 53) find that 
“average energy savings were higher for shorter studies (10.1%) than for longer studies 
(7.7%).” This is reflected by the finding that in the situations where a follow-up to a short-
term study was conducted (e.g. van Dam et al., 2010; AECOM, 2011), the effect had often 
diminished over time (this is acknowledged in some review studies (e.g. Abrahamse et al., 
2005; Owen & Ward, 2006; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010). However, the analysis conducted 
for this study showed that the duration of the study did not have a significant effect on the 
magnitude of the electricity reduction found. The Smart Meter data collected for this 
experiment also cover relatively short time periods (less than 3 months) for most of the data 
point in the sample. Although the effect is not significant, the possibility of a diminishing 
effect over time, this calls for further research to explore the longitudinal effects of feedback, 
comparative, normative, as well as behavioural. 
Effect of sample size 
Some studies (e.g. Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010) also speculate that small-sample studies find 
higher levels of effect than large-scale studies, e.g. Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) find that 
“average energy savings across large-sample [>100] studies is roughly 6.6% compared to 
average savings of 11.6% across small-sample [<100] studies.” This report also tested these 
relationships, and although there is an indication that Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) are right 
in assuming that small-scale studies generally find larger effects, the results are not statistically 
significant. However, the finding is not robust, and the low number of studies evaluated 
(n=20), calls for further evaluation studies that take these issues into account. If small samples 
do find larger reductions, it would of course have implications for real-life interventions, as it 
would suggest that the effect found in a population would be smaller than in the study sample, 
meaning that the effect of the Smart Meter rollout would be smaller than indicated by trials. 
Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. (2010) further caution that only two household-level studies in recent 
times (post-1995) have found energy savings in excess of 10% as a result of feedback, a 
finding which indicate that the very large numbers reported in older literature (e.g. 18.8% 
reduction in Midden et al., 1983) most likely are not a reflection of the reductions that one can 
expect from Smart Meter interventions. They further speculate that reviews including studies 
older than 20 years (as is done by e.g. the widely cited study by Darby, 2006) might result in 
“inflated expectations regarding potential energy savings today” (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 
Simon Bager, IIIEE, Lund University 
56 
2010, p. 74). Furthermore, all reviews studies that this work consulted gave equal weight to 
studies, meaning that small-scale, short-term studies count as much in the final average given 
as long-term large-scale studies. The review conducted for this study applied the same 
methodology. As more than half of the studies reviewed are short term and small sample, this 
could lead to inflated expectations about possible energy savings if these studies generally 
report larger electricity reductions. In sum, the studies reviewed for this thesis, as well as the 
experiments conducted, yield support to the concern voiced by Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 
(2010) that the provision of feedback alone is unlikely to lead to reductions above 10%. 
The influence of experimental design on the effect of feedback 
The variability in the field settings of the studies reviewed complicate comparison of these. 
The studies include participants with highly different housing types, household composition, 
financial means, cultural backgrounds, and climatic conditions (van Elburg, 2009), and 
findings might reflect these or other factors such as variations in equipment used, regulatory 
regimes, or the cost of electricity in that location (Darby, 2010). In the experiments conducted 
for this thesis, some of these problems also surfaced; in the analysis of Smart Meter data, the 
cultural context and climatic conditions of the households included are the same, but the 
actual composition of the households (e.g. income, house size) is not know, which potentially 
affects results. Furthermore, many studies were “opt-in” trials, which, based on findings from 
BE, could have an effect on the outcome, as it must be assumed that those deciding to “opt-
in” have a reason to do so, and thus are more willing to change behaviour than the general 
population, which could lead to higher reductions in the study samples than in the population 
(Raw et al., 2011). 
5.1.3 Limitations and applicability of the results 
The types of experiments and studies conducted and analysed for this thesis take place on a 
spectrum: At one end are lab experiments, where one change can be observed by holding all 
other things constant. At the other end are real-life situations, such as the loss aversion 
intervention using Smart Meters conducted for this this thesis, where the behaviour takes 
place in the actual setting, but the causal link is difficult to establish. The field experiments, 
such as those on salience and discounting conducted for this thesis, can be seen to be 
somewhere in between. The two ends of the spectrum yield a trade-off between internal and 
external validity49: “laboratory experiments provide greater internal validity than field data, 
while field data provide greater ecological validity and […] a lower burden for establishing 
external validity” (Roe & Just, 2009, p. 1267). An overview of this can be seen in Table 5-1. 
 Internal validity External validity Replicabability 
Lab experiments High Low High 
Field experiments Medium to high Medium to High Medium to Low 
Real-life interventions Low High Low to medium 
Table 5-1 – Validity (after Roe & Just, 2009). 
                                                
49 Validity is the question of whether a particular conclusion represents a good approximation of the true conclusion, i.e. 
whether the methods of research reflects the truth. Generally, one distinguishes between internal and external validity. 
Internal validity can be defined as “the ability of a researcher to argue that observed correlations are causal,” whereas 
external validity can be defined as “the ability to generalize the relationships found in a study to other persons, times, and 
settings” (Roe & Just, 2009). Finally, ecological validity is understood to be the “extent that the context in which subjects 
cast decisions is similar to the context of interest,” i.e. whether the experimental settings reflect the settings where 
decisions would be made in real life. 
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Generalizability 
It is unclear whether people across the globe in different cultural and social settings would 
respond uniformly to some of these interventions. Social norms differ, and it seems likely that 
our response to defaults, feedbacks and framing could differ within and between countries 
and subsamples of the population (Henrich et al. (2001). Experiments have historically relied 
on a distinct set of people (university undergraduate students are highly overrepresented), so 
there is a need to test these interventions on a broader group of people having “participants 
that are representative of whole countries or cultures” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, p. 790). If a 
specific finding is inferred on a narrow sub-set of the population (e.g. undergraduate 
students), the relationship may not exist in more diverse samples. This study does not 
contribute to filling that particular knowledge-gap, as all participants from a society that 
Henrich et al. (2010) classify as WEIRD – “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic.” However, as the research is mainly intended to inform EU and EU Member 
State policy, countries all belonging to the “WEIRD” group, this probably is less problematic, 
although it must be noted that there is some difference in the concern over energy-related 
issues e.g. climate change between EU countries (EC, 2011d), as well as a “great deal of 
country heterogeneity in household energy-efficient technology adoption, household use of 
energy conservation practices, and household attitudes towards energy savings” in the EU 
(Mills & Schleich, 2012, p. 625). This means that findings from this study, which took place in 
a comparatively very energy-use aware country are not necessarily applicable in another EU 
country. 
It is also likely that different population segments experience different barriers and therefore 
will respond differently to some of these interventions (Gifford, 2011, p. 298). Romanach et 
al. (2013) found that only 10% of the energy-saving programmes in Australia involving 
households were targeted at low-income households, so there is a need to be cautious against 
assuming that these findings are applicable in any social settings in high-income countries. The 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for (or against) an intervention (e.g. energy use) need to be 
considered. Romanach et al. (2013) found that “financial savings” was the main reason low-
income household participated in energy-use programmes, but this would not necessarily be 
the case for high-income households (e.g. it might be social norms or other non-monetary 
reasons) and these issues need to be tested, and then considered when designing these 
experiments, so that they experiment fits the context. It is not known what income group the 
participants in the questionnaire-based experiments belong to, but the participants in the 
Smart Meter loss framing experiment all live in semi-detached houses near Copenhagen, and 
must be assumed to be middle class or richer in order to afford these houses, meaning that the 
findings from this study are not necessarily representative of residents in low-income areas. 
Scalability 
Whether or not the experiments described above can actually improve information provision 
and lead to reductions in GHG emissions hinges to large extent on their scalability. If an 
intervention cannot be scaled, the resulting impact will be all the smaller. 
The choice preference exercises were carried out in an artificial real life setting (participants’ 
decisions had no influence on their real-life situation), meaning that the external validity of the 
results is fairly low. As the choice exercises generally tests only one bias, the internal validity is 
fairly high, meaning that the effect in question is probably what is causing the change in 
behaviour. The experiments could easily be tested in real-life settings, where decisions had 
consequences, and the tentative indication of an effect from most experiments calls for 
further testing. 
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The Smart Meter experiment on loss aversion took place in a real-life setting where consumers 
actually used and paid for their electricity. This means that the results have a high external and 
ecological validity, as the experiment took place in the home of the participants, indicating that 
this effect is likely to be found even if implemented in real life. The very specific context 
makes replicating the experiment difficult (low internal validity), which means that the effect 
found in this case cannot be assumed to be of the same magnitude once scaled to a 
population. If previous large-scale trials are any indication, effects in a population is assumed 
to be in the order of 4-6%. Had a complete regression analysis been possible, the internal 
validity of the loss aversion intervention could have been improved, i.e. there could have been 
reason to expect that a causal link between loss aversion and a reduction in electricity actually 
existed. However, as only preliminary statistical tests were conducted, the internal validity is 
fairly low, as it cannot be determined whether the loss aversion widget did in fact reduce 
electricity (if there was a signal) or whether another unknown factor (noise) was interpreted as 
an effect of the widget. In any case, the clear indication of an effect in both instances (daily 
and standby consumption), and the likelihood of replication in real-life situations, calls for 
large-scale trials to further test this50.  
Potential biases in the experimental design 
There are two reasons why it is worth reflecting on how the design of the various experiments 
impacted the results obtained. Firstly, this has implications for the conclusions that can be 
drawn based on the experiments conducted. Secondly, it has implications for future research, 
as this can help inform and improve any experiment that other researchers might undertake to 
test the findings of this study. 
The ‘Hawthorne effect’ 
There is some evidence that people that are aware of their participation in an experiment 
modify their behaviour because they are partaking in said experiment; an effect sometimes 
labelled ‘the Hawthorne effect’ (Draper, 2013; Olson et al., 1994). In the original study, 
workers were found to be more satisfied and effective when observed. The theory thus 
suggests that people are more responsive when observed than when not. It it not confirmed 
whether this effect in fact exists, but based on the importance of randomised-controlled trials 
(Haynes, 2012) in other research areas, especially medicinal and pharmaceutical sciences, it 
seems plausible that behaviour does change when people know they are part of an experiment. 
If this is the case, it has implications on the conclusions to be drawn based on the experiments 
conducted for this thesis. For the loss aversion experiment, the possibility of a Hawthorne 
effect is possible. Both groups know they partake in an experiment, since written consent had 
to be obtained before the intervention was set in motion. This entails that there is a risk that 
people want to perform well (reduce consumption) because they know they are being 
observed; an effect that would not be found under normal circumstances. It seems likely that 
this could be the case, but due to the limited knowledge on the subject (no double-blind 
experiments have been performed on electricity feedback to the authors knowledge), no 
assessment to quantify the effect of this has been carried out. The implications of such an 
effect is that the experiments conducted for this thesis can serve as guidance for future studies 
by providing an indication of what intervention work, e.g. salience of information, and this 
intervention can then be tested in a controlled setting where participants; a) do not know they 
partake in a study and b) suffer the consequences of their action. This would increase the 
                                                
50 In general, as pointed out by Levitt & List (2007), there is a lack of knowledge on how to scale economic behaviour as 
found in a lab or artificial setting to the market. This calls for further large-scale trials in order to close this knowledge gap. 
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external validity and provide a more accurate picture of what to expect if these interventions 
are scaled to an entire population. 
Respondent bias 
It is a well-established fact that human behaviour changes when others can observe it (Bell et 
al., 1996; Schultz, 1998; Nolan et al. 2008). This has implications for the choice preferences 
exercises conducted as part of this research, as the respondents typically filled these out in a 
public space where other participants could (in principle) watch their results (though the 
extent to which this happened was actually fairly limited). However, as Nolan et al. (2008) 
demonstrated, even the feeling of having other people watch your behaviour can lead to 
changes to behaviour. For instance, the participants asked to select a refrigerator might select 
the efficient one, because they feel that this is what the experimenter (or other participants, or 
“society”) wants them to do. Along those lines, it can be argued that a preference for a green 
product displayed by a participant arise not because of a careful deliberation that the perceived 
(social) environmental benefits outweigh the private costs, but rather to express the values that 
this choice connotes (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013). However, as there is still a significant 
difference between the two groups, there is an indication that the framing has an effect, but it 
is likely that the respective proportions procuring efficient models (85% and 95% in the two 
versions, respectively) would be lower in real-life. 
Hypothetical bias 
The participants in the preference choice exercises did not have to spend their own money, 
and their choice had no implications on their real-life situation. This entails that there is a risk 
of hypothetical bias; the effect that participants’ choices have been found to change depending 
on whether they bear the cost of this or not (Moser et al., 2014). This means that the decisions 
participants were found to make would likely not have been the same, if they had had to bear 
the costs of these decisions. In principle, all exercises except exercise 3 are affected by the 
(theoretical) presence of this bias, but in practice it is difficult to judge what effect his would 
have had on participant choice. This bias is assumed to be especially influential for testing the 
effect of defaults, and one can rightly question whether preference choice exercises can be 
used to test for the effect of defaults, or whether one should employ other methods? 
It is not immediately clear whether better experimental design can completely overcome all 
these potential biases, but further research is warranted to establish the magnitude of these 
biases and the potential implications for results. 
5.2 Discussion of Methodological Issues 
5.2.1 Critique of experiments 
The preference choice exercise consisted of 7 separate questions and was filled out by 
participants at a hardware store. The exercises were tested before the final version was applied 
in the field, but during and after research, a number of noteworthy learnings appeared. In 
exercise 1, several participants asked why they should pay to obtain information on their 
consumption; indeed a legitimate question, which perhaps diverted some of the attention 
towards that instead of selecting between the two. The energy label is missing from the first 
version (Q1) of exercise 2, which is a mistake as the question was intended to only test the 
effect of salience, not the presence of labels. As the information displayed in the label was also 
written in the question, it is assumed that this had little effect. The answer to exercise 3 is 
actually indirectly provided by exercise 2 for those participants given the second version (Q2) 
of the questionnaire, as the electricity price can be inferred from the total cost. Only one 
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participant noted this, which indicates that the effect is probably limited. (It nicely sums up the 
inherent limitations to our ability to process information, even when present.) Exercise 3 
worked fine, and although there is a slight difference between 330 kWh per month and 4,000 
kWh per years, it is assumed that this is of less importance, since both are clearly larger than 
4,000 DKK. Exercise 4 should have been turned into two separate questions, as at least some 
participants were confused as to whether they should answer only one of the two or answer 
both. This can perhaps explain why some participants have indicated a yes in 4b, but a no in 
4a. Exercise 5 was too complex. Although the idea was to make it more difficult than exercise 
4, the amount of people unable to answer the question indicates that the task was more 
complex than imagined. Exercise 6 had the same type of problem as exercise 1. Participants 
did not understand why a saving was not guaranteed, which removed focus from deciding 
between the two. The question in exercise 7 is too long (as noted by a participant), but it is 
unknown what effect this had.  
The loss aversion experiment unfortunately had a very low number of participants. This was 
mainly caused by the fact that participants had to provide their consent to participating, i.e. in 
effect opting in. Furthermore, those not at home at the point of installation had to install the 
meter themselves, which led to even lower participation. It was not possible to get around 
these issues, as consent was needed due to the privacy issues. As only a limited number of 
meters were due for installation in the early summer months when the project was initiated, it 
was not possible to expand the initial sample. Despite numerous reminders, participants did 
not install meters and/or fill out questionnaires, meaning that the final sample was severely 
reduced. The difficulty of getting people to participate indicates how complicated conducting 
research on electricity consumption generally is. As the experiment took place over summer, 
there is a risk that some participants installed the meter and then went on vacation. This 
would obviously lead to lower consumption, as only stand-by and passive consumption is 
captured when participants are not at home. This should only affect the results for the daily 
consumption, meaning that the effect found might not be as pronounced as indicated by the 
result. As standby consumption is still consuming power when people are not at home, this 
should have little effect on the results for the standby experiment. 
In general, the study was limited by a lack of access to electricity consumption data from 
Smart Meters, as shown by the sample containing data from only around 100 meters and the 
experiment only having 65 invited participants and 17 final participants. A number of utilities, 
DSOs and energy service providers were contacted, but only one company agreed to share 
consumption data and install a loss framing widget. The dataset for the Smart Meter analysis is 
de-limited both temporally and spatially, and thus most likely not representative. Secondly, the 
number of households and individuals willing and able to participate in interventions and 
experiments were limited, and none of the experiments can be said to be representative of the 
study area (Denmark) assuming standard error (5%) and standard confidence interval (95%). 
Thirdly, the experiments all took place during summer, were electricity consumption is low in 
DK (due to low penetration of air conditioning) and houses are often vacated due to the 
holiday season. This possibly affected the results. 
Given the difficulties encountered in conducting this research, there are a number of things 
that should be done differently when a follow-up to this study is hopefully conducted one day. 
As it was not known which of the behavioural biases that could be expected to affect the 
effect of Smart Meters most, a number of these were tested. In hindsight, the study should 
have focused on just one or two biases in order to assess the effect of these in more detail. 
Ideally, the study should have focused only on loss aversion and salience and conducted a trial 
of the effect of this with a larger sample. When looking at the exercises, the added value 
provided by excercise 1 and 7 is limited, and these should have probably been left out. 
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5.2.2 Critique of conceptual framework 
Naturally, behavioural economics has its critics. There are generally three main points of 
critique, each of which will be addressed briefly. The first is that BE rely extensively on 
laboratory and experimental studies, which means that the findings might not apply in real-
world or market settings, or at least be less pronounced (Levitt & List, 2008; Etzioni, 2011; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1996). This critique has some merit, as the strongest evidence of 
behavioural anomalies (as viewed from neoclassical economics) has emerged from the lab. 
This does not disqualify the anomalies found hitherto, but calls for extensive real-life or 
market experiments (Levitt & List, 2008). This author highly agrees with this, and sees 
extensive real-life experiments as an important line of future research. Secondly, it has been 
suggested (Etzioni, 2011) that the findings of BE might not apply in all cultural and social 
settings, a critique based on the fact that most studies and experiments have taken place in 
Western cultures. This notion is briefly discussed here as well. Finally, there has been critique 
of BE as promoting paternalistic approaches, in which the state or the policy maker exercises 
undue control, limiting the free choice of humans. This critique has been especially vocal in 
the US, and less so in Europe, and has been discussed extensively (e.g. Sunstein, 2013; 
Loewenstein et al., 2013; Lunn, 2014; John et al., 2013). This critique is briefly touched upon 
later. However, it is important to note that BE and the concept of “nudge,” which is the target 
of most critique, are not interchangeable. The former is a scientific discipline or sub discipline, 
and thus has a positivist approach, while the latter is a method of applying behaviourally 
informed findings to public policy, and thus can be considered a normative approach (Lunn, 
2014). This research has mostly concerned itself with how humans actually behave when 
confronted with behavioural biases (a positivist approach), and only to a lesser degree 
discussed how these biases should be used in practice (a normative approach). 
Psychologists and sociologists have historically conducted most of the research on energy-
related behaviour that does not apply a strict (neoclassical) economic framework (e.g. Bell et 
al., 1996; Stern, 2000a; b; 2011; Gifford, 2011, von Borgstede et al., 2013; Miller & Prentice, 
2013; Bratt et al., 2014). The research by sociologists has especially focused on practice theory, 
as informed by Bourdieu (1977). While this strain of research is no doubt useful to understand 
how society shapes our general use of and approach to energy consumption, it has not been 
used here, as the approach taken here is fundamentally economic, informed not just by 
behavioural economics, but also to a certain degree by other schools of economics, such as 
New Institutional and environmental. Using a sociological approach would constitue a 
fundamental departure from economic research, rather than, as this thesis does, explore how 
economics can be used to understand human behaviour and decision-making with regards to 
energy and electricity. 
5.3 Policy implications 
5.3.1 Realising Smart Meter policy goals 
The presence of a positive CBA in many countries hinges on whether the benefits from Smart 
Meter rollout can be realised by utilities, DSOs and consumers. Therefore, it is worth pausing 
to take a look at this. As mentioned in the introduction, Smart Meters will likely have several 
operational benefits to utilities such as elimination of meter reading, automatic or faster 
detection of power downs and grid problems, e.g. through proactive maintenance to correct 
sag and swell, and less electricity theft (Faruqui et al., 2010a; Krishnamurti et al., 2012; L. 
Elmegaard, personal communication, 4 June 2014). However, it is commonly acknowledged 
that meters do not on their own present a positive business case, as is noted by Owen and 
Ward (2006). For instance, a customer-owned Danish utility company installed Smart Meters 
at all their customer points at a cost of roughly 1,000 DKK (~€135) per customer. The 
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company calculated that the project had an IRR of roughly 10 years, using a discount rate of 
4%, a much longer payback and much lower discount rate than usually applied by private 
enterprises (L. Elmegaard, personal communication, 4 June 2014). Most benefits accrued from 
operational efficiency and avoidance of losses in the system.  
Arguably, as has been amply discussed in this report, the main consumer benefit accrues from 
a reduction in consumption. The expected energy saving from the installation of Smart Meters 
in the MS CBAs are somewhat lower than that of the EC, ranging from 0 to 5%, with an 
average of 3%±1.3% (EC, 2014). Reviewing the CBAs of the various Member States reveal 
that consumer benefits in some instances are a significant part of the total benefit, which 
means that if consumers are not able to realise these benefits (i.e. reduce consumption), the 
CBA can become negative. This would make the argument for rolling out Smart Meters a lot 
weaker (Groothuis & Mohr, 2014). The CBAs reveal that consumer benefits make up half or 
more of the benefits in four countries (Austria, Greece, Netherlands, Northern Ireland), and 
electricity savings are expected to be above 3% in Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Romania. Analysis reveal that end-user consumption 
reductions make up 55% of the total benefits in Austria, 44% in Greece, 15% in Netherlands, 
and 39% in Northern Ireland. A large-scale trial in the Netherlands (Huizing, 2014) found 
reductions of 0.6% as a result of Smart Meters coupled with bi-monthly home energy reports; 
markedly lower than expected reductions (3.2% for indirect feedback)51. This indicates that 
either action must be taken to increase the feedback achieved in many of these countries, or 
benefits must be realised elsewhere, unless the policy is to become a net cost to the society at 
large in those countries. An alternative interpretation is that the discrepancy between the 
behaviour assumed when conducting CBAs and actual behaviour displayed by market 
participants calls for alternative ways of conducting CBAs that take into account behavioural 
aspects (e.g. bounded rationality). 
Increasing the number of households accessing feedback 
Leaving concerns over rebound effects aside for a moment, the total amount of electricity that 
can be saved, and thus the total reduction in GHG emissions, depends on not just the amount 
reduced by each household, but also the number of households participating (Ehrhardt-
Martinez et al., 2010). Therefore, it is important that this number is as high as possible. 
Figures from a Danish utility company (L. Elmegaard, personal communication, 4 June 2014) 
and the results from the Smart Meter experiment suggest that participation rates will be low if 
people have to sign up to receive this feedback. In the Danish case, less than 15% signed up, 
and less than 10% of the customers continued using the portal, while for this thesis, 75% of 
those invited to participate agreed to do so, while less than 25% actually installed the meter, 
and only around 10% installed the meter and filled in the questionnaire. Instead, if legally 
possible, participants could be automatically enrolled, but have the option to opt-out. 
Evidence from the Netherlands suggests that participation rates in such a case can be very 
high (98%), despite being voluntary (Huizing, 2014). An experimental study in Denmark 
found similar results; the acceptance rate to install a Smart Meter was higher if offered as “an 
‘opt-out’ frame ("No, I would not like to have a Smart Meter with remote control installed in 
my home") than as an opt-in frame” (Sunstein & Reisch, 2013, see also Ölander & Thøgersen, 
2014). 
 
                                                
51 To test whether alternative ways of providing feedback have an effect on consumption reductions, three alternative means 
of communication are being tested by DSO’s: in-home display, web-based information systems and community-based 
concepts. These results are not yet available (Huizing, 2014). 
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Applying dynamic tariffs 
If operational savings alone do not provide a positive CBA and if reductions are smaller than 
expected, benefits in other areas are needed. To this end, especially changes to peak demand 
will matter. Faruqui et al. (2010a) estimate the cost of installing Smart Meters in the EU to be 
€51 billion, while benefits from operational savings will amount to €26-41 billion, meaning 
that there is a gap between costs and benefits. They argue that this cost-benefit gap can be 
filled by adopting dynamic pricing, which supposedly can save up to €67 billion, mostly by 
reducing the need to build and maintain expensive peaking power plants. Two things are 
worth noting on the adoption of dynamic tariffs. Firstly, will consumers accept these, and 
secondly, will they have an affect? The results from the exercise indicate that under the right 
circumstance, consumers do seem willing to try these. However, it is important how the 
change is framed. Exercise 6 showed that people are willing to gamble to avoid a loss, but less 
willing to gamble if they risk losing a sure gain, while exercise 7 indicated that the notion of a 
gain incentivised people to change plan, meaning that communication to consumers about 
future electricity plans should be carefully considered. Ideally, various communication forms 
should be tested (as was done for tax returns in the UK (Hallsworth et al., 2014)) to test the 
effect of various frames in getting people to switch plans. There is also the option that people 
could automatically switch plans52, though this has certain ethical implications. The evidence 
of the effect of changing plan, is, like the evidence of feedback in general, rather 
heterogeneous, meaning that there is a need to systematically test this. Some experiments find 
reductions in the 5% range, while others report savings upwards of 30% (Faruqui et al., 2010a; 
Owen & Ward, 2006). Generally, the more elaborate and automated the technologies are, the 
larger the response. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that not all customers seem to 
respond to price signals; in an experiment in California, about 80% of the total response came 
from 30% of the customers. Furthermore, the high reductions found in e.g. the US are 
probably not as applicable in Europe, as air-conditioning and electric space heating are 
generally not very common (Faruqui et al., 2010a). Furthermore, the social impact of dynamic 
tariffs needs to be taken into account. Carlsson-Kanyama & Lindén (2007, p. 2170) find 
evidence that “depending on how household’s chores are divided between the sexes […], the 
extra workload induced by energy savings [e.g. doing chores at night or weekends] may at 
times be significant and fall upon women in a disproportional way” (p. 2170). Implementation 
of dynamic tariffs has to be accompanied by a certain degree of automatisation to ensure that 
disproportionate amounts of extra work do not fall on women or those undertaking 
significant amount of household work. 
Potential rebound effects resulting from Smart Meter feedback 
Finally, the presence of potential indirect rebound effects from Smart Meter implementation 
must be considered. If the installation of Smart Meters does lead to a reduction in electricity 
consumption, it will increase the disposable income of the consumer, which can then be used 
to procure other goods or services that require energy (e.g. money saved on electricity can be 
spent on travelling, obliterating the environmental reduction achieved). If this rebound effect 
is of significant size, there would be a need to counteract this. For instance, savings achieved 
as a result of a Smart Meter could be funnelled into an account that could finance home 
renovation or other EE measures, which would then provide further benefits, essentially 
generating an energy-saving, positive feedback loop. Joachain & Klopfert (2013) provide 
                                                
52 Once sufficient data had been collected to decide on a plan, the customer could, as a default, be switched to the appropriate 
plan, completely overcoming the transaction costs involved in switching. As noted earlier, evidence suggests that 
consumers would stay with the default plan, but should of course be given the option to manually switch plans. To make 
this less coercive, the consumers could opt out of this service (automatic plan switching), but, based on evidence on organ 
donation rates (Johnson & Goldstein, 2013), opting out should be the default, rather than opting in, as this significantly 
increases participation. 
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another interesting solution that electricity reductions could generate complimentary 
currencies, a form of social currency that, unlike conventional money, cannot be spent in 
stores, but instead, can only be spent in an environmentally friendly way, e.g. they can be used 
for public transportation, but not to buy gasoline. This issue is not discussed in any detail here, 
but is worthy of further research, especially if rebound effects are significant. 
In conclusion, a number of factors related to consumer electricity reduction influence whether 
the Smart Meter policy will be a success. As this short discussion outlined, the effect of many 
of these factors is unknown, and there is a clear need to analyse the effect of these issues in 
greater detail. 
5.3.2 Considerations for further development of Smart Metering and 
overall use of behavioural insights in public policy 
Before impleting behavioural insights into electricity feedback on a large scale, a number of 
issues, ranging from the design of the feedback, the need for large-scale trials, technological 
considerations, and political and ethical considerations, are worth discussing and testing. With 
this in mind, a disclaimer is needed before providing policy recommendations. A significant 
amount of the findings informed by or taking a starting point in behavioural economics 
research suffer from low external validity; they are context specific and many of them have 
not be replicated in real-life settings, which makes suggesting general policy recommendations 
difficult (as noted by Faure & Luth, 2011). A certain amount of caution is therefore warranted 
when recommending future courses of action, but with this in mind, the author agrees with 
the view taken by Faure and Luth (2011) that “behavioural insights can and should be used to 
draft effective and efficient behaviourally informed consumer policy” (p. 355).  
Systematic design of feedback 
Electricity feedback to customers is in essence a form of communication by the utility or 
DSO. Research on risk communication has found that those who provide information to the 
public need to understand how people think about and respond to this information to 
successfully communicate it (Slovic, 1987). Relatively little work has been done on the best 
ways to present information in order to maximise electricity reductions, with Wood & 
Newborough (2003) and Karjalainen (2011) being the major exceptions. Karjalainen (2011) 
conducted a qualitative study where participants were asked which feedback they would find 
most useful, and similar work has been done by Anderson & White (2009). Results indicate 
that consumers preferred information on costs-over-time, appliance-specific breakdown and 
historical comparison. The problem is that asking people what they think works best might 
not actually be what works best. Studies (Nolan et al. 2008; Schultz et al., 2007; Wood & 
Newborough, 2007) suggest that “people hold incorrect beliefs about what motivates them to 
conserve [electricity] and may not be able to predict which strategies will be the most 
effective” (Nolan et al. 2008, p. 921). To that end, the EC has launched a survey on consumer 
understanding of energy labels (EC, 2011a), which might not be as effective as they could be, 
as this study pointed out (e.g. experiment 2). In general, it is not known how feedback should 
be provided, e.g. whether currency, environmental statement, or something else will have the 
largest effect on behaviour, but the underlying motivation to act (e.g. monetary or intrinsic) 
has been found to influence the extent to which people think feedback is worth responding to 
(Dogan et al., 2014). Following on from other parts of the research conducted for this thesis, 
it seems indisputable that there is a need to conduct a study of consumer understanding of 
energy information from Smart Meters. 
Karjalainen (2011) suggest that when designing the feedback, utilities and DSOs should rely 
on knowledge from computer design specialists, since optimal display of data has long been an 
Information Feedback, Behaviour, and ’Smart Meters’ 
65 
issue in the area of human-computer interaction. As anyone working with data visualisation 
can confirm, how data is visually presented has a huge impact on perception. As BE shows 
that humans are prone to biases stemming from reference point or salience, it is important 
that the display of data take these biases into account. This ranges from discussion of whether 
data should be shown as numericals or symbols, to whether or not to use bar/column charts 
or graphs and other graphical presentations, to whether the user will be only observing the 
information or have the ability to change the information displayed (Wood & Newborough, 
2007). Weber (2013, p. 392) also points out the need to experiment with how to best provide 
feedback “without overstretching people’s processing capacity or losing their attention over 
extended periods of time.” Wilhite et al. (2002) and Egan (1999) are noteworthy examples of 
studies that explore these connections, but with the advent of Smart Meters, data visualisation 
is bound to become even more important. A thorough discussion of this is not possible here, 
but interested readers should consult Wood & Newborough (2007), Karjalainen (2011), as 
well as infographics websites53. 
Technological considerations 
Because feedback studies are conducted using various media (e.g. some studies use IHDs, 
others use web-based solutions, while newer studies could use phone applications) and no 
studies have systemically tested these against each other, there is disagreement over what 
medium should be used to provide the feedback. Darby (2012) argues that “the picture is of 
broadly consistent and durable effects from the adoption and use of displays,” but given the 
problems with concluding on the effect of feedback in general, this author find little support 
for this claim. In this regard, the recommendation by earlier research, primarily of British 
origin (e.g. Darby, 2006; 2012, Owen and Ward, 2006; van Elburg, 200954), to require IHD’s as 
part of the rollout already seem puzzling. As smart phones, tablets, and other devices become 
ubiquitous, a development, which was difficult to predict in 2006, but which seem obvious 
now, it is questionable whether consumers need yet another device in their home. Web-based 
solutions, as was used in the experiments for this thesis, have received little attention (most 
notable exception is the trials reported in Raw et al. (2011) and in Pyrko (2011) where some 
feedback is available online to customers), so it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the 
potential effect.  
As feedback systems no doubt will become more sophisticated and automated as technology 
progress, there is no telling what future feedback will look like (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 
2010). For this reason, focus should be on providing feedback to consumers in a way they can 
understand and act upon, rather than focusing exclusively on the medium through which this 
is provided. The rapid technological development within the sector calls for a focus on 
maintaining flexibility in the system and keeping an open-minded approach to the design of 
meters and feedback, in order to ensure that new findings can be incorporated into the 
existing system. As pointed out by Martiskainen & Coburn (2011), a trade-off between a rapid 
rollout and a more cautious approach to ensure technological maturity exist. The fast rollout 
of Smart Meters will provide the projected benefits at an earlier point, but due to the rapid 
development within the sector, there is a risk that today’s Smart Meter will not be very ‘smart’ 
by 2020, and will need an update to comply with customer expectation, increasing the cost of 
the system. These potential problems have caused some to raise concern over the pace of the 
rollout and argue that a more cautious approach is needed to ensure that findings from real-
                                                
53 Noteworthy examples include: http://www.good.is/infographics; http://mashable.com/category/infographics/. 
54 Darby (2012) argues that “the inclusion of an in-home display [on the Smart Meter] is significant from the point of view of 
improving customer feedback.” These have not been included in the early rollouts of Smart Meters (in Italy, Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway), but are part of the roll-out in the UK. 
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life trials and academia can be incorporated into policy (Martiskainen & Coburn, 2011). Given 
what is known from BE in general and this study in particular, it seems that a more inductive 
approach, where policy is formulated as knowledge develop, might lead to larger benefits 
overall, as the risk of buying into the wrong technology or basing the expected benefits on 
results never arising will be minimised with such an approach. 
The case for a major trial 
The research presented above is just a snapshot of the interventions possible and the resulting 
impacts, and there is a need for further studies evaluating the effectiveness of these 
interventions. These studies should rely on solid experimental research design, such as 
randomised controlled trials (RCT) (Haynes et al. 2012) that reveal the effectiveness of 
behavioural insights over various time frames. The tests should include treatment groups and 
control groups (Figure 5-1), and take to socio-economic backgrounds of the 
individuals/households participating in the studies into account. As it was generally hard to 
determine the long-term effect of the feedback studies reviewed, evaluations should test for 
both short-term and long-term impacts (Steg & Vlek, 2009). Furthermore, measures or 
interventions suggested by the Smart Meter need to be acceptable to customers (e.g. see work 
by Poortinga et al. (2003, p. 54pp). As has been pointed out, behaviourally informed 
interventions run the risk of being seen as paternalistic, and there is a need to test which 
interventions are acceptable to customers and which are not, to ensure that individual freedom 
is maintained and the Smart Meter is not seen as intrusive. Some major Smart Meter trials 
(similar to those presented Raw et al., 2011) are under way or planned in Member States, and 
present opportunities for exploring these research gaps, as well as implement some of the 
successful interventions found in this thesis, such as loss aversion and salience. Solid empirical 
evidence would allow for modification to national CBAs and better evaluation of Smart Meter 
policies (Owen & Ward, 2006). 
 
Figure 5-1 – Experimental research design should rely on control groups to determine the effect of interventions 
(Source: Author, after Haynes et al., 2012). 
Incorporating behavioural insights into policy 
Knowing that humans have certain biases that affect their economic decision making and that 
policies generally try to influence behaviour, an argument can be made that behavioural 
findings should have implications for policy (Lunn, 2014). One could even argue that BE is in 
a better position to provide policy suggestions than conventional economic theory, as it 
identifies the biases that lead to diversions from optimal decision making (Loewenstein et al., 
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2013). As many findings from BE are difficult to generalise, translating these into specific 
policy recommendations becomes difficult without large-scale, real-life trials. This calls for a 
more inductive policy approach, where hypotheses are formulated and then tested within the 
market in order to arrive at the/those idea(s) showing the most promising results (Lunn, 
2014). As policies are needed to correct market failures and reduce externalities, there is a need 
to evaluate the effect of these, but policy evaluation has generally been lacking, especially so in 
the field of environmental policy (Mundaca, 2008). This is unfortunate, as a lack of ex-ante 
evaluation might result in the implementation of inefficient or ineffective policies, while a lack 
of ex-post evaluation might result in continuation of ineffective, inefficient or downright 
harmful policies (Mundaca, 2008). The normative approach taken by neoclassical economics 
means that very few ex-ante evaluations have been conducted, while the ex-post evaluations 
have tried to correct the human failures, rather than recognising that the policy might have 
failed. Changing this involves taking a more empirical approach to regulation, as is already 
done in some countries, most notably the UK (e.g. UK BIT). For Smart Meters, this has the 
implication that feedback studies should be conducted and results made publicly available, in 
order for others to learn from and replicate these55. Once determined which intervention that 
appeared most promising, policy could be formulated (mandating standards, rollout time, etc.). 
This calls for a more extensive role for the policymaker, but also holds the potential to induce 
confidence of the public in the regulatory process, as it could increase objectivity, rigour and 
openness, as the process is in essence more democratic. 
Behavioural interventions as public policy 
It is easy to demonstrate that the behavioural interventions that can possible be employed 
using Smart Meters are on a scale from very libertarian to more paternalistic or coercive. Some 
tools, such as having information provided as a forgone loss rather than a benefit, are very 
benign, and it is hard to see how these restrict freedom. Others, such as using behavioural 
patterns to detect which electricity plan fit a customer best, and automatically moving a 
consumer from their current plan to that plan, are clearly more paternalistic. It is also possible 
to completely circumvent behaviour and automate decisions, e.g. turning off all appliances 
when a person leaves the home, but it is easy to see that this has certain ethical implications, 
and such measures would need careful deliberation before implementation. Numerous authors 
have discussed the legitimacy of behavioural interventions. Some are critical of BE as a 
regulatory tool (see e.g. Bonell et al., 2011; Frerichs, 2011; Goodwin, 2012; Heilmann, 2014; 
Whitehead et al., 2011), some are cautious (see e.g. Cooper & Kovacic, 2012; Berggren, 2011; 
Hausman & Welch, 2010), while yet others encourage the use of these insights (see e.g. 
Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Guldborg Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Lunn, 2014). Finally, there are 
those who have tried to assess how the public feels about this, in order to understand if these 
insights should be used, and if so, how (see e.g. Felsen et al., 2013 and Branson et al., 2012). It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these matters, but it is noted that a thorough 
discussion of these issues is needed before any BE-based insights, specifically those of more 
coercive character, are employed on a large scale. 
                                                
55 Leaving aside concerns over the replicability of reserach findings, a topic currently so heatedly debated by behavioural and 
psychological researchers that it has been given its own name: ’repligate’ (Meyer & Chabris, 2014). 
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6 Conclusions 
At the risk of oversimplifying, this thesis has argued that the existence of market barriers 
associated with lack of information (or information asymmetries), has led to the popularity of 
the ‘Information-Deficit Model’ in both academic and policy circles, due to the relatively 
simple policy advise: correct information barriers by providing consumers with better or more 
(technical) information. The expectation that provision of information would lead to 
reduction of electricity use by European households was argued to be a prominent feature in 
the EU policy on Smart Meter deployment in Member States. 
As the success of this policy depend on whether such electricity reduction materialises, this 
thesis argued that it is of importance to better understand how, and to what extent, the 
provision of information can actually affect end-user behaviour with regards to electricity use. 
By taking insights from behavioural economics as a starting point, it was argued that the way 
information is presented to households has an impact on how it is perceived and acted on. It 
was argued that there is a lack of knowledge on if and how findings from behavioural 
economics can inform the provision of feedback to consumers, and what the effects of this 
would be. 
• RQ #1: Which behavioural biases, as suggested by behavioural economics, are 
applicable when consumers are faced with energy-related decisions or provided 
with information on electricity consumption? 
The thesis intended to explore which behavioural biases, as suggested by research in the field 
of behavioural economics, would be applicable when consumers faced energy-related 
decisions or were provided with information on electricity consumption. This question was 
addressed by conducting a number of field-based preference-choice exercises and a Smart 
Meter experiment. The preference-choice exercises tested five specific biases; above-average 
bias, information overload, salience, loss aversion, and defaults, by having participants answer 
questions related to these biases. The Smart Meter experiment focused on two of these biases: 
salience and loss aversion. The exercises and experiment showed that end-users are prone to 
several behavioural biases when faced with decisions relating to energy and/or electricity use, 
which have implications for the way in which information is understood and acted upon.  
The exercise on above-average bias indicated that consumers hold incorrect beliefs about their 
electricity use, which warrants the provision of information on electricity, comparative and 
normative alike. The exercise on information overload found that the presence of additional 
options led to decisions of deteriorating quality, inconsistent with the axioms of EUT. The 
experiment indicated, again with due limitations, that more information is not necessarily 
better. The exercise on the effect of default setting found, again with due consideration, that 
consumers are willing to try new electricity tariff schemes. This indicated that Smart Meters 
might be a fitting place to provide information on dynamic pricing structures. The exercise on 
loss aversion found that framing an EE investment decision as reducing a loss, rather than as 
obtaining a gain, increased the number of participants willing to undertake risky investments, 
which suggests that using Smart Meters to frame EE investment decisions could potentially 
increase the uptake of these, which would increase the effect of the Smart Meters and help 
meet EU policy goals. The exercises on salience found that increasing the salience of 
information changed consumer preference, which is in conflict with EUT. This suggests that 
Smart Meters could be employed to display the electricity use cost, which would help close the 
EE gap by inducing consumers to purchase more efficient goods. Decreasing salience led to 
higher implicit discount rates among consumers, which indicated that consumer discount rates 
are not static. This warrants careful consideration of how EE-related information is provided 
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to consumers, as this can potentially help close the EE gap. Together, the exercises 
demonstrated that consumers do not display rational behaviour, as understood by EUT, but 
that behavioural biases systematically influence electricity and energy-related decisions in such 
a way that especially the salience of the information provided, i.e. the mental capacity required 
to utilise this information, as well as the frame in which this is presented, impact our decisions. 
• RQ #2: Using insights from behavioural economics, what may be the expected 
energy efficiency improvements on electricity use as a result of Smart Meter 
deployment, particularly in the field of controlled customer feedback? 
The Smart Meter analysis was conducted to test the whether installing a Smart Meter could be 
expected to lead to a reduction in electricity consumption. Due to the structural differences 
between the households, large fluctuations within and between samples were found. It was 
therefore impossible to draw any statistically valid conclusions. To establish this with 
significance, a regression analysis with a larger sample would be needed. The effect found in 
the Smart Meter analysis generally aligned with electricity reductions found in previous 
research on the topic. Taken together, the review and analysis indicate that it is not 
unreasonable to expect a reduction in electricity use in the medium-term (weeks/months) of 
~7%, but the findings suggest that this effect will likely diminish over time. 
The Smart Meter experiment with feedback tested the effect of salience and loss aversion on two 
aspects of electricity consumption: total daily consumption and total standby consumption. It 
was originally planned to conduct an econometric analysis, but due to the lack of conclusive 
statistical power caused by the small sample size, alternative analyses were conducted. It was 
found that loss aversion does seem to have an effect on electricity consumption. In both of 
the analyses testing the effect on daily electricity use, the intervention group had a larger 
reduction than the reference group. This was also the case for both analyses of standby 
consumption, except the effect was much more pronounced here, which indicated that 
increasing salience of standby consumption is an effective way of achieving large electricity 
reductions. These results, coupled with the finding from the exercise on risk preferences, 
indicate that loss aversion indeed trigger behavioural responses, as theorised. However, it must 
be noted that the results are neither statistically robust nor representative for the case area.  
The experiment was conducted in a real-life setting where consumers actually used and paid 
for their electricity. This means that the results have a high external and ecological validity, as 
the experiment took place in the home of the participants, indicating that this effect is likely to 
be found even if implemented in real life, but the low internal validity means that the effect 
found in this case cannot be assumed to be of the same magnitude once scaled to a 
population. It was discussed that if previous large-scale trials give any indication of future 
results, the effect on electricity use in a population of applying a loss aversion frame will likely 
be in the order of 4-6%. However, the reduction in electricity use found in the loss aversion 
experiment was higher than most other studies testing the effect of feedback, and especially 
the reduction in standby consumption was higher. This suggests that there is a need to 
conduct a study similar in design to what was originally intended for this study, i.e. a large-
scale, longitudinal study were effects are determined using regression analysis, in order to 
establish whether these interventions can be said to work over time, and what the effect is 
likely to be. 
• RQ #3: To what extent can research findings support and be utilized in public 
policy design? 
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The research conducted for this thesis has implications for policy-makers, because it highlights 
that information is not just about quantity (i.e. correcting the market failure), but that a policy 
prescribing the delivery of information to consumers need to take into account that how the 
information is presented, framed, and designed affects the impact that this information will have on 
consumer behaviour. The research highlighted that insights from BE could explain why some 
information is more effective than other, and that especially two features from BE, salience 
and loss aversion, seem to affect behaviour. This implies that when designing informative 
policies, there is a need to look beyond the information-deficit model, and view information 
as much in terms of quality as quantity. As the research is based on findings from Denmark, it 
might be of most value to policy-makers finding themselves in similar settings, e.g. 
Scandinavian or perhaps European countries. 
The work conducted here contributed to existing research by showing that behavioural biases 
exist when humans are faced with electricity and energy-related decisions, and that these biases 
affect the decisions we make. It was shown that at least two of these biases; salience and loss 
aversion, can be utilised when providing feedback to consumers using Smart Meters, and that 
this is likely to increase the effectiveness of said feedback. Regarding the scope of this thesis, 
the research does not claim to provide conclusive knowledge on whether the behavioural 
interventions applied will increase the expected energy efficiency improvements on electricity 
use as a result of Smart Meter deployment, but rather that there seems to be a potential to 
increase the effectiveness by applying these insights.  
This thesis provide evidence that Smart Meters do lead to reduced electricity consumption, at 
least in the short to medium term, but that these meters alone are unlikely to lead to the 
sustained behaviour change needed to meet EU policy goals. However, the research also 
indicates that the right combination of behavioural insights, informative policy instruments 
and Smart Meter technologies can lead to significant reductions in energy use, which can 
potentially achieve or even surpass the EU policy target. 
This research is important to utility companies and practitioners working with electricity end-
users, as it demonstrated that behavioural insights represent an opportunity to improve the 
effectiveness of initiatives aiming at energy efficiency improvements from a behavioural 
(demand) point of view. This includes inducing customers to save electricity overall and at 
peak hours (or use it more efficiently), getting end-users to accept dynamic tariff structures, or 
increase the uptake of energy efficiency measures in order to reduce heating, cooling, or other 
energy service demands. 
To researchers, this thesis is important because it highlighted that our knowledge on the effect 
of information on human (economic) behaviour with regards to energy use is still incomplete, 
and it suggested several research gaps that need to be explored. It is hoped that academics will 
continue exploring the effect of some of the behavioural biases pointed out in this work in 
order to establish the likely impact of these on energy-related behaviour. Furthermore, as 
many feedback studies do not include statistical significance of results, this calls for further 
studies to employ regression analysis in order to separate the signal (the effect) from the noise 
(other variables). 
The results generated by academia, hopefully in collaboration with utility companies, as was 
the case with the famous OPOWER experiment, are likely to be very important in furthering 
our understanding of consumer behaviour with regards to electricity use and energy-related 
decisions, and a proactive role by the sector would be conducive to knowledge-generation.  
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Appendices 
6.1 Appendix I – Questionnaires 
6.1.1 Questionnaire 1 
Please indicate your answer to the following questions by ticking the box. The questionnaire 
is anonymous. NB! There are no right answers or wrong answers. A guess is better than no 
answer. 
Question 1: 
Imagine that you have installed a new electronic electricity meter (Smart Meter) in your 
home. With the Smart Meter you have the opportunity to log on to a website and check your 
consumption. You can also choose to have a detailed consumption report sent to on e-mail 
or phone. Which of the following solutions would you choose? 
  Online access to check your consumption (price: 10 DKK per year) 
  Online access to check your consumption as well as a detailed daily, weekly and 
monthly consumption report sent to my email and phone (price: 25 DKK per 
year) 
Question 2: 
Imagine that you are about to buy a new fridge. Which of the following two models would 
you buy? 
   Fridge A   Fridge B 
Price 5.599 DKK (≈€750) 3.805 DKK (≈€507) 
Type Combined fridge & freezer Combined fridge & freezer 
Energy label A+++ A+ 
Energy consumption (kWh/year) 150 274 
Volume fridge/freezer (litre) 215 / 89 215 / 94 
Size (HxWxD) (cm) 186 x 60 x 65 186 x 60 x 65 
 
Question 3: 
Which of the following constitutes the largest monetary cost per year? 
  An electricity consumption of 4,000 kWh per year  
  An electricity bill of 4,000 DKK per year 
  I do not know  
Question 4 
Imagine that you receive an offer for an energy efficiency renovation of your home. Please 
state whether you would accept the following offer (yes/no): 
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a) Would you be willing to spend 1,000 DKK on an energy efficiency investment if you 
could save 250 DKK on your yearly heat and electricity bill?    Yes         No 
b) Would you be willing to spend 3,000 DKK on an energy efficiency investment if you 
could save 500 DKK on your yearly heat and electricity bill?        Yes          No 
Question 5: 
If an energy saving device with a long life time could be bought and installed in your home 
for 500 DKK, how large would your yearly saving on your electricity bill have to be before 
you would be willing to install such a device? (please state an amount in DKK): 
      _____________________________ 
Question 6: 
Imagine that you have installed a heat pump in your home. The pump costs 600 DKK per 
year in electricity consumption. Your electrician says that he can installed one of the 
following two devices, which would cut the electricity consumption. Which of the following 
two devices would you choose?  
  Device A guarantees a saving of 200 DKK per year. 
  Device B has 1/3 probability that you can save 600 DKK and 2/3 probability 
that you will not save anything at all (0 DKK) 
Question 7: 
Imagine that you have an opportunity to participate in an experiment at your utility company 
where you will pay variable prices for your electricity depending on when you use the 
electricity. The utility company believes that you can save about 5% on your electricity bill 
compared to the normal plan, but they cannot guarantee anything. You have the option to 
call your utility company and tell them that you wish to participate. Choose one of the 
following two: 
  I would like to keep my current plan. 
  I would like to call the utility company, so I can be moved to the new 
experimental plan.  
Final questions: 
Gender:          Male          Female 
 
Age:      _________________________ 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! J 
6.1.2 Questionnaire 2 
Please indicate your answer to the following questions by ticking the box. The questionnaire 
is anonymous. NB! There are no right answers or wrong answers. A guess is better than no 
answer. 
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Question 1: 
Imagine that you have installed a new electronic electricity meter (Smart Meter) in your 
home. With the Smart Meter you have the opportunity to log on to a website and check your 
consumption. You can also choose to have a detailed consumption report sent to on e-mail 
or phone. Which of the following solutions would you choose? 
  Online access to check your consumption (price: 10 DKK per year) 
  Detailed daily, weekly and monthly consumption report sent to my email and 
phone (price: 25 DKK per year) 
  Online access to check your consumption as well as a detailed daily, weekly and 
monthly consumption report sent to my email and phone (price: 25 DKK per 
year) 
Question 2: 
Imagine that you are about to buy a new fridge. Which of the following two models would 
you buy? 
   Fridge A   Fridge B 
Price 5,599 DKK (≈€750) 3.805 DKK (≈€507) 
Expected electricity costs over lifetime (12 years) 3,960 DKK (≈€530) 7,234 DKK (≈€965) 
Type Combined fridge & freezer Combined fridge & freezer 
Energy label A+++ A+ 
Energy consumption (kWh/year) 150 274 
Volume fridge/freezer (litre) 215 / 89 215 / 94 
Size (HxWxD) (cm) 186 x 60 x 65 186 x 60 x 65 
         
Question 3: 
Which of the following constitutes the largest monetary cost per year? 
  An electricity bill of 4,000 DKK per year 
  An electricity consumption of 330 kWh per month  
  I do not know  
Question 4: 
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Imagine that you receive an offer for an energy efficiency renovation of your home. Please 
state whether you would accept the following offer (yes/no): 
a) Would you be willing to spend 10,000 DKK on an energy efficiency investment if 
you could save 2,500 DKK on your yearly heat and electricity bill?    Yes         No 
b) Would you be willing to spend 30,000 DKK on an energy efficiency investment if 
you could save 5,000 DKK on your yearly heat and electricity bill?   Yes          No 
 
Question 5: 
If an energy saving device with a long life time could be bought and installed in your home 
for 500 DKK, how large would your yearly saving on your electricity bill have to be before 
you would be willing to install such a device? (please state an amount in DKK):_________ 
      _____________________________ 
Question 6: 
Imagine that you have installed a heat pump in your home. The pump costs 600 DKK per 
year in electricity consumption. Your electrician says that he can installed one of the 
following two devices, which would cut the electricity consumption. Which of the following 
two devices would you choose?  
  Device A guarantees that your cost for the pump would be 400 DKK per year. 
  Device B has 1/3 probability that your cost would be 0 DKK per year and 2/3 
probability that your cost will be 600 DKK per year 
Question 7: 
Imagine that you have been moved to a new electricity plan by your utility company where 
you will pay variable prices for your electricity depending on when you use the electricity. 
The utility company believes that you can save about 5% on your electricity bill compared to 
the normal plan that you previously had, but they cannot guarantee anything. You have the 
option to call your utility company and tell them that you wish to be moved to your old plan. 
Choose one of the following two: 
  I would like to keep my new plan. 
  I would like to call the utility company, so I can be moved back to the normal 
plan.  
Final questions: 
Gender:          Male          Female 
Age:      _________________________ 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! J 
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6.2 Appendix II – Chi-square (X2) goodness-of-fit test 
Chi-square is a method to determine if a significant difference exists between a set of 
observed frequencies and the corresponding expected frequencies. 
The null hypothesis (H0) states that the population from which the sample has been drawn 
fits an expected frequency distribution, i.e. H0 assumes no difference between observed and 
expected frequency counts. 
Conversely, the alternative hypothesis (HA) states that there is a significant difference 
between observed and expected frequencies. 
The formula for the chi-square test is: 
𝑥! = (𝑂! − 𝐸!)!𝐸!!!!!  
where, 
Oi = observed frequency count in the i
th category 
Ei = expected frequency count in the i
th category 
k = number of nominal or ordinal categories 
If the calculated value is greater than critical value under the given degrees of freedom, the 
null hypothesis (H0) is rejected, meaning that there is a significant difference between the 
observed and the expected values. The degrees of freedom is calculated as: 
(df) = n-1, 
where n is the number of classes 
Upper-tail critical values of chi-square distribution with v degrees of freedom: 
Degrees of freedom (v) Level of significance 
95% 99% 
1 3.841 6.635 
2 5.991 9.210 
3 7.815 11.345 
4 9.488 13.277 
 
(after McGrew & Monroe, 2000, p. 155). 
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6.3 Appendix III – Letter to Participants in Smart Meter Loss 
Aversion experiment  
 
Spørgeskema til beboerne i Grøndalsvænge i forbindelse med opsætning af 
elektroniske elmålere fra NorthQ 
København, 26 Maj 2014 
Kære beboere i Grøndalsvænge Andelsforening 
I forbindelse med opsætningen af såkaldte Power Readers (elektroniske el-målere) fra 
NorthQ, vil der blive foretaget et forsøg, der skal forbedre effekten af disse målere. For at 
kunne foretage dette forsøg har vi brug for Jeres tilsagn, samt information om de enkelte 
husstande. 
Ønsker I at deltage i dette forsøg, bedes vedlagte spørgeskema udfyldes. Heri bedes du/I 
angive husstandens størrelse, elforbrug, og enkelte andre parametre. Jo mere detaljeret og 
korrekt spørgeskemaet udfyldes, des bedre bliver resultaterne, der kan indhentes. Da disse 
resultater bruges til at forbedre funktionaliteten af den nye elmåler er det vigtigt at 
spørgeskemaet udfyldes korrekt og efter bedste evne. 
Har du spørgsmål angående spørgeskemaet er du velkommen til at kontakte Simon Bager. 
 
Med venlig hilsen 
Christian von Scholten, NorthQ 
Steen Hartvig, Rubrik 
Hans Gyum Larsen, IT-energy 
Simon Bager, Lunds Universitet (simonbager@gmail.com) 
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Spørgeskema i forbindelse med opsætning af elektroniske elmålere fra NorthQ 
Navn: 
Adresse: 
Postnummer og by: 
Spørgsmål Svar Eventuelle 
kommentarer 
Angiv engangskode (PIN-kode) vedlagt Power 
Reader pakken (8 cifret kode) 
 
Kode:__________________ 
 
Elforbrug i foregående år 
Angiv venligst husstandens elforbrug (årsbasis) 
for de tre foregående år i antal kilowatttimer 
(angives i antal kWh à xxxx kWh). 
 
2011:___________________ 
 
2012:___________________ 
 
2013:___________________ 
 
Antal beboere i husstanden: 
Hvor mange beboere er der i husstanden? 
 
Antal beboere:____________ 
 
Alder på husstandens beboere 
Hvor gamle er beboerne i husstanden? (Angiv 
alder på alle beboere) 
Person 1: 
Person 2: 
Person 3: 
Person 4: 
Person 5: 
Person 6: 
 
Husets størrelse 
Angiv husets størrelse (i kvadratmeter) som 
angivet i kontrakt/ejerbevis. 
 
 
   ______________m2 
 
Årlig husstandsindkomst 
Hvor stor er husstandens årlige indkomst? 
(Vælg den af de bokse der kommer nærmest 
husstandens samlede årlige indkomst før skat). 
☐ 0-250.000 DKK 
☐ 251.000-400.000 DKK 
☐ 401.000-600.000 DKK 
☐ +601.000 
☐ Ønsker ikke at oplyse 
 
Antal elektriske eller elektroniske apparater i 
husstanden 
Hvor mange elektroniske og elektriske 
apparater (f.eks. ovn, fjernsyn, mikroovn, 
computer, elkedel, brødrister, kogeplade, 
vaskemaskine, køleskab, kaffemaskine, 
tørretumbler, fryser) findes i husstanden? 
 
☐ 0-9  
☐ 10-19 
☐ 20-29 
☐ 30-39 
☐ 40+ 
(Antal lamper, pærer, 
mv. skal ikke 
medregnes) 
Opholdstid i hjemmet 
Hvor mange timer i døgnet opholder husets 
beboere sig i hjemmet? (Angiv antal timer 
beboerne er i hjemmet i de tre intervaller) 
 
kl. 07-15:_____________ 
kl. 15-23:_____________ 
kl. 23-07:_____________ 
 
Miljøbevidsthed 
Anser du/I husstandens beboere som værende 
miljøbevidste? 
 
☐ Ja 
☐ Nej 
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6.4 Appendix IV – Statistical tests from knowledge exercise (#3) 
 
Results from chi-squared tests: 
Experiment 3 – Knowledge (all) 
Observed Version 1 Version 2 Total 
DKK 16 27 43 
kWh 78 69 147 
Don't know 36 48 84 
Total 130 144 274 
Expected Version 1 Version 2 Total 
DKK 20.40145985 22.59854015 43 
kWh 69.74452555 77.25547445 147 
Don't know 39.8540146 44.1459854 84 
Total 130 144 274 
Squares 0.9495815 0.857261076  
 0.977178609 0.882175133  
 0.372695917 0.336461592  
Sum 4.375353827 p-value 0.112177043 
No significant difference between version 1 & 2 at 95% confidence interval 
 
Experiment 3 – Knowledge: Difference between old and young participants 
Observed Young Old Total 
DKK 14 29 43 
kWh 39 106 145 
Don't know 29 54 83 
Total 82 189 271 
Expected Young Old Total 
DKK 13.01107 29.98892989 43 
kWh 43.87454 101.1254613 145 
Don't know 25.11439 57.88560886 83 
Total 82 189 271 
Squares 0.075165403 0.032611445  
 0.541569864 0.234966819  
 0.601167518 0.260824002  
Sum 1.746305051 p-value 0.417632874 
No significant difference between version 1 & 2 at 95% confidence interval 
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Experiment 3 – Knowledge (men)  
Observed Version 1 Version 2 Total 
DKK 7 24 31 
kWh 57 55 112 
Don't know 15 23 38 
Total 79 102 181 
Expected Version 1 Version 2 Total 
DKK 13.53038674 17.46961326 31 
kWh 48.8839779 63.1160221 112 
Don't know 16.58563536 21.41436464 38 
Total 79 102 181 
Squares 3.151864895 2.441150262  
 1.347472476 1.043630643  
 0.151591388 0.117409017  
Sum 8.25311868 p-value 0.01613831 
Significant difference between version 1 & 2 at 95% confidence interval 
 
Experiment 3 – Knowledge (women)  
Observed Version 1 Version 2 Total 
DKK 9 3 12 
kWh 21 14 35 
Don't know 21 24 45 
Total 51 41 92 
Expected Version 1 Version 2 Total 
DKK 6.652173913 5.347826087 12 
kWh 19.40217391 15.59782609 35 
Don't know 24.94565217 20.05434783 45 
Total 51 41 92 
Squares 0.828644501 1.030752916  
 0.131585678 0.163679745  
 0.624083546 0.776299046  
Sum 3.555045433 p-value 0.16905643 
No significant difference between X & Y at 90% confidence interval 
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6.5 Appendix V – Results from salience exercise (#2): 
Exercise 2 – Purchase of refrigerator (all participants) 
Observed Version 1 Version 2 Total 
Fridge A (efficient fridge) 112 138 250 
Fridge B (average fridge) 19 7 26 
Total 131 145 276 
Expected Version 1 Version 2 Total 
Fridge A (efficient fridge) 118.6594203 131.3405797 250 
Fridge B (average fridge) 12.34057971 13.65942029 26 
Total 131 145 276 
Squares 0.373740901 0.337655572  
 3.593662505 3.246688194  
Sum 7.551747172 p-value 0.005995192 
Significant at 99% confidence level 
 
Exercise 2 – Purchase of refrigerator (all women) 
Observed Version 1 Version 2 Total 
Fridge A (efficient fridge) 46 38 84 
Fridge B (average fridge) 5 3 8 
Total 51 41 92 
Expected Version 1 Version 2 Total 
Fridge A (efficient fridge) 46.56521739 37.43478261 84 
Fridge B (average fridge) 4.434782609 3.565217391 8 
Total 51 41 92 
Squares 0.006860715 0.00853406  
 0.072037511 0.089607635  
Sum 0.177039922 p-value 0.673929524 
Not significant 
 
Exercise 2 – Purchase of refrigerator (all men) 
Observed Version 1 Version 2 Total 
Fridge A (efficient fridge) 66 98 164 
Fridge B (average fridge) 14 4 18 
Total 80 102 182 
Expected Version 1 Version 2 Total 
Fridge A (efficient fridge) 72.08791209 91.91208791 164 
Fridge B (average fridge) 7.912087912 10.08791209 18 
Total 80 102 182 
Squares 0.5141316 0.403240471  
 4.684310134 3.673968733  
Sum 9.275650938 p-value 0.002322201 
Significant at 99% confidence level 
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6.6 Appendix VI – Results from energy-use awareness exercise 
 
Results: 
 Me Danes 
Mean (m) 5.828125 5.046875 
Standard deviation (SD) 2.020173555 1.798411279 
Count (n) 64 67 
Median (M) 6 5 
 
t-test: 
f-test 0.351476386 homoscedatic (f-test > 0.05) 
t-test (two-tailed) 0.028697343 p-value < 0.05 
 Significant difference 
 
Answers: 
Awareness (scale 1-10) Me Danes 
1 1 0 
2 3 6 
3 4 5 
4 11 12 
5 10 23 
6 4 8 
7 16 5 
8 11 4 
9 4 4 
10 0 0 
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6.7 Appendix VII – Results from risk aversion exercise (#6) 
 
Results of chi-squared test: 
Experiment 6 – Risk aversion (all) 
Observed Gain frame (Q1) Loss frame (Q2) Total 
Risk averse (A) 114 100 214 
Risk seeking (B) 14 39 53 
Total 128 139 267 
Expected Gain frame (Q1) Loss frame (Q2) Total 
Risk averse (A) 102.5917603 111.4082397 214 
Risk seeking (B) 25.4082397 27.5917603 53 
Total 128 139 267 
Squares 1.268600253 1.168207427  
 5.122272719 4.716913008  
Sum 12.27599341 p-value 0.000458822 
Significant at 99.9% confidence level 
 
Experiment 6 – Risk aversion (women) 
Observed Gain frame (Q1) Loss frame (Q2) Total 
Risk averse (A) 48 26 74 
Risk seeking (B) 3 12 15 
Total 51 38 89 
Expected Gain frame (Q1) Loss frame (Q2) Total 
Risk averse (A) 42.40449438 31.59550562 74 
Risk seeking (B) 8.595505618 6.404494382 15 
Total 51 38 89 
Squares 0.738357657 0.990953698  
 3.642564442 4.888704908  
Sum 10.2605807 p-value 0.001359029 
Significant at 99% confidence level 
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Experiment 6 – Risk aversion (men) 
Observed Gain frame (Q1) Loss frame (Q2) Total 
Risk averse (A) 66 74 140 
Risk seeking (B) 11 27 38 
Total 77 101 178 
Expected Gain frame (Q1) Loss frame (Q2) Total 
Risk averse (A) 60.56179775 79.43820225 140 
Risk seeking (B) 16.43820225 21.56179775 38 
Total 77 101 178 
Squares 0.488328365 0.372289942  
 1.799104503 1.371594522  
Sum 4.031317332 p-value 0.044663053 
Significant difference at 95%-confidence level 
 
Experiment 6 – Risk aversion (version one – gain framing) 
Observed Men Women Total 
Risk averse (A) 66 48 114 
Risk seeking (B) 11 3 14 
Total 77 51 128 
Expected Men Women Total 
Risk averse (A) 68.578125 45.421875 114 
Risk seeking (B) 8.421875 5.578125 14 
Total 77 51 128 
Squares 0.096921992 0.146333204  
 0.789221939 1.191570378  
Sum 2.224047514 p-value 0.13587643 
Not significant at 95% 
 
Experiment 6 – Risk aversion (version two – loss framing) 
Observed Men Women Total 
Risk averse (A) 74 26 100 
Risk seeking (B) 27 12 39 
Total 101 38 139 
Expected Men Women Total 
Risk averse (A) 72.6618705 27.3381295 100 
Risk seeking (B) 28.3381295 10.6618705 39 
Total 101 38 139 
Squares 0.024642781 0.065497917  
 0.063186617 0.167943378  
Sum 0.321270694 p-value 0.570845003 
No significant difference between the two genders 
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6.8 Appendix VIII – Results from Smart Meter consumption data 
 
Including the two observations discarded earlier changes the result to plus 10%(±83%, 
n=49). As can be seen from the figure below, the deviations from the two meter readings 
excluded are very large and distorts the overall signal. 
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6.9 Appendix IX – Results from Loss Aversion and Smart Meter 
experiment  
 
Data series for daily consumption 
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Data series for nightly consumption 
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6.10 Appendix X – Smart Meter feedback studies included in literature 
review 
 
Author Description of intervention 
 
* Average change in electricity consumption 
(in percentage) (from feedback) 
** Intervention period, days 
Type 
of 
feedb
ack 
* Sample 
size 
Durati
on 
** 
McClella
nd & 
Cook 
(1979) in 
Abrhams
e et al 
(2005) 
Households continuous feedback over a period 
of 11 months about monetary costs of 
electricity use by means of a monitor displaying 
electricity use in cents per hour. On average, 
households who had a monitor installed in their 
homes used 12% less electricity than a control 
group  
Mont
hly 
-12.0%  11 
months 
330 
Bittle et 
al (1979) 
in 
Abraham
se et al 
(2005) 
Households were assigned to either a daily 
feedback group or a control group. The 
feedback group saved an average of 4% on their 
electricity use (compared to baseline 
consumption), and also saved more than the 
control group.  
Daily -4.0% 30 
househ
olds 
42 days 42 
Katzev et 
al (1981) 
after 
Abraham
se et al 
(2005). 
Households were given either daily feedback 
about electricity use (kWh, cost and compared 
to other households), feedback every third day 
(kWh, cost, and compared to others), or 
noncontingent (viz., regardless of whether 
households had actually saved electricity or not) 
feedback (kWh and cost). No significant group 
differences in electricity use were found, 
possibly due to a low number of respondents in 
each experimental group. 
Daily 0.0% 44 4 weeks 28 
Winett et 
al (1979) 
in 
Abraham
se et al 
(2005) 
Households were given information about how 
to conserve and they were asked to choose an 
energy conservation goal. Results show that 
households who had received daily feedback 
used 13% less electricity, and households who 
were taught to read their outdoor meters (self- 
monitoring) used 7% less electricity than did a 
control group. The effect was still present 
during a follow-up measurement.  
Daily -13.0% 71 1 
month 
30 
Seligman 
and 
Darley 
(1977) in 
Abraham
se et al 
(2005) 
All participating households were told that air 
conditioners were the largest users of electricity 
in homes. Half of them received feedback about 
electricity savings (four times a week during one 
month), while the other half did not receive any 
feedback. Households in the feedback group 
used 10.5% less electricity than the control 
group did. There was no follow-up 
measurement to determine whether the effect 
was maintained.  
Weekl
y 
-10.5% 40 1 
month 
30 
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Hayes & 
Cone 
(1981) in 
Abraham
se et al 
(2005) 
The effect of monthly feedback on electricity 
use, both in terms of kWh as well as in terms of 
money was examined. Households who had 
received feedback reduced electricity use by 
4.7%, while households in the control group 
increased electricity use by 2.3%.  
Mont
hly 
-4.7% 40 4 
months 
120 
Midden 
et al. 
(1983) in 
Abraham
se et al 
(2005) 
The effectiveness of comparative feedback, 
individual feedback, monetary rewards and 
information was tested. The comparative 
feedback consisted of a comparison with 
consumption levels of households in similar 
settings. For individual feedback and 
information, the savings were 18,8% for 
electricity. 
Weekl
y 
-18.8% 91 12 
weeks 
84 
Matsuka
wa 
(2004) 
Matsukawa (2004) finds that 113 Japanese 
households, who had feedback provided by a 
continuous display installed in the residence and 
giving information about consumption, were 
observed with a level of electricity consumption 
that was 1.5 % lower than that of a control 
group  
? -1.5% 319 
househ
olds 
(113 
referenc
e and 
206 
control) 
 68 
Gleerup 
et al 
(2009) 
The effect of feedback by text message and 
email sent out at a daily frequency. The 
experiment ran for an entire year. Email and 
SMS messaging that communicated timely 
information about a household's 'exceptional' 
consumption periods (e.g. highest week of 
electricity use in past quarter) produced average 
reductions in total annual electricity use of 
about 3%. 
Daily -3.0% Control 
(205, 
189), 
test 
(333, 
325, 
345) 
1 year 365 
Dobson 
& Griffin 
(1992) in 
Fischer 
(2008) 
Field experiment. Continuous feedback on 
consumption and cost, broken down to various 
appliances and time intervals. Measurement of 
consumption. 12.9% less consumption than 
control groups  
Daily -12.9% 100 
househ
olds (25 
test, 75 
control) 
60 days 60 
Haakana 
et al 
(1997) in 
Fischer 
(2008) 
Field experiment. Various combinations of 
monthly feedback (written or video) and advice. 
Questionnaire on satisfaction and conservation 
activities, calculation of savings from the 
activities. Average reduction in first half of 
feedback period: “feedback plus video 
information” group: 21%, “feedback plus 
written information” group: 19%, “feedback 
only” group: 17%, control group: 14%  
Mont
hly 
-3.0%  17 
months 
510 
Mack 
and 
Hallman
n (2004) 
in 
Fischer 
(2008). 
30 households in German neighborhood. Field 
experiment. Weekly written feedback. Meter 
readings, interviews. Baseline interval: average 
of 6 measurements during 3 months before 
treatment (temperature corrected). Control 
group 4 weekly measurements during 
intervention, 30 measurements over 10 months 
after treatment, divided in 5 intervals with 6 
measurements each. Reduction during treatment 
period that can be attributed to the treatment: 
2.9%.  
Weekl
y 
-2.9% 30 
househ
olds 
(19 
experim
ental 
group, 
10 
control 
group) 
 1 
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Ueno et 
al (2005) 
in 
Fischer 
(2008) 
Computerized interactive tool with daily 
feedback on consumption and cost; breakdown. 
Electricity consumption measurement, 
monitoring of feedback tool usage, 
questionnaire. electricity consumption reduced 
by 17.8% (control group 4.7%). 
Daily -13.1% 19 
househ
olds 
4 weeks 28 
Schleich 
et al 
(2013) 
The effects of providing feedback on electricity 
consumption in a field trial involving more than 
1500 households in Linz, Austria. About half of 
these households received feedback together 
with information about electricity-saving 
measures (pilot group), while the remaining 
households served as a control group. 
Participation in the pilot group was random, but 
households were able to choose between two 
types of feedback: access to a web portal or 
written feedback by post.  
Daily 
(web 
based
), 
Mont
hly 
(writt
en) 
-4.5% 1525 
househ
olds 
775 
(pilot 
group) 
750 
(control 
group).  
11 
months 
330 
Gaskell, 
Ellis and 
Pike 
(1982) in 
Darby 
(2006) 
Feedback type: Meter readings. weekly visits, 
daily diaries. 9% from feedback, 11% from 
feedback + information 
Weekl
y 
-9.0% 160 
househ
olds 
4 weeks 28 
Winett et 
al (1982) 
in Darby 
(2006) 
Daily, plus weekly visits from experimenters. 3-
week baseline + 5- week intervention, winter 
and summer. 15% against controls for feedback 
and/or video message.  
Daily -15.0% 85 
winter, 
53 
summer 
3 weeks 
baseline
, 5 
weeks 
interve
ntion 
35 
Nielsen 
(1993) in 
Darby 
(2006). 
Feedback: meter reading, written information. 
Flats. 1% (flats), 10% (houses)  
Unkn
own 
-1.0% app. 
1500 
househ
olds 
3 years 109
5 
 Same as above, but for houses. Unkn
own 
-10.0% app. 
1500 
househ
olds 
3 years 109
5 
Mountai
n (2006) 
in Darby 
(2006) 
Portable monitor with instantaneous feedback, 
consumption in kWh, $ and CO2, per hour, in 
total and predicted. 6.5% against baseline 
(adjusted for weather, appliances, 
demographics). Response was persistent across 
the study period. 
Daily 
(hourl
y) 
-6.5% 505 
(test), 
52 
(control
) 
2.5-year 
study.  
912.
5 
Arvola et 
al (1994) 
in Darby 
(2006). 
Bills every 36 days; in the 2nd year, historic 
feedback was added to the bills. 3% against 
controls for feedback; 5% for feedback+ advice 
tips  
Mont
hly 
-3.0% 525 
(test), 
175 
(control
) 
 700 
Wilhite 
and Ling 
(1995) 
6 bills/year based on meter readings, with 
simplified text and a graphic showing each 
period compared with the previous year, 
temperature-corrected. 10% against control 
group 
Mont
hly 
(every 
2nd 
mont
h) 
-10.0% 209 
(feedba
ck); 211 
(feedba
ck+tips
), 675 
(control
) 
3 years 109
5 
Simon Bager, IIIEE, Lund University 
104 
Hydro 
One 
Network
s of 
Ontario, 
Canada 
in 
Faruqui 
(2010b) 
Real-time feedback on residential electricity. 
Over 400 participants. Consumption patterns 
were tracked for a period of over 2.5 years. 
During this time, the treatment period lasted 
approximately 12 months. Comparing IHD and 
control group customers in pre-treatment and 
treatment periods, real-time feedback from IHD 
reduced electricity consumption on average by 
6.5% across the whole sample. The impacts for 
individual non-electric heating households 
ranged from 5.1% to 16.7%. 
Daily 
(hourl
y) 
-6.5% 382 
(test) 
and 42 
(control
) 
2,5 
years, 
12 
month 
treatme
nt 
365 
Abraham
se et al. 
(2007) 
In this multidisciplinary study, an Internet-based 
tool was used to encourage households (n=189) 
to reduce energy use. A combination of tailored 
information, goal setting (5%), and tailored 
feedback was used. After 5 months, households 
exposed to the combination of interventions 
saved 5.1%, while households in the control 
group used 0.7% more energy.  
Mont
hly 
5.7%  189 
group 1 
(feedba
ck)=71, 
group 2 
(feedba
ck+nor
ms)=66
referenc
e group 
=53. 
 
 
